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University of Melbourne Law School Research Series |
Last Updated: 17 August 2010
Australia’s Constitutional Rights and the Problem of Interpretive Disagreement
Adrienne Stone[*]
1. Introduction
The rights found in the Australian Constitution are
regarded as patchy, inconsistently interpreted and, in the case of
‘implied’ rights,
obscure.[1]
The inadequacy of Australia’s constitutional rights is frequently one
plank in an argument for an Australian bill of
rights.[2]
In this article, I subject Australia’s constitutional rights to closer
scrutiny. My point is three-fold. First, I seek to broaden
the understanding of
how rights pervade, or could pervade, Australian constitutional law. Secondly, I
reexamine the critique of Australia’s
constitutional rights. I agree with
the conclusion that Australia’s constitutional rights are especially weak,
but I provide
a more precise articulation of the source of that weakness.
Finally, I briefly consider the implications of this analysis in deciding
whether Australia should adopt a constitutional bill of rights.
I begin, in
Part 2, with a brief review of Australia’s existing constitutional rights.
The analysis extends beyond the express and implied rights
that form the
backbone of Australia’s constitutional rights to less obvious means of
rights protection found in apparently
right-neutral contexts. In this latter
section, I show how the High Court can pursue rights protection through the use
of rights-sensitive
interpretive devices and judicially created rules for the
application of constitutional provisions.
In Part 3, I assess the claim that
Australia’s constitutional rights are an especially weak form of
protecting rights. I will argue that
a system of rights protection that depends
so heavily on the implication of rights, on the incorporation of rights from
extra-constitutional
sources and other judicially created rules of
constitutional law, is inevitably weak. The source of this weakness lies in the
contested
nature of constitutional interpretation itself. Because the methods of
constitutional interpretation on which Australia’s constitutional
rights
rely are themselves contested, many of these rights are subject to an on-going
disagreement as to their very existence. The
doubt that attends the use of these
methods is exacerbated when they are used in the context of a written
constitution that deals
primarily with non-rights concerns and was drafted
without much consideration of rights. Arguments based on constitutional text and
constitutional history will tend to run counter to rights-protective readings of
the Constitution.
In many cases, then, Australia’s constitutional
rights are likely to be accompanied by disagreement about the methods of
constitutional
interpretation on which they rely. Such rights are therefore
peculiarly vulnerable to judicial revision in the short term. Further,
even when
a right obtains a degree of acceptance over time, doubts surrounding its
recognition will adversely affect its development.
I conclude with some brief
reflections on the implications of these conclusions for the Australian bill of
rights debate. It follows
from my analysis in Part 3 that an express bill
of rights in the Australian Constitution would put to rest one important area of
dispute, by providing an unarguable basis for the recognition of constitutional
rights. However,
I suggest that the settling of that interpretive controversy is
not, itself, a reason to adopt a bill of rights, because such a reform
would,
overall, make constitutional adjudication considerably more complex and
uncertain.
2. Rights under the Australian Constitution
A. Express and Implied Rights
The Australian Constitution is usually understood to contain express rights and rights implied from constitutional text and structure. Far more controversially, it has also been suggested that the Constitution contains rights implied from fundamental underlying doctrines.[3] Since these rights have received extensive treatment elsewhere,[4] I will deal with them only briefly before turning to another constitutional method of protecting rights.
(i) ‘Express Rights’
Despite
the absence of a comprehensive bill of rights, a number of provisions in the
Australian Constitution are categorised as ‘express
rights’.[5]
The provisions most often placed in this category are s 116, which in part
prevents the Commonwealth acting to ‘establish’ a religion or to
prohibit its ‘free
exercise’;[6]
s 80, which provides for a jury trial when a Commonwealth offence is tried
on indictment; and s 117, which prevents discrimination based on state
residence.[7]
From a
rights perspective, the High Court’s interpretation of these provisions
has been disappointing. The rights that resemble
traditional civil and political
rights – such as sections 80 and 116 – have been given very narrow
fields of operation,[8]
and criticism of their evisceration is heightened by charges of inconsistency.
Commentators have complained of the Court’s
inconsistent preference for
plain or literal meaning of constitutional text in some cases and for the
framers’ intent in
others.[9] The
narrowness of the Court’s approach to these civil and political rights
also contrasts unfavorably with those sections that
seem to confer
‘economic rights’ (such as s 51(31) and s 92), which have
been given a relatively wide field of
operation.[10]
Though a thoroughgoing reinterpretation of the ‘express rights’
provisions is often
advocated,[11] that
argument has, with one notable exception (the interpretation of
s 117[12]), met
with little success.
(ii) Implied Rights – Text and Structure
A second form of constitutional right in the
Australian Constitution arises from a method of interpretation known as
‘implication from text and structure’. Two well-known kinds of
implied
rights in the Australian Constitution provide illustrations – the
rights implied from representative and responsible government, and the rights
implied from the
separation of judicial power.
The first implication, drawn
from representative and responsible
government,[13] gives
rise to a right of freedom of political communication (a limited kind of free
speech right)[14] and,
perhaps, to rights of freedom of movement and
association.[15]
Although the Court has occasionally been reticent about using the language of
rights to describe the freedom of political
communication,[16] the
protection conferred by the freedom of political communication fits easily
within the concept of a constitutional
right.[17]
Indeed the scope of the implied freedom overlaps with (though may be narrower
than) the protection conferred by express free speech
rights contained in other
constitutions.[18]
A
second set of constitutional rights is implied from the separation of judicial
power.[19] In general
terms, the separation of judicial power requires, first, that the judicial power
of the Commonwealth be exercised only
by the courts identified in s 71 of the
Constitution;[20] and
secondly, that courts established by or under the Constitution only exercise the
judicial power referred to in Ch III of the Constitution (together with
incidental non-judicial
powers).[21]
Those
general principles give rise to a wide range of more specific rules, too complex
to be summarized
here.[22] These rules
can all, in some sense, be understood as protecting individual rights, because
diffusing government power among the three
branches (and particularly separating
judicial power) guards against the possibility of abuse of that
power.[23] The implied
separation of judicial power also gives rise to some rules that resemble rights
commonly found in bills of rights. For
example, because the ajudgment of
criminal guilt is regarded an exclusively judicial
task,[24] the High
Court has recognised that the federal Parliament cannot enact a bill of
attainder.[25] In
addition, the Parliament cannot order detention (at least of a punitive nature)
without the intervention of a
court.[26]
Finally, there is also a requirement that courts act consistently with judicial
process which, though it has not lived up to the
hopes of its most vigorous
interpreters, has led some commentators to speak of a general right to curial
due process.[27]
B. ‘Fundamental’ Implied Rights
The Australian Constitution is sometimes understood
to contain a third set of rights derived from fundamental doctrines that are
said to be assumptions or foundations
on which the Constitution is based. One
form of this argument has it that the common law contains principles that are so
fundamental that they limit parliamentary
sovereignty.[28]
These
rights are much more controversial than the rights implied from text and
structure. Rights derived from fundamental doctrines
or constitutional
assumptions have only ever been recognised by a minority of the
Court[29]
and, in some contexts, they have met with explicit
rejection.[30]
Moreover, there are clear indications that the present High Court disapproves of
this form of reasoning. Recent cases concerning
immigration detention, which
might have lent themselves to arguments based on fundamental common law
rights,[31]
were decided without any reference to the idea. Further, because these rights
are derived with little direct appeal to constitutional
text, their recognition
seems to be precluded by the High Court’s recent insistence that
constitutional implications must have
a firm textual
base.[32]
However, these arguments cannot be entirely neglected in a study of
Australian constitutional rights. The idea that common law notions
might limit
parliamentary sovereignty seems to underlie another argument that still
influences the High Court. This idea is prominent
in the constitutional
understandings of Sir Owen
Dixon[33]
and finds its most famous expression in his judgment in the Communist Party
Case:[34]
[The Australian Constitution] is an instrument framed in accordance with many traditional conceptions, to some of which it gives effect ... others of which are simply assumed. Among these I think that it may fairly be said that the rule of law forms an assumption.
No doubt at least partly due to the personal prestige of Sir Owen Dixon, the
idea that the ‘Rule of Law’ is a limiting
principle in the
Australian Constitution has retained some force, even despite doubts about the
more general limiting power of the common law. It reappeared in the joint
judgment of Justices Gummow and Hayne in Kartinyeri v
Commonwealth,[35]
who suggested that the power in s 51(26) of the Constitution (which confers
legislative power with respect to ‘the people of any race for whom it is
deemed necessary to make special laws’)
might be limited by Dixon’s
idea.[36]
The
precise content of this ‘assumption’ is unclear. The ‘Rule of
Law’ is as complex and contested ideal as
there
is[37]
and its invocation in Australian constitutional law has been infrequent and
sometimes
tentative.[38]
However, it is very likely that interpreting the Constitution to contain such an
assumption would confer protection like that conferred by constitutional rights
in other systems. A procedural
conception of the ideal might impose limitations
like those imposed by ‘due process’
guarantees[39] (thus
overlapping with, or perhaps incorporating, implications drawn from the
separation of judicial power) and by provisions requiring
that limitations on
rights be ‘prescribed by
law’.[40] A
‘substantive’ conception of the rule of law – which is
unlikely though not entirely ruled out on current
authority[41] - could
be even more significant. Requiring law to conform to some set of substantive
moral criteria may entail protection resembling
rights of equality or freedom of
speech.[42].
C. Rights Protection in Rights-Neutral Contexts
So far, I have advanced only the well-understood
point that rights are protected under the Australian Constitution when there is
constitutional language that refers (or is understood to
refer)[43] to a right
and secondly, when some general rights-protecting principle is given
constitutional status (either because it is inferred
from the text or, more
tentatively, because it is considered to be assumed by the Constitution). But
the recognition of express and implied rights does not exhaust the ways in which
rights might enter Australian constitutional
law. First, these methods might
also be combined in quite complex ways. The dissenting justices in Leeth v
The Commonweath, Justices Deane and Toohey, demonstrate the
point.[44] In that
case, their Honours derived a right of ‘equality before the law’
relying both on fundamental principles of common
law[45] and
implications from other features of the
Constitution.[46]
In addition, the High Court has incorporated rights into more discrete
aspects of its interpretation of the Constitution. The Court has sometimes
identified limitations that reflect a concern for rights in the course of
deciding the extent of a particular
power. In this way, considerations of rights
may become relevant in what appear to be ‘right-neutral’ contexts.
To make this point, I need to make a few preliminary points about
constitutional adjudication. Grants of legislative power (like many
constitutional provisions) are usually expressed in general terms. Take, by way
of illustration, the Commonwealth’s power with
respect to ‘trade and
commerce among the
states’[47] and
its power with respect to ‘external
affairs’[48]. In
the context of individual cases, the courts are faced with very specific
questions: Can the Commonwealth Parliament use its power
over ‘trade and
commerce among the States’ to enact a law requiring that interstate
traders obtain Ministerial approval
before exporting a certain
good?[49] Can the
Commonwealth Parliament use its power over ‘external affairs’ to
enact a law that implements obligations assumed
under such a
treaty?[50]
One
task for a court, therefore, is to transform the Constitution’s general
commands into rules that are capable of resolving specific disputes. To do this,
the courts develop a body of rules
or doctrines best known, at least in the
Australian constitutional context, as ‘tests’ of
application.[51]
Because judges have considerable latitude in the way they formulate these tests
they may develop tests that allow them to take a
rights-protective
stance.
The rights-protecting potential of these tests is demonstrated by
Davis v
Commonwealth[52]
and by the judgments of Chief Justice Mason and Justice McHugh in Nationwide
News v Wills.[53]
In these cases, Commonwealth legislative
powers[54] were held
to be subject to limitations that prevented the Commonwealth from circumscribing
freedom of expression. In Davis, the Court invalidated restrictions on
the use of certain expressions (including the use of ‘200 years’ in
conjunction
with the ‘1988’, ‘1988’ or ‘88’)
that were imposed as part of the national commemoration of 200
years of white
settlement in
Australia.[55] In
Nationwide News, some judges used a similar technique to invalidate a
law[56] that
prohibited criticism ‘calculated ... to bring a member of the [Industrial
Relations] Commission into
disrepute.’[57]
These
cases are usually taken to illustrate the application, in the constitutional
sphere, of a traditional principle of statutory
interpretation – the
principle that requires judges to construe statutes to override traditional
common law rights only where
there is a clear statutory intent to do
so.[58]
The constitutional corollary is that Commonwealth legislative powers should not
be interpreted to authorize legislation that overrides
traditional common law
rights unless the power can clearly be interpreted to do so. This view of
Davis and Nationwide News is essentially correct but, on closer
inspection, these cases also illustrate the importance, and the
rights-protecting potential,
of a particular kind of ‘test of
application’ (proportionality) that drew attention to the effect of the
law on rights.
For much of its history, the High Court has employed rather
deferential tests of application in the interpretation of grants of legislative
power. For example, when interpreting incidental
powers,[59] the Court
showed a high level of deference to the means employed by the Parliament to
pursue ends within its
power.[60] But for a
period in the 1990s, the Court sometimes used a test of
‘proportionality’[61]
to apply closer scrutiny to Commonwealth legislation. Under this test, the Court
considered whether alternative, less restrictive
means could have been used and
whether the end pursued by that law was worth the restriction
imposed.[61]
In Nationwide News and Davis, the proportionality test drew
attention to the adverse consequences of the law − the effect on freedom
of expression.[62] In
Davis, Chief Justice Mason and Justices Deane and Gaudron described the
law in question as ‘grossly disproportionate to the need
to protect the
commemoration [of the Bicentenary of European
Settlement]’.[63]
The language of ‘proportionality’ was also employed Nationwide
News to similar
effect.[64]
Thus,
these cases demonstrate that rights-promotion need not be pursued only through
doctrines understood as ‘constitutional
rights’. Even when
considering the apparently technical question of whether a law was ‘with
respect to’ a nominated
head of power, the Court had latitude to
incorporate rights concerns through closer scrutiny of the means chosen by
Parliament to
pursue a nominated end. Similar choices arise when framing the
test for determining whether a Commonwealth law is contrary to a limitation
on
power (express or implied), such as the implied freedom of political
communication. There is a continuing discussion of the proper
test for the
application of the freedom of political
communication,[65]
including discussion of the appropriate level of deference (if any) that courts
should give to legislative
judgments.[66] A test
that is less deferential to legislative judgment will tend to give more
protection to
rights.[67]
3. Existing Constitutional Rights and An Australian Bill of Rights
I have so far sought to illustrate how the Australian Constitution has been interpreted to protect rights and the criticism of the High Court’s approach to interpretation. In the next part of this article, I will identify why the Australian Constitution has proved to be an especially weak mechanism for the protection of rights.
A. The Potential Power of Non-Express Rights
To make that argument, I will first address a
possible suggestion to the contrary. It might be argued that Australia’s
current
system of constitutional rights is an especially powerful method
for the protection of rights. Certainly some commentators have considered the
existing express and implied rights to be at
least functionally equivalent to a
bill of rights. Following the early decisions recognising the freedom of
political communication,
Michael Detmold optimistically heralded the arrival of
‘The New Constitutional Law’, stating ‘we now have everything
a written bill of rights could give
us’.[68]
The argument could perhaps be taken even further. Those who fear that
articulating rights in textual form would undesirably limit
rights,[69] or
encourage technical legal argument about the meaning of text over substantive
consideration of
values,[70] might
prefer a system in which rights are implied from constitutional structures or
fundamental assumptions. After all, the point
of these structural methods of
interpretation is that they focus our attention on the nature of the
Constitution and the institutions it
creates.[71]
Viewed in that light, the interpretive methods just discussed can be viewed
as instances of a potentially broader
phenomenon.[72] The
method of implication might give rise to a broad range of rights implied from
various constitutional structures or perhaps even
the nature and existence of
the Constitution
itself.[73] The
reference to common law rights in Nationwide News and Davis might
find analogous applications in the use of international
law[74]
or perhaps even by reference to developments in statute
law.[75] Judges may
also respond to uncertainty in constitutional meaning by incorporating their own
conception of the appropriate protection
of rights or by their assessment of
community values.[76]
Detmold’s declaration was, to be fair, intended as a statement of
constitutional theory rather than as a prediction of the direction
that the High
Court would take.[77]
However, its failure as a matter of prediction points to a deeper problem - the
problem of interpretive disagreement. Most of the
methods of constitutional
interpretation on which Australian constitutional rights rely are contested,
either generally or in their
specific applications. Disagreement about
constitutional rights thus stems from the highly contested nature of
constitutional interpretation
itself.
Interpretations of the Constitution
will be most secure when an interpretation is clearly supported by one or more
established methods and is not inconsistent with any
of them. Established
methods are textual argument, historical (or originalist) argument, argument
based on precedent, and implications
from constitutional text and structure.
Although there are disagreements about the proper emphasis to be given to these
arguments
in any given case, it is generally agreed that there is some
place in constitutional interpretation for their use. By the same token,
however, readings of the Constitution which rely on controversial modes of
constitutional interpretation or which seem to run contrary to one of the
established modes
will be much less secure. The problem for many of the
Australian constitutional rights is that there is at least one established
form
of constitutional argument (usually one based on constitutional text or
constitutional history) that undermines them.
B. The Problem of Interpretive Disagreement
(i) Reliance on a Contested Method of Constitutional Interpretation
The phenomenon of
interpretive disagreement is most obvious in relation to the implication of
rights based on fundamental doctrines
of the common law or other unexpressed
concepts. For this reason perhaps, the implication of such rights has never been
fully accepted
by the
Court,[78] and the
recognition of rights implied in this manner has only ever sporadic and, except
where supported by long-standing precedent,
remains
tentative.[79]
Reservations about this kind of interpretive method have thus prevented the
realisation of Michael Detmold’s vision of ‘The
New Constitutional
Law’ which would recognise extensive implied rights, and in which the
interpretation of the Constitution more generally would be infused by a
commitment to equality and the rule of law. These reservations have also
prevented the general
acceptance of Justice Kirby’s
anti-originalist[80]
and
internationalist[81]
approach to constitutional
interpretation.[82]
That approach would allow for much greater protection of rights in the
Constitution, because it renders irrelevant the framers’ decision not to
include rights in the Australian
Constitution[83]
and provides a mechanism for the incorporation of the growing international law
of human rights.
(ii) Accepted Method; Contested Application
Constitutional
interpretation is further complicated by disagreements that arise as to the
applications of a given method of interpretation.
Thus, even when a method of
constitutional interpretation is accepted, particular doctrinal developments are
likely to remain disputed.
That phenomenon is best illustrated by reference to
implication of the freedom of political communication. The judgments first
recognising
the freedom of political communication stressed the legitimacy (and
prior use) of the method constitutional
implication.[84]
Nonetheless, the implication of a freedom of political communication was
controversial, largely because it appeared to run contrary
to originalist
arguments as to the intention of the framers and because of doubts as to its
textual
foundation.[85] Even
among those judges who have accepted that some form of implication exists, there
are doubts – inspired by originalist
and textualist concerns – about
some of its applications. In particular, its application to the common law of
defamation in
Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times was almost
immediately subject to
doubt[86] and soon
after revised in Lange v Australian Broadcasting
Corporation.[87]
The weakness that arises from this controversy has now been offset by
the weight of precedent. The existence of the implied freedom
of political
communication was affirmed unanimously - though confined in Lange. By
virtue of the weight accorded to that decision, the existence of the implied
freedom is probably beyond challenge for the moment.
Nonetheless, the
controversy surrounding the doctrine and its insecure textual and historical
foundations may have on-going effects.
The freedom of political communication
still remains the subject of some judicial
opposition,[88] and
there may long be a temptation to revisit the foundational question of the
doctrine’s
legitimacy.[89]
In
addition, it seems that misgivings about the doctrine’s foundation have
had a continuing effect on its content. Doubts about
the doctrine’s
textual basis were answered in Lange with an attempt to confine the
doctrine to the necessary implications from the text and structure of the
Constitution.[90]
However, as I have argued at length
elsewhere,[91] it is
not possible to understand or articulate the extent of the freedom of political
communication without reference to some ideas
or values found outside
constitutional text. By discouraging attention to these values, the High Court
has deprived itself of the
tools it needs to develop the freedom of political
communication in a coherent
manner.[92]
(iii) Text and Context
A common thread in this discussion relates to the
role of constitutional text. Rights implied from text and structure, rights
implied
from constitutional assumptions, and rights-sensitive tests of
application all lack an obvious textual foundation in the Constitution. Reliance
on constitutional text is a particularly powerful form of constitutional
argument, at least where the text is sufficiently
specific to resolve the
question at issue.[93]
Thus without clear textual recognition, rights-protective constitutional
interpretations are vulnerable to later
revision.[94] It is
not surprising therefore to see a judicially created doctrine, like the doctrine
of proportionality, revised and considerably
confined.[95]
But
text alone is also an insecure basis for the recognition of
constitutional rights. Where constitutional text is read without reference to
its
context or its historical understanding, that interpretation is likely to be
vulnerable to revision because aspects of context and
historical understanding
will be advanced as reasons to doubt that interpretation, even if that
interpretation could be reconciled with constitutional text. Consider for
example, the peculiarly open-textured s 92. The injunction that ‘trade,
commerce and intercourse among the States shall be absolutely free’ was
once read as a guarantee
of an individual right to engage in these
activities.[96]
However, that interpretation (at least in so far as it applied to inter-state
trade and commerce) eventually gave way to an interpretation,
informed by the
section’s history, aimed at preserving free trade among the
states.[97]
(iv) Are the express and implied rights really ‘rights’?
The insufficiency of constitutional text, considered
without reference to other sources of constitutional understanding, casts doubt
on whether the so-called express rights are properly regarded
‘rights’ at all. The chief reason for regarding these provisions
as
‘express rights’ is that they appear to resemble rights found in
constitutional bills of rights in other
systems.[98]
However, despite this superficial resemblance, there are some other matters
– some contextual and some historical - that suggest
an opposite
conclusion. For one thing, these provisions are scattered through a document
otherwise concerned with structures of government
and the division of power
between the central and state governments. Their textual manifestation reflects
the place they held in
the framers’ deliberation. At most, rights were an
intermittent concern in a task overwhelmed with the more pressing task of
forming a
federation.[99]
The classification of many constitutional provisions as constitutional
rights may therefore be open to challenge by reference to methods
of
constitutional interpretation that rely on historical meaning. Consider the
protection of religion conferred by s 116 of the Constitution. An interpretation
informed by the history of that provision (and perhaps also the context of the
provision which is placed in a
chapter headed ‘The States’) might
interpret the provision to be aimed only at preserving state independence with
respect
to the regulation of
religion.[100]
On this analysis, s 116 would be devoted to dividing power among the States and
the Commonwealth, like much of the rest of the Constitution.
Section 80
could be similarly reinterpreted. James Stellios has shown how such an argument
could be made in relation to the jury trial requirement
of s 80, which he
characterises as ‘an essential element of [the] federal
structure’.[101]
His argument is that section 80 operates to qualify the power of State
Parliaments over the constitution of state
courts;[102] to
empower a lay panel of a federal court to exercise the judicial power of the
Commonwealth (in the form of jury trials); and to
ensure that in federal
criminal cases, accused persons face a jury drawn from their own state.
Stellios’ argument is important
because it accepts the (undeniable) point
that the reasons given for the current interpretation of s 80 are unconvincing,
but challenges the idea that a ‘rights-promoting’ interpretation
would be the natural replacement.
It remains to be seen whether such arguments
are available with respect to other ‘express rights’, but the
argument serves
as a reminder that, even in this sphere, a rights-promoting
interpretation may not be the only coherent alternative to the current
interpretation.
At base the problem with Australia’s constitutional
rights is that in most cases, there are interpretive arguments that count
against them (as well as some that count in their favour). So, many of
Australian constitutional rights are likely to be mired in
controversy not just
as to their meaning, but also as to their existence. In this sense then they are
particularly weak form of constitutional
rights protection.
4. Conclusion
Like most other commentators on the Australian
Constitution, then, I regard it as a weak institution for the protection of
rights. In this article, I have located the source of that weakness
more
precisely in the interpretive controversy that inevitably attends
rights-protective readings of a constitution that, in textual
and historical
terms, is so inhospitable to rights. Having reached that conclusion I will not,
however, go on to argue for a constitutional
bill of rights. Indeed, I regard
the current state of Australia’s constitutional rights as largely
irrelevant to that question.
That conclusion might not be immediately
obvious. At first glance, my argument could make an Australian bill of rights
seem more attractive.
An express bill of rights would, after all, settle the
interpretive controversy I have just reviewed. An express bill of rights would
provide judges with two good arguments for the existence of constitutional
rights - constitutional text and a clear expression of
‘original’
intention.[103] If
the Australian Constitution contained an explicit right of freedom of
expression, a right of due process or an equality guarantee, there would be no
point to
a debate about whether one should be implied from text and structure or
in some other manner. Similarly, an express guarantee of
a right to a jury trial
would end the attempts to derive such a guarantee from s 80, and an express
freedom of religion (expressed in terms that made it generally applicable) would
render irrelevant the limitation
of s 116 to Commonwealth laws.
The settling
of this interpretive controversy, however, does not make the case for an
Australian bill of rights. Certainty is an important
legal value, but the
adoption of a bill of rights would, if anything, make Australian constitutional
law more complex and uncertain.
The adoption of a bill of rights would settle
interpretive controversy about the existence of rights, but an interpretive
controversy
about the precise meaning of the rights adopted would
remain.[104]
Importantly, that controversy about the meaning of rights would not be
reduced by their recognition in constitutional text. The text
itself will
provide only limited
guidance.[105]
Further, though a court interpreting a bill of rights would have various
interpretive resources (such as international case law and
scholarship on
questions of rights), the guidance such resources could provide is also limited.
In each case, these resources are undermined by the prevalence of
disagreement about the precise meaning of rights concepts. It is
because rights
are the subjects of such disagreement that bills of rights are expressed in
general terms, leaving disputes about
the limits of rights and their competing
conceptions
unresolved.[106]
That same disagreement about rights would be reflected in other interpretive
resources. Consider, for example, the suggestion that
‘[t]he social or
political background to rights created [through a bill of rights formulated with
wide popular involvement]
may ... assist the High Court in its role by giving it
the context necessary to balance rights against other community
interests.’[107]
Although the ‘social and political background’ may illuminate very
general points of agreement (as may the text), it
is difficult to see how it
would yield much information useful in the rather precise process of determining
‘the limits of
a
right’.[108]
And
as a practical matter, a bill of rights would almost certainly expand the realm
of constitutional rights. Therefore, even if (contrary
to my earlier argument) a
bill of rights could achieve greater certainty about the content of, say,
constitutional freedom of expression,
a bill of rights would give rise to many
controversies surrounding rights that currently do not have constitutional
status.
An argument for an Australian bill of rights does, of course,
remain: By resolving interpretive disagreement about the existence of
rights, an
express bill of rights would limit the capacity of a court seriously to
eviscerate or completely eradicate those rights.
However, the weakness of the
existing constitutional rights – including the possibility of their
eradication - is only undesirable
if stronger constitutional rights are
desirable. Thus, we return to that fundamental question: whether constitutional
rights are,
in the final analysis to be preferred to other methods of rights
protection.
[*] Fellow, Research
School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. Thanks are due to
Peter Cane, Graeme Hill, James Stellios
and Amelia Simpson for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts.
[1] For critiques of
the express rights, see Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution,
(4th ed, 1997) 410, Hilary Charlesworth, Writing in Rights (2002)
30-31, George Williams, Human Rights Under the Australian Constitution
(1999) 245, Peter Bailey, Human Rights: Australia in an International Context
(1990). With respect to the ‘implied rights’ see Williams
ibid, 259 and for a detailed critique of the freedom of political
communication see Adrienne Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and
Freedoms:
The Nature of the Freedom of Political Communication’ [2001] MelbULawRw 13; (2001) 25
Melbourne University Law Review 374; ‘Freedom of Political
Communication, the Constitution and the Common Law’ (1998) 26 Federal
Law Review 219; ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and
Structure’ [1999] MelbULawRw 26; (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review
668.
[2] See, for
example, Williams, above n 1, 245, 257,
259; Murray R Wilcox, An Australian Charter of Rights? (1993) 194-209;
230-31.
[3] For a
different, but very helpful, account of the ‘schema’ of
constitutional rights see, George Winterton, ‘Constitutionally
Entrenched
Common Law Rights’ in Charles Sampford and Kim Preston, Interpreting
Constitutions (1996)
121.
[4] See Zines,
above n 1, Chs 15 and 16, Winterton,
above n 3.
[5]
Zines, above n 1, 402-15; Williams, above
n 1, chapters 5 and 6.
[6] In these two
respects s 116 resembles the non-establishment and free exercise clauses of the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Section 116 also prevents the
Commonwealth from ‘imposing any religious observance’ and provides
that ‘no religious test shall
be required as a qualification for any
office or public trust under the Commonwealth’.
[7] The list of
express rights sometimes also includes s 41, which gives those who qualify as
state electors the right to vote in federal elections; s 92, which requires that
interstate trade and commerce be ‘absolutely free’; s 51(xxxi),
which qualifies the Commonwealth power to acquire property with a requirement to
provide ‘just terms’; and s 51(xiiiA), which precludes the
‘civil conscription’ of medical
practitioners.
[8] As
interpreted by the High Court, s 80 does not apply if Parliament provides
that an offence is not to be tried on indictment: R v. Archdall &
Roskruge [1928] HCA 18; (1928) 41 CLR 128. The protection of religion by s 116 is
readily outweighed by other values: See for example, Adelaide Company of
Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth [1943] HCA 12; (1943) 67 CLR 116 (holding that
s 116 did not prohibit laws prohibiting advocacy detrimental to the prosecution
of war by the Commonwealth, even if that advocacy is undertaken
in pursuit of
religious conviction); Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Black v
Commonwealth (DOGS case) [1981] HCA 2; (1981) 146 CLR 559 (allowing government
funding of the educational activities of religious schools). The ‘right to
vote’ in s 41 guarantees a right to vote only to those who qualified to
vote in state elections at the time of federation: R v Pearson; Ex
Part Sipka ([1983] HCA 6; 1983) 152 CLR 254. See generally, Zines above n 1,
402-05.
[9] George
Williams contrasts the interpretation of s 80 (in which the ‘plain
meaning’ of the text has been said to preclude a substantive
interpretation of ‘trial on indictment’)
with the interpretation of
s 41 (where historical material was used to limit the apparent plain meaning).
He concludes ‘[i]t is hard to avoid the conclusion
that until [the High
Court’s judgment in Street v Queensland Bar Association in] 1989
judges of the High Court have selectively used whatever tool was available ...
to construe sections 41, 80, 116 and 117 as empty guarantees”. Williams,
above n 1, 128.
[10] See
generally, Peter Bailey, Human Rights: Australia in an International
Context (1990), 84-86; Williams above n 1, ch
6.
[11] See Bailey,
above n 10, 105; Williams, above n 1, 128,
249-50.
[12] See
Street v Queensland Bar Association [1989] HCA 53; (1989) 168
CLR 461, which transformed s 117 into a real limitation on government that
protects the individual from discrimination based on state
residence.
[13] In
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520, the Court
emphasized that the freedom of political communication is derived from specific
textual provisions implementing certain
institutions of representative and
responsible government rather than general principles. For a critique of that
line of reasoning,
see Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and
Structure’, above n 1.
[14]
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520.
[15] The freedoms
of movement and association have not determined any case but have received some
judicial recognition. Kruger v Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR 1, 91 (Toohey
J); 116 (Gaudron J); 142 (McHugh J), cf 156 (Gummow J holding that there is no
freedom of association for ‘political
cultural and familial
purposes’). See also R v Smithers; Ex parte Benson [1912] HCA 96; (1912) 16 CLR
99, 109-110; Higgins v Commonwealth (1998) 79 FCR 528, 535. On the
constitutional right of freedom of association see, ACTV [1992] HCA 45; (1992) 177 CLR
106, 232 (McHugh J); Kruger [1997] HCA 27; (1997) 190 CLR
1, 91 (Toohey J), 142 (Gaudron J) and Mulholland v Australian Electoral
Commission [2004] HCA 41 (8 September 2004) [113] – [116] (McHugh J);
[148] (Gummow and Hayne JJ with whom Heydon J agreed); [284] – [286]
(Kirby
J) cf [334] – [335] (Callinan
J).
[16]
Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission [2004] HCA 41, [104],
[182].
[17] Albeit
that the implied freedom is a ‘negative’ right (which only prevents
interference), which applies ‘vertically’
(only against government
action). See Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms’ above
n 1.
[18]
On the kinds of communication covered by the freedom of political communication,
see Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms’
above n 1, 378-90; on the level of protection
accorded to that communication, see Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional
Text and Structure’
above n 1.
[19]
For an authoritative account see Zines, above n 1, 161-70,
202-12.
[20] New
South Wales v Commonwealth (Wheat Case) [1915] HCA 17; (1915) 20 CLR 54;
Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia v J W Alexander Ltd
[1918] HCA 56; (1918) 25 CLR
434.
[21] R v
Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia [1956] HCA 10; (1956) 94 CLR 254
affirmed on appeal to the Privy Council in Attorney-General of the
Commonwealth of Australia v The Queen [1957] HCA 12; (1957) 95 CLR
529.
[22] See
Zines, above n 1,
202-12.
[23] Fiona
Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Chapter III and the New High Court’, (2004)
32 Federal Law Review 205. Blackstone stated that public liberty
‘cannot subsist long in any State, unless the administration of common
justice be in some
degree separated both from the legislative and also from the
executive power’: see Huddart, Parker and Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead
[1909] HCA 36; (1909) 8 CLR 330, 381 (Isaacs
J).
[24] Chu
Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27; Nicholas v The
Queen [1998] HCA 9; (1998) 193 CLR 173, 186, 208-09,
220.
[25]
Polyukhovich v Commonwealth [1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501, 536. For comparable
express provisions, see Art I ss 9 and 10 of the Constitution of
the United States (prohibiting Bills of Attainder); Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms s 11 (requiring a trial according to law in a fair an
public hearing by and independent and impartial tribunal); see also s 25 of the
New Zealand Bill of Right Act (1990) and Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human
Rights.
[26]
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27-28. Those
limitations do not, however, preclude the Parliament authorizing indefinite
administrative detention: Al Kateb v Goodwin [2004] HCA 37. Moreover,
conditions of immigration detention are not relevant to the validity of that
detention: Behrooz v Secretary of the Department of Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] HCA 36.
[27] Re Tracey;
Ex Parte Ryan [1989] HCA 12; (1989) 166 CLR 518, 580: the separation of powers gives rise
to ‘the Constitution’s only general guarantee of due process’
(Deane J). See generally, Zines, above n 1, 202-212; Fiona Wheeler, ‘The
Doctrine of Separation of Powers and constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in
Australia [1997] MonashULawRw 18; (1997) 23 Monash University Law Review 248.
[28] A view
defended by TRS Allan, Constitutional Justice (2001). For a critical
appraisal see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Homogenizing Constitutions’
(2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 483.
[29] By Justice
Murphy (see Winterton, above n 3, 131)
and Justices Deane and Toohey (who relied partly on the common law in advancing
their argument that the Constitution contained ‘a general doctrine of
legal equality’). Leeth v Commonwealth (1991) 174 CLR 455,
486.
[30] Durham
Holdings v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399 (rejecting the argument that a
common law principle limited the power of a state parliament so that an statute
of expropriation must
provide for just compensation).
[31] In Behrooz
v Secretary, Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
[2004] HCA 36, a detainee charged with ‘escaping’ from detention
asserted that the conditions in which he had been kept were inhuman
and
degrading. In Al Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37, a stateless Palestinian
who wished to leave Australia but would not be accepted by any other nation
challenged the indefinite nature
of his detention. Neither claim succeeded.
See above n 26 and accompanying text. For
an account of these cases noting the absence of any consideration of fundamental
common law rights, see
The Hon Justice Michael Kirby, ‘The Robin Cooke
Lecture 2004: Deep Lying Rights - A Constitutional Conversation Continues’
available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj_25nov04.html#f107
[32]
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR
520.
[33] See
generally Michael Wait, ‘The Slumbering Sovereign: Sir Owen Dixon’s
Common Law Constitution Revisited’ [2001] FedLawRw 3; (2001) 29 Federal Law Review
57, 67-8.
[34]
Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5; (1951) 83 CLR 1,
193.
[35] [1998] HCA 22; (1998)
195 CLR 337.
[36]
[1998] HCA 22; (1998) 195 CLR 337, 381. Recently, the Court has sought to give some textual
basis for this doctrine. See Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth
(2003) 211 CLR 476, 513 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ):
‘The provision of the constitutional writs and the conferral upon this
Court of an irremovable jurisdiction to issue them to
an officer of the
Commonwealth [in s 75(v)] constitutes a textual reinforcement for what
Dixon J said about the significance of the rule of law for the Constitution
in Australian Communist Party v The
Commonwealth.’
[37]
Richard Fallon, ‘The Rule of Law as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse’ (1997) 97 Columbia Law Review
1.
[38] In
Kartinyeri v Commonwealth [1998] HCA 22; (1998) 195 CLR 337, 381 Justices Gummow and
Hayne say only ‘the occasion has yet to arise for consideration of all
that may follow from Dixon
J's
statement’.
[39]
The rule of law is commonly associated with the idea that law meet certain
procedural requirements that ensure an individual is able
to obey it, and that
it effectively guides the conduct of citizens, that it is reasonably stable,
that legal authority governs the
exercise of political power and that it is
impartially administered by independent courts. Joseph Raz, The Authority of
Law: Essays on Law and Morality (1979), 212-14. A
‘procedural’ interpretation of the Rule of Law would overlap with
the guarantee of curial due process derived
from the separation of judicial
power.
[40]
Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that
‘The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society’. See also European Convention on Human Rights, Articles 10
(2) and 11
(2).
[41] The
judgment of Justices Gummow and Hayne in Kartinyeri v Commonwealth may
even contemplate such an understanding, because they seem to suggest that a law
could possibly infringe the rule of law requirement
because of its content (the
conferral of a racially discriminatory burden). However, there are also
indications that point in the
other direction. In Re Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam, Justices McHugh and
Gummow stated:
In Australia, the observance by decision-makers of the limits within which
they are constrained by the
Constitution and by statutes and subsidiary laws validly made is an aspect
of the rule of law under the Constitution. It may be said that the rule of law
reflects values concerned in general terms with abuse of power by the executive
and legislative
branches of government. But it would be going much further to
give those values an immediate normative operation in applying the
Constitution.
[2003] HCA 6, [72] (12 February 2003); see also Plaintiff S 157/2002 v
The Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, 513 [102]-[104] quoted at above n 36. I am grateful to Graeme Hill for this
point.
[42] Allan,
above n 28.
[43]
The classification of a constitutional provision as a ‘right’ is
sometimes controversial. See below nn 94-95 and accompanying
text.
[44] (1992)
174 CLR 455. I am seeking here to demonstrate possibilities in constitutional
interpretation rather than accepted propositions of
law.
[45]
(1992) 174 CLR 455,
487.
[46] (1992)
174 CLR 455,
486.
[47] Section
51(i).
[48] Section
51 (xxxix).
[49]
Murphyores Incorporated Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1 (holding
that such a law was within the Commonwealth’s power with respect to
‘trade, commerce and intercourse among the
States’).
[50]
See Commonwealth v Tasmania [1983] HCA 21; (1983) 158 CLR
1.
[51] For
extensive scholarly analysis of these and related kinds of rules see, Richard H
Fallon Jr, ‘Supreme Court Foreword: Implementing
the Constitution’
(1997) 111 Harvard Law Review 54, Lawrence G Sager in ‘The
Strategic Space Between Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law’ (1985) 63
Texas Law Review 9959 (1985); Mitchell N Berman ‘Constitutional
Decision Rules’ (2004) 90 Virginia Law Review 2; David Strauss
‘The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules’ (1998) 55 University of
Chicago Law Review
190.
[52]
[1988] HCA 63; (1988) 166 CLR
79.
[53] [1992] HCA 46; (1992) 177
CLR 1.
[54] In
Davis, the so-called ‘implied nationhood’ power; in
Nationwide News v Wills, the conciliation and arbitration power (s
51(35)).
[55]
[1988] HCA 63; (1988) 166 CLR 79, 100 Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ (with whom Wilson, Dawson
and Toohey JJ agreed on this
point)).
[56]
Section 299 (1) (d)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 1988
(Cth).
[57] [1992] HCA 46; (1992)
177 CLR 1, 34 (Mason CJ); see also 102 (McHugh J). Other justices held
that the law was contrary to the implied freedom of political
communication.
[58]
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Constitutional Protection of Rights in Australia’
in Greg Craven (ed) Australian Federation, Towards the Second Century
(1992) 151, 157; Winterton above n 3.
The principle is that that courts should not interpret a law to interfere with
fundamental rights unless the law contains ‘a
clear expression of an
unmistakable and unambiguous intention to abrogate or curtail a fundamental
freedom’: Coco v R [1994] HCA 15; (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437. For a recent discussion
of the principle see Al Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37, [19] (Gleeson CJ),
[241] (Hayne J).
[59] The
Commonwealth Parliament has an express grant of incidental power conferred by s
51(xxxix) of the Australian Constitution, which refers to ‘matters
incidental to the execution of any power vested by this Constitution in the
Parliament’. In addition, each grant of enumerated power is taken, by
virtue of the ordinary rules of construction,
to authorize measures that are
necessary to effectuate the main purpose of the power: D’Emden v
Pedder [1904] HCA 1; (1904) 1 CLR 91, 109; Grannall v Marrickville Margarine Pty
Ltd [1955] HCA 6; (1955) 93 CLR 55,
77.
[60] See
Herald & Weekly Times [1966] HCA 78; (1966) 115 CLR 418, 437 (Kitto J) for a famous
statement of this approach. See generally Zines, above n 1,
47.
[61] Zines,
above n 1, 44-48.
[61] The
proportionality test as used by the Supreme Court of Canada and the European
Court of Human Rights is usually understood to consist
of three inquiries: (1)
whether a law exhibits a ‘rational connection’ to its purported end;
(2) the availability of
alternative, less drastic means by which that same end
could be achieved; and (3) whether the end pursued by that law is worth the
restriction or costs imposed. Jeremy Kirk, ‘Constitutional
Guarantees, Characterisation and the Concept of Proportionality’ [1997] MelbULawRw 1; (1997) 21
Melbourne University Law Review 1, 4-7. But see Leask v
Commonwealth [1996] HCA 29; (1996) 187 CLR
579.
[62] [1988] HCA 63; (1988)
166 CLR 79,
99-100.
[63] [1988] HCA 63; (1988)
166 CLR 79, 100. (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ); 116 (Brennan J). For Justice
Brennan it was also relevant that the power was, on his analysis,
an incident of
the Executive power to ‘advance the nation – an essentially
facultative function’ which made him
especially reluctant to allow the
creation of offences: [1988] HCA 63; (1988) 166 CLR 79,
112-13.
[64]
[1992] HCA 46; (1992) 177 CLR 1, 33 (Mason CJ), 101 (McHugh J).
[65] See Stone,
‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms’ above n 1, Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39,
[95], [196],
[211].
[66] For a
discussion of this in explicit terms, see Mulholland v Australian Electoral
Commission [2004] HCA 41, [237] (Kirby
J).
[67] As argued
in Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms’ above n 1.
[68] Michael
Detmold, ‘The New Constitutional Law’ [1994] SydLawRw 18; (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review
228, 248.
[69]
George Williams lists this as an argument put against an Australian bill of
rights in George Williams, A Bill of Rights For
Australia?(2004).
[70]
A possibility raised by Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999)
106.
[71] Charles L
Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (1969). For
Black, the great virtue of the structural method is that, ‘it frees us to
talk sense’ when compared with
‘[t]he textual method [which], in
some cases, forces us to blur the focus and talk evasively’. Ibid,
13.
[72] In a
recent speech Justice Kirby has issued a reminder of the continuing significance
of implied rights:
At least in a country such as Australia, without a comprehensive and
entrenched Bill of Rights, it is natural that courts should scrutinise
cases of
apparent or arguable injustice against the criterion of whether the written
Constitution permits it - either in its text or in the implications derived from
that text or the assumptions upon which it is drawn.
Kirby, above n 31.
[73]
See Detmold, above n 69.
[74]
Prominently (and controversially) Justice Kirby interprets the Constitution by
reference to international law. Justice Kirby adopted this approach in his
interpretation of the constitutional guarantee of ‘just
terms’ in s
51 (31) (Newcrest Mining (WA) Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 38; (1990) 190 CLR
513, 657-8), in his interpretation of the Commonwealth’s power to make
laws with respect to ‘the people of any race’
(Kartinyeri v
Commonwealth [1998] HCA 22; (1998) 195 CLR 337, 417-18) and, most recently, in his
interpretation of the Commonwealth’s power over aliens and limitations on
that power implied
from the separation of judicial power (Al Kateb v
Godwin [2004] HCA 37,
[150]).
[75] This
method is not widely advocated or even discussed. However, in an intriguing
passage in Street v Queensland Bar Association [1989] HCA 53; (1989) 168 CLR 461,
Justice Gaudron appears to interpret the Constitution by reference to
developments in legislation when, along with other members of the Court, she
adopted a substantive and more rights
protective interpretation of the concept
of discrimination (found in s 117 prohibition on discrimination based on state
residence). In reference to the earlier cases on s 117, she held: ‘Those
cases ... do not reflect recent developments within the field of
anti-discrimination law which have led to
an understanding that discrimination
may be constituted by its or decisions have discriminatory effect or disparate
impact (indirect
discrimination) as well as by acts or decisions based on
discriminatory considerations (direct discrimination).’ Her Honour
refereed to the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), s. 5, the
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s 7; the Equal Opportunity Act
1984 (Vic) s 17. Street v Queensland Bar Association [1989] HCA 53; (1989) 168
CLR 461, 566.
[76]
See John Braithwaite ‘Community Values and Australian Jurisprudence’
[1995] SydLawRw 21; (1995) 17 Sydney Law Review 351; Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Conventional
Morality and Judicial Standards’ (1987) 73 Virginia Law Review
339.
[77]
Detmold’s view is that the very idea of a constitution brings with it
rights at least as extensive as those seen in a typical
bill of rights. Detmold,
above n 69.
[78] The method is
regarded as relying on weak historical premises and as too imprecise to provide
meaningful limit on government. Winterton,
above n 3,
142-3.
[79] As is
the case with the ‘rule of law’ assumption recognised in
Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5; (1951) 83 CLR 1, see above n 34.
[80]
Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent:
A Form of Ancestor Worship?’ [2000] MelbULawRw 1; (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law
Review 1.
[81]
See above n 75.
[82]
Despite Justice Kirby’s opposition to the originalist method, other
members of the Court continue to have regard to constitutional
history,
including the framers’ intention, to determine the meaning that the
Constitution. Among many examples, see Grain Pool of Western Australia v
Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479, in which a joint judgment of 6 judges
interpreted the Commonwealth’s power with respect to ‘patents of
invention’
partly by reference to essential characteristics in 1900 and in
which Justice Kirby declined to consider the historical meaning of
the
phrase. (2000) 202 CLR 479, 492-6, 515. On these cases see Graeme Hill
‘ “Originalist” v “Progressive” Interpretations
of the Constitution – Does it Matter?’” (2000) 11
Public Law Review 159. See also, Singh v The Commonwealth
[2004] HCA 43 in which all members of the High Court (including Justice
Kirby) interpret the Commonwealth’s power with respect to
‘aliens’
by reference to the historical understanding of that
concept. For a critical assessment of Justice Kirby’s anti-originalism,
see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Interpreting the Constitution in Its Second
Century’ [2000] MelbULawRw 27; (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 677. For
judicial rejection of Justice Kirby’s approach to international law see
Al Kateb v Goodwin [2004] HCA 37, [62]-[72]. See generally, Kristen
Walker, ‘International Law as a Tool of Constitutional
Interpretation’ (2002) 28 Monash University Law Review 77; Amelia
Simpson and George Williams, ‘International Law and Constitutional
Interpretation’ (2000) 11 Public Law Review
205.
[83] For
accounts of the framers attitudes with respect to rights, see Charlesworth,
above n 1, 20-27, See Enid Campbell,
‘Civil Rights in the Australian Constitutional Tradition’ in Carl
Beck (ed) Law and Justice
(1970).
[84]
Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth [1992] HCA 45; (1992) 177 CLR 106, 133
(Mason CJ); Nationwide News v Wills [1992] HCA 46; (1992) 177 CLR 1, 41 (Brennan CJ),
69-70 (Toohey J), 209-10 (Gaudron J).
[85]
Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth [1992] HCA 45; (1992) 177 CLR 106, 186
(Dawson J). See also, Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Constitutional Implications
and Freedom of Political Speech: A Reply to Stephen
Donaghue’ (1997) 32
Monash University Law Review
362.
[86]
See, McGinty v. Western Australia, [1996] HCA 48; (1995) 186 CLR 140, 235-36 (McHugh J);
291 (Gummow J).
[87] [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189
CLR 520, 566.
[88]
See Lenah Game Meats v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2001) 208 CLR
199, 331 (Callinan
J).
[89] Consider
for example the lingering doubts about the constitutional right to privacy and
the consequent limits on the power of government
to regulate the availability of
abortions. Roe v Wade [1973] USSC 43; 410
U.S. 113 (1973). Despite widespread doubts about the decision (see John
Hart Ely, ‘The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade’ (1972) 82 Yale Law Journal 920, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
‘Some Thoughts On Autonomy And Equality In Relation To Roe v
Wade’ (1985) 63 North Carolina Law Review 375), Roe v
Wade was affirmed (though modified) in Casey v Planned Parenthood [1992] USSC 112; 505
US 833 (1992). However, there remains a real possibility that it will one day be
overruled. The views of potential Supreme Court Justices
on the question are,
therefore, closely scrutinised. See, ‘Symposium: The Judicial
Appointments Process’ (2001) 10 William and Mary Bill of Rights Law
Journal.
[90]
[1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520,
566.
[91] Stone,
‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure’, above n 1. For a judicial response, see Coleman v
Power [2004] HCA 39,
[84]-[90].
[92] For
example, the Court’s commitment to ‘text and structure’ does
not provide an adequate basis for determining
the class of communication
entitled to protection. On this see Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and
Freedoms’, above n
1, 378-90.
[93] As I have
explained elsewhere reliance on constitutional text appeals to ‘rule of
law’ values. Constitutional text is
an ascertainable and generally
applicable source of law and is the result (at least it is often argued) of a
legitimate law making
process. See Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional
Text and Structure’, above n 1,
706.
[94] Michael
Dorf has made a similar observation about the use of structural argument in
constitutional interpretation: ‘In our
legal culture - by which I mean at
least the legal culture of the common-law countries and probably something
substantially broader
- interpretive arguments unmoored from text are always
vulnerable to being attacked as illegitimate ... structuralism in the absence
of
clear textual warrant is always vulnerable to retrenchment’. Michael C
Dorf, ‘Interpretive Holism and the Structural
Method, or How Charles Black
Might Have Thought About Campaign Finance Reform and Congressional
Timidity’ (2004) 92 Georgetown Law Review 833, 834.
[95] The High
Court has since held that proportionality has a very limited role in determining
whether a Commonwealth law is ‘with
respect to’ a (non-purposive)
head of legislative power. Leask v Commonwealth [1996] HCA 29; (1996) 187 CLR
579. There were differences, however as to how that revision was expressed.
Justice Brennan’s approach was to equate the test of
proportionality with
more deferential (and traditional) tests of application, finding that
‘[p]roportionality is another expression
for “appropriate and
adapted” ...[s]o used, proportionality has nothing to say about the
appropriateness, necessity or
desirability of the law to achieve an effect or
purpose’. Leask [1996] HCA 29; (1996) 187 CLR 579, 593. Justice Dawson, on the
other hand, declared that ‘to introduce the concept of proportionality ...
is to introduce a
concept which is alien to the principles which this court has
thitherto applied’: [1996] HCA 29; (1996) 187 CLR 579,
602.
[96]
Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales [1949] HCA 47; (1949) 79 CLR 497; Hughes and
Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 1) [1954] UKPCHCA 5; (1954) 93 CLR 1. For an account of the
complex history of section 92 and its various interpretations see Zines, above n
1, ch 7 and Michael Coper, Freedom of
Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution
(1983).
[97]
Cole v Whitfield [1988] HCA 18; (1988) 165 CLR 360. Zines, above n 1, 136-43.
[98] Compare for
example the text of s 116 (‘The Commonwealth shall not make any law for
establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for
prohibiting
the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office or public trust under
the
Commonwealth.’) with the relevant parts of the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States (‘Congress shall make no law respecting
and establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof’).
[99]
See Charlesworth, above n 1, 20-27,
Campbell, above n 84.
[100]
Delegates at the drafting Conventions appears to have been concerned that
‘without the prohibition, the Commonwealth would
have been in a position
to regulate Sunday observance throughout Australia ... it was clear that the
mere prospect, however, remote
of a federal government legislating gin this area
was on which most state representatives desired to avoid.’ Campbell, above
n 84, 307-8. See also, J Quick
and RR Garran, Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth
(1901) 951.
[101]
James Stellios, ‘Section 80 of the Constitution – ‘A Bulwark
of Liberty’? (2005) Sydney Law Review.
[102] By
preventing them from abolishing jury trials when the federal Parliament has
provided for a trial by indictment for an offence
against Commonwealth law.
[103] That is
the enactment of a bill of rights would be taken as an expression of intention
(by the framers of that bill of rights and
by the people who ratified it) to
protect
rights.
[104] In
relation to the freedom of expression, I address some of these issues in Stone,
‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure’,
above n 1, and Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights
and Freedoms’, above n 1.
[105]
It would, of course, be entirely naïve to suggest otherwise. Although
rights can occasionally be expressed in a relatively specific
form, bills of
rights are overwhelmingly expressed contain rights expressed in general terms.
Moreover, as Leighton McDonald points
out, generality is expression of rights in
inevitable. In a diverse society, it is only because rights concepts are
indeterminate
(and terms in which they are expressed consequently general) that
a bill of rights can obtain general agreement. Leighton McDonald
‘New
Directions in the Australian Bill of Rights Debate’ (2004) 12 Public
Law 22.
[106]
Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999), 220, Andrei Marmor,
‘On the Limits of Rights’ (1997) 16 Law and Philosophy 1.
[107] Williams,
above n 1,
259.
[108]
Williams admits these resources would not provide the Courts with very precise
guidelines for the resolution of particular disputes
but maintains that they
‘would assist a court in ascertaining the appropriate limits of a right
and where it might draw the
line between the judicial and political
process.’ Williams, above n 1, 259.
But ‘ascertaining the appropriate limits of a right’ requires a
precise determination of the nature of a right
(what activity it covers, how
much protection it confers on that activity) and its relative weight with
respect to other rights and
interests. If ‘the social and political
background’ or ‘context’ cannot assist with that task then it
is
difficult to see what it adds to the process of applying rights and in
particular how it renders that task more precise than the
task of applying
implied rights.
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