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University of Melbourne Law School Research Series |
Last Updated: 23 November 2009
Leveraging Asylum
James C. Hathaway[*]
Until the mid-1980s, only refugees could invoke international law to resist
removal to a dangerous country of origin. The evolution
in international law
since that time has been both fast-paced and profound.
This is most clearly
true under European human rights law. No less an authority than the House of
Lords has declared that the right
of non-return extends not only to refugees,
but to any person at risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment,
and – at least where the risk is clear and extreme –
applies also where any of the rights to life, freedom from slavery,
liberty and
security of person, to protection against ex post facto criminality, the
right to privacy and family life, and to freedom of thought, conscience or
religion is
threatened.[1]
But the dramatic expansion of protection is not limited to Europe. While
less easily enforced than the rules of the European safety
net,[2] the combination
at the global level of an explicit duty of non-return in the United Nations
Torture Convention[3]
and of implied duties of non-return grounded in recent authoritative application
of Arts. 6 and 7 of the Civil and Political
Covenant[4] now
establishes a principled limit on the right of the most states to remove a
broadly defined group of at-risk non-citizens from
their
territory.[5] More
embryonic support for an expanded duty to protect may be found in the Convention
on the Rights of the
Child[6] and through
invocation of international humanitarian law, specifically common Art. 3 of the
Geneva Conventions.[7]
The problem is that none of these new sources of international
protection expressly sets out just how members of the broader
class of
non-returnable persons is to be treated. In contrast to the Refugee Convention,
nearly all of which is devoted to defining
the precise legal entitlements of
members of the protected class (for example, to freedom of internal movement and
other civil liberties,
as well as to key socioeconomic rights, including to work
and to access
education[8]), the new
protections against refoulement are bare-bones entitlements. Members of
the beneficiary class may not be returned to the place of risk, but there is no
express
duty in international law to provide them with any particular bundle of
rights, much less to enfranchise them in the host community.
This situation
is grave for the protected persons themselves, and is potentially destabilizing
for the governments and communities
that host them. The same arguments advanced
at the birth of refugee law, namely that the social inclusion of non-returnable
persons
is both ethically right and socially
responsible,[9] have
clear contemporary resonance. Perhaps for this reason the European
Union’s 2004 Qualification
Directive[10] came
remarkably close to granting Refugee Convention rights to all persons legally
entitled to protection against
refoulement[11]
and is likely soon to be revised to go even farther in that
direction.[12] Canada
has already amended its domestic law to give the same rights to refugees and
other legally non-returnable
persons,[13] with
Australia and New Zealand poised to follow
suit.[14]
But does
international law actually require states bound by one or more duties of
non-refoulement beyond that set by the Refugee Convention itself to adopt
rights-granting measures of this kind? Is the provision of civil liberties
and
socioeconomic entitlements to non-returnable persons simply good policy, or is
it legally compelled?
Recent scholarship suggests that granting rights to
all non-returnable persons is not just advisable, but is already required by
international law. First, it is said that even states not bound by relevant
conventions are required by customary international
law to honor the duty of
non-refoulement in relation to a wide-ranging group comprised of both
refugees and others facing the prospect of serious harm. Second, it is
suggested
that all persons who are entitled to protection against
refoulement – not just refugees – must, by virtue of a
conceptual fusion of the Refugee Convention and other human rights accords,
be
granted all of the refugee-specific entitlements codified in the Refugee
Convention itself.
In essence, under the first claim, the protection of
refugees against refoulement ceases to be a matter of treaty-based
entitlement. And under the second claim, the specific, treaty-based
entitlements of refugees
are deemed applicable to all beneficiaries of the duty
of non-refoulement, whether refugees or not.
Taken together, the
two claims amount to an assertion that there is today a legally binding and
universally applicable right to asylum
for all seriously at-risk persons. In
short, the right to asylum has been leveraged through scholarly analysis despite
its express
rejection by
states.[15]
I
believe that the analysis underlying the leveraged right to asylum is
conceptually flawed. As I will show, there is no duty of
non-refoulement
that binds all states as a matter of customary international law and it is not
the case that all persons entitled to claim protection
against
refoulement of some kind are ipso facto entitled to refugee
rights. These claims are unsound precisely because the critical bedrock of a
real international legal obligation
– namely, the consent of states
evinced by either formal commitments or legally relevant actions – does
not yet exist.
The leveraged right to asylum is attractive because it
allows scholars simply to ordain law, rather than having to work to create
a
renewed protection architecture that convinces states that extant duties can be
reconciled to national
self-interest.[16]
But the effort to rebuild, rather than simply to ordain, is required precisely
because rhetorical claims standing alone will not
serve as a meaningful
constraint on the behavior of states.
The First Claim: The Duty of Non-Refoulement Binds All States
The essence of the first claim is that because an express or implied duty of
non-refoulement is recognized in the various treaties I have mentioned,
it is now the case that all states – whether bound by a relevant
treaty or not – are legally obligated to honor the duty of
non-refoulement vis à vis not only any refugee, but also in regard
to any potential victim of torture, cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment
or
punishment (“torture”), as well as most persons facing risk to
“life, physical integrity, or
liberty.”[17]
The claim is that at least this one critical refugee right inheres in all
persons who are in fact refugees or who face another serious
human rights risk,
regardless of treaty accession. How was this conclusion reached?
In a study
commissioned and championed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), Eli Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem
invoke the decision of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases[18] for the
view that treaties “may influence the creation of... a rule of
custom.”[19]
They argue that because the treaty-based norm of non-refoulement is of
norm-creating character,[20]
enjoys widespread and representative state
support,[21] and has
stimulated consistent relevant
practice,[22]
“non-refoulement must be regarded as a principle of customary
international
law.”[23] If
sound, this analysis means that the duty of non-refoulement is no longer
merely a matter of treaty-based obligation (applicable only to state parties)
but instead now binds all states, including
those which have never signed on to
a relevant treaty.
The basic notion that customary law may emerge from a
treaty-based norm is well-accepted. At least since the Asylum
Case,[24] it has
been recognized that the tree of customary international law can grow from the
acorn of specific
treaties.[25] But the
role of the treaty-based norm is essentially
auxiliary:[26] it
crystallizes the content of the putative
norm[27] and provides
a context within which the two essential elements of a customary norm –
opinio juris and consistent state
practice[28] –
can be located.[29]
In the case of the putative customary duty of non-refoulement, these two
essential requirements for the emergence of customary international law are not
made out.[30]
To
begin, is there opinio juris sufficient to justify the putative
norm?[31] The rigid
traditional understanding of opinio juris sive necessitatis –
requiring that the observed uniformity of practice be a consequence of a
sense of legal
obligation[32] –
has, of course, given way to the less demanding requirement “of an
express, or most often presumed, acceptance of the
practice as law by all
interested states.”[33]
It is sufficient to show that states presently regard the putative norm
as legally compelled, even if their concordant actions in
keeping with the norm
were not induced by a sense of legal duty. There is moreover good authority
that opinio juris can be shown in many different ways. In its
Nicaragua decision, for example, the ICJ held that “opinio
juris may, though with all due caution, be deduced from, inter alia,
the attitude of... States towards certain General Assembly resolutions...
support of [regional conference] resolutions... [and]
statements by State
representatives.”[34]
The views of most scholars are similarly
inclusive.[35]
Despite
this very flexible approach to the material basis for identification of
opinio juris, the specific facts relied upon by Lauterpacht and Bethlehem
fall short. They ground their claim of opinio juris for a universally
binding duty of non-refoulement on a combination of three indicia: first,
the “near-universal
acceptance”[36]
of a non-refoulement duty in various UN and regional treaties; second,
the unanimous adoption by the General Assembly of the 1967 Declaration on
Territorial Asylum; and third, the absence of express opposition to the
principle of non-refoulement by the states which neither signed a
relevant treaty nor were present in the General Assembly when the 1967
declaration was
adopted.[37]
The
primary portion of the claim is substantively rickety. For a single rule of
customary international law to emerge, the indicia
of opinio juris must
clearly relate to the same putative
rule.[38] In
contrast, Lauterpacht and Bethlehem weave together disparate bits of opinio
juris arising from distinct treaties dealing with distinct issues to locate
opinio juris for a principle that is more comprehensive than any of the
underlying commitments. Specifically, they argue that because all but
nineteen
UN member states “... participat[e] in some or other conventional
arrangement embodying
non-refoulement...”[39]
– that is, they have all agreed to be bound by at least one of
Art. 33 of the Refugee Convention, Art. 3 of the Torture Convention, Arts. 6
and 7 of the Civil and Political Covenant, or by a comparable
provision under a
relevant regional treaty – it is now possible to conclude that there is a
sufficiently widespread and representative
opinio juris for an
overarching principle that “... non-refoulement must be regarded as
a principle of customary international
law.”[40]
The
incongruity of the claim arises from the fact that non-refoulement is
merely a means to a protection end. The means itself can only be the subject of
general acceptance within a particular context.
That is, the assertion that all
states accept the duty of protection against refoulement assumes some
agreement about the circumstances in which the duty is owed. Yet there is no
such agreement, since the evidence of
opinio juris relied upon by
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem sometimes relates to persons who have a well-founded
fear of being persecuted; in other
cases, to persons at risk of torture; and in
still other circumstances, to persons at risk of other forms of human rights
abuse.
There is, in short, no common acceptance of the duty of
non-refoulement related to any particular class of persons or type of
risk, much less to their combined beneficiary class.
By way of analogy, one
might consider the claim that there is opinio juris to support an
international legal duty to issue an injunction. At one level, it is true that
the courts of virtually all states
do, in fact, authorize injunctive relief in
at least some circumstances. Yet it would be meaningless to claim a normative
consensus
on a duty “to issue injunctions” since there is no
substantive accord on the circumstances in which the remedy is to
be granted.
The argument for opinio juris in support of a general duty of
non-refoulement is similarly flawed. Lauterpacht and Bethlehem’s
assertion of agreement sufficient to count as opinio juris is a thinly
veiled, cobbling together of disparate commitments with only the veneer of a
remedial mechanism – non-refoulement – in common. With no
substantive commonality to the obligations agreed, no general opinio
juris can be derived.
The second form of evidence of opinio juris
relied upon by Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, the unanimous adoption by the General
Assembly of the 1967 Declaration on Territorial
Asylum,[41] does
have a common substantive core. Unfortunately for their project, the common core
is limited to persons seeking “asylum
from
persecution,”[42]
a group far smaller than said by them to benefit from the customary
norm.[43] Equally
fundamental, General Assembly resolutions cannot be relied upon in
abstracto as evidence of universal opinio
juris.[44] As the
ICJ observed in Nicaragua, the opinio juris is instead to be
deduced from “the attitude of... States towards certain General
Assembly resolutions (emphasis
added).”[45]
The Court noted that while General Assembly resolutions may be the basis for
opinio
juris,[46] they
have to be considered “in their
totality.”[47]
A critical part of that totality is the fact that a United Nations conference
convened in 1977 with the specific intention of transforming
the 1967
declaration into binding law was a
failure.[48] Lapenna
notes that “the Committee met for [more than] four weeks, and only three
of the ten articles of the experts’
draft were discussed and voted on...
[T]he preoccupation of the majority of the states was that of safeguarding, to
exasperation
point, the sovereign right of a state to grant
asylum.”[49]
There has moreover been no subsequent effort to revisit the asylum convention
project.[50] To rely
on the 1967 asylum declaration as an indication of state parties’
acceptance of a comprehensive duty of non-refoulement – much less
to isolate the nineteen abstaining countries and deem their failure to protest
to be implied support – is
disingenuous given the totality of the evidence
of state attitudes.
The more plausible basis for General Assembly-based
opinio juris – ironically, not invoked by Lauterpacht and
Bethlehem[51] –
is the line of subsequent General Assembly calls to respect the duty of
non-refoulement, often said to apply to “asylum seekers” as
well as to the arguably more constrained category of
refugees.[52] While
not as specific as the beneficiary category contended
for,[53] the
regularity of the endorsement of non-refoulement in the General
Assembly[54] is
noteworthy, and goes some distance in support of the claim that there is
opinio juris for a duty of non-refoulement owed to more than just
Convention refugees.
The challenge, though, is that General Assembly
resolutions are merely one factor to consider in the assessment of opinio
juris. They must be weighed-up against contrary indications, in particular
those emanating from states not already bound by a treaty-based
duty of
non-refoulement.[55]
Apart from the failure of (and failure to resuscitate over the ensuing
forty years) the territorial asylum initiative described above,
the major
contraindication is the persistent refusal of most states of
Asia[56] and the
Middle East[57] to be
formally bound by the asserted comprehensive duty of
non-refoulement.[58]
While such states have often agreed to admit refugees and other human
rights victims, there is no evidence that whatever openness
they have shown
– often partial, and usually highly
conditional[59]
– has been influenced by a sense of legal obligation (rather than, for
example, by political or economic calculus, social or
cultural affiliation, or a
sense of moral responsibility). A former Chief Justice of India, for example,
affirmed that while courts
in his country “have stepped in” on
occasion to prevent refugee deportations, “... most often these are ad hoc
orders. And an ad hoc order certainly does not advance the law. It does not
form part of the law, and it certainly does not make
the area
clear.”[60] As
the ICJ noted in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, such actions do
not support a finding of opinio
juris.[61]
The
persistent reluctance of the majority of states in Asia and the Middle East to
embrace a comprehensive legal duty to protect
refugees and others against
refoulement is problematic for a second reason. Customary international
law formation sensibly gives particular attention to the views of states
“specially affected” by the phenomenon sought to be
regulated.[62] With
Asia and the Middle East hosting the majority of refugees in the
world[63] yet failing
clearly to affirm a duty to protect, the assertion of universal opinio
juris based on General Assembly resolutions is thus especially
fragile.
To be clear, I recognize that when a treaty-based norm stimulates a
broadly embraced sense of obligation (in particular, among non-party
states),
opinio juris in support of a cognate customary international legal
obligation may emerge. But there is no basis to assert that just because most
countries have accepted something that may broadly be termed a
non-refoulement obligation, applying to at least some kinds of cases, and
in at least some contexts, it can now be concluded that there is a universally
applicable duty of non-refoulement owed to the combined class of all
refugees and other persons at risk of significant human rights abuse. Much less
can opinio juris be located in General Assembly resolutions considered in
isolation from the more general context of state attitudes towards the putative
norm, in particular the attitudes of states specially affected by refugee
flows.
But even if opinio juris could be located, the next question
that must be addressed is whether there is evidence of consistent state practice
that aligns
with the putative norm (the second essential element for
establishment of a customary
law[64]). Sadly,
there is in fact very significant empirical evidence that undermines the claim
of state practice in conformity with a broad-ranging
and universally applicable
duty of non-refoulement. For example, a recent survey of the 52
countries hosting the largest number of refugees found that 35 such states
– that
is, more than 2/3 of the states examined – had committed
“some” (11), “significant” (10), or “severe”
(14) acts of refoulement or comparable physical
endangerment.[65] In
nearly a quarter of the countries evaluated, the risk was adjudged to be
intensifying over
time.[66] This data
moreover exists against a long-standing and extensive pattern of
refoulement across the world, including blatant refusals to allow
refugees[67] to access
state territory;[68]
turn-back policies implemented by the closure of borders to
refugees;[69] the
construction of blunt physical barriers to prevent the entry of
refugees;[70] summary
ejection of refugees able physically to cross a
border;[71] removals
ordered without access to a procedure to verify refugee
status;[72] expulsions
consequent to the failure to ensure even basic procedural safeguards in the
assessment of refugee
status;[73] disguised
removals under the rubric of “voluntary”
repatriation;[74]
arms-length maneuvers to repel refugees in areas of arrogated
jurisdiction beyond a state’s
borders;[75] and the
establishment of non-entrée legal regimes that prevent refugees
from even reaching the point of being able to present their case for
protection.[76]
There
is, in short, pervasive – perhaps even dominant – state practice
that denies in one way or another the right to
be protected against
refoulement.[77]
These surveys of state practice are moreover restricted to the
comparatively well-protected category of “refugees”; it
is likely
that the refoulement of the broader categories of human rights victims
claimed by Lauterpacht and Bethlehem to be part of the beneficiary class of the
customary norm is even more pervasive. How, then, can it be argued that there
is relatively consistent state practice in conformity
with the putative
universal duty to protect refugees and other human rights victims against
refoulement?
First, some argue that the depth and consistency of
state practice required for the establishment of customary international law
should not be overstated. So long as respect for non-refoulement remains
the norm, it is suggested that the state practice requirement is met. Second,
and impliedly allowing for the inadequacy
of an empirical record of concordant
practice, there is authority for the view that so long as there is an effort to
justify acts
of refoulement as permissible exceptions to the alleged
norm, practice that is on its face violative of the norm is in fact supportive
of it. And
third and most significantly, it is claimed that while state
practice is required, real state action on the ground may be overcome
by
alternative “practice” in the form of verbal commitments to protect
refugees against refoulement. I will consider each of these claims in
turn.
First, what of the view that the depth and consistency of state
practice required for the establishment of customary international
law should
not be overstated? There has certainly been a trend in the ICJ jurisprudence to
soften the standard of uniformity required.
The 1950 Asylum decision
spoke of “constant and uniform
usage,”[78] the
1969 North Sea Continental Shelf case stated the test as “extensive
and virtually
uniform”[79]
practice, while the Nicaragua decision of 1986 noted that
“absolutely rigorous
conformity”[80]
is not required. It is thus easy to see why scholars are disinclined to set an
overly demanding threshold of consistency of state
practice. Brownlie, for
example, opines that consistency of state practice “is very much a matter
of
appreciation.”[81]
That
having been said, there is little doubt that clearly predominant global practice
remains a requirement for the establishment
of a customary legal duty. The
ICJ’s exhortation in the Asylum decision that “fluctuation
and
discrepancy”[82]
in practice undermines the argument for custom is a helpful, and surely not
overstated, indicator of the circumstances in which consensus
through action is
simply not
present.[83] While
those seeking to downplay the relevance of practice often rely on the
Court’s statement in Nicaragua that custom can arise despite
“not
infrequent”[84]
inconsistent practice, this obiter
dictum[85]
must be balanced against the same judgment’s insistence that a
“settled
practice”[86] be
identified.[87] More
specifically, as Villiger writes, state practice for a customary norm binding
all states must at least be “general” in the sense
“that common and widespread practice among many States is required. While
universal practice is not necessary, practice should be
‘representative,’ at least of all major political and socio-economic
systems.”[88]
Assessed
against even this relatively low benchmark, the case for identification of
consistent state practice in line with a broadly
inclusive duty of
non-refoulement fails. Not only is there a record of refoulement
in the majority of the states hosting most of the world’s
refugees[89] –
and becoming more common in roughly a quarter of
them[90] – but
there is a clear geopolitical skew to the pattern of
non-compliance,[91]
with half of the major hosting countries with the worst records on
refoulement located in Asia or the Middle
East.[92] To suggest
that there is anything approaching a “settled practice” of
non-refoulement, much less a settled practice that is geopolitically
inclusive, defies analysis.
Nor is the case for a settled practice in line
with the duty of non-refoulement assisted by a second argument, namely
that breaches can sometimes support a finding of consistent state practice. The
ICJ’s
Nicaragua judgment, generally regarded as the most
authoritative statement of this
rule,[93] is at pains
carefully to explain the basis for its holding that “instances of State
conduct inconsistent with a given rule...
treated as breaches of that
rule”[94]
contribute to a finding of consistent state practice in support of the norm:
If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule.[95]
In that case, the question was whether instances of foreign intervention in support of an internal opposition group espousing “worthy... political or moral values”[96] – at least prima facie in breach of the putative norm of non-intervention – had been defended on the basis of justifications or exceptions said to be part of the putative norm itself. The manner in which the argument was rejected is instructive:
... [T]he Court finds that States have not justified their conduct by reference to a new right of intervention or a new exception to the principle of its prohibition. The United States authorities have on some occasions clearly stated their grounds for intervening in the affairs of a foreign State for reasons concerned with, for example, the domestic policies of that country, its ideology, the level of its armaments, or the direction of its foreign policy. But these were statements of international policy, and not an assertion of rules of existing international law. In particular, as regards the conduct towards Nicaragua which is the subject of the present case, the United States has not claimed that its intervention, which it justified in this way on the political level, was also justified on the legal level, alleging the exercise of a new right of intervention...[97]
Much the same concerns arise from an examination of state practice of
refoulement. To begin, most instances of refoulement appear not
to be justified at all – they simply
occur.[98] And where
an effort to justify refoulement is made, states tend to offer only blunt
and unsubstantiated assertions that those seeking protection are not refugees or
that the
political cost of protection is too
high.[99] There is,
in short, rarely an effort made to justify turn-backs and other acts of
refoulement by reference to the norm of non-refoulement itself,
much less by arguing the applicability of the internal limitations to that
duty.[100] As such,
inconsistent practice is just that – inconsistent, and hence at odds with
the assertion of a customary legal duty.
This analysis leaves us, then, with
one final argument in support of state practice sufficient to ground a broad
duty of non-refoulement in customary international law. The essence of
the argument is that a very broad reading of “state practice” is
justified
under which words alone may amount to “practice.” The
proponents of this position look to many of the same statements
relied upon to
show opinio juris as the relevant practice in support of the norm, and
thereby arrive at the conclusion that consistent state “practice”
can be located despite the evidence of non-conforming “practice on the
ground” previously identified.
It is in regard to this issue that the
rules of customary law formation are most
contested.[101] As
Kammerhofer explains, there is a tendency among many academics to define
“practice” in a way that obviates the distinction
between practice
and opinio juris:
Behind the apparent dichotomy of “acts” and “statements” lies a more important distinction: that between one argument that sees practice as the exercise of the right claimed and the other that includes the claims themselves and thus blurs the border between the concept of “state practice” and “opinio juris.”[102]
This is indeed the nub of the controversy: despite the continued insistence of the ICJ that there are two, not one, essential elements to the formation of customary international law,[103] there seems to be a determined academic effort to downplay that requirement. The Final Report of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law[104] provides a classic example of this propensity to confuse:
The Court has not in fact said in so many words that just because there are (allegedly) distinct elements in customary law the same conduct cannot manifest both. It is in fact often difficult or even impossible to disentangle the two elements.[105]
The language used is quite extraordinary: note that the ILA does not
say that the International Court of Justice has held that both elements
of custom may be manifested by the same, presumably purely verbal, evidence, but
rather simply that it “has
not... said in so many words” that it
cannot!
This cautious, if convoluted, framing is warranted given the actual
state of ICJ jurisprudence. The decision in Nicaragua, while often cited
as the leading source of the notion that words alone can constitute state
practice,[106] did
not actually reach that conclusion. The focus of the dispute was whether there
was a customary norm prohibiting the threat or
use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of a state that parallels the
treaty-based rule in Art.
2(4) of the UN
Charter.[107] The
Court was insistent that a customary norm could arise only upon proof of
“the actual practice and opinio juris of
States.”[108]
For good measure, it added:
The mere fact that States declare their recognition of certain rules is not sufficient for the Court to consider these as being part of customary international law... [I]n the field of customary international law, the shared view of the Parties as to the content of what they regard as the rule is not enough. The Court must satisfy itself that the existence of the rule in the opinio juris of States is confirmed by practice.[109]
The common confusion about just what the Court decided arises from the fact
that it took what can only be described as a fairly slipshod
approach to the
assessment of state practice before focussing on the issue of opinio
juris.[110]
Implicit in its analysis that “[i]t is not to be expected that in
the practice of States the application of the rules in question
should have been
perfect,”[111]
that “rigorous
conformity”[112]
is too high a standard, and that prima facie violations justified by
reference to the rule itself “confirm rather than weaken the
rule”[113] is
an assumption – admittedly, an empirically suspect
assumption[114]
– that one could reasonably assume evidence of relatively
consistent state practice of non-intervention other than as authorized
by the
Charter.[115]
Because the parties chose not to contest the issue of state practice, the Court
understandably focussed its analysis on the opinio juris question,
finding (as previously
noted[116]) that a
wide-ranging set of verbal acts could give rise to opinio
juris.[117]
The
Court is, however, explicit that these verbal acts are approved strictly as
forms of opinio juris, not state
practice.[118] As
such, and despite the failure of the Court clearly to interrogate the state
practice dimension of the claim, it is disingenuous
to suggest that its lack of
precision in this regard amounts to an endorsement of a new theory of customary
international law formation
in which state practice is rendered virtually
identical to opinio juris. If this had been the Court’s intention,
why would it have been at such pains to confirm the traditional two-part test
and
address the sufficiency of imperfect state practice?
It follows that the
notion that verbiage without concordant state practice gives rise to customary
law is at best de lege ferenda rather than settled law. Four main
arguments are posited in favor of this
approach:[119]
plain meaning allows it; it avoids a detrimental reliance concern; states want
it; and it promotes international order and human
values.
On the first
point, Villiger argues that “the term ‘practice’ is general
enough – thereby corresponding with
the flexibility of customary law
itself – to cover any act or behaviour of a State, and it is not...
entirely clear in what respect verbal acts originating from a State would be
lacking...”[120]
While linguistically
plausible[121] and
with at least some support in the
jurisprudence,[122]
the double-counting of the same words as both opinio juris and
relevant practice is difficult to square with the ICJ’s continued
insistence on both evidence of state practice and opinio
juris.[123] If
words evincing acceptance as law are the essence of opinio juris, a court
inclined to view words as sufficient state practice ought simply to have
dispensed with the dual requirement – which
the ICJ has not.
A second
argument for treating words alone as practice advanced by Villiger is grounded
in the importance of avoiding detrimental
reliance. He writes that
“whatever a State feels or believes when making a statement, at least
other States may come to rely
on this statement, and the original State may even
be estopped from altering its
position.”[124]
This is a circular argument, since if it is clear that only practical actions
“on the ground” count as relevant state
practice, then there is no
reasonable basis for other states to put stock in pure statements, thus
disposing of the risk of detrimental
reliance.
Underlying this argument,
though, is a third point. Oscar Schachter has argued that in at least some
circumstances states seem to
want statements standing alone to be treated as
practice relevant to the formation of custom. In Schachter’s opinion,
“...
in the contemporary international milieu governments have felt a need
for a new law which, for one reason or another, could not be
fully realized
through multilateral treaties... For one thing, the processes of treaty
negotiation are often slow and cumbersome...
In these circumstances, it has been
natural for States to turn to law-declaring resolutions of the General
Assembly.”[125]
There is in Schachter’s view implied consent for treating at least
this one form of “words alone” – namely,
law-declaring
resolutions adopted unanimously or without significant
dissent[126] –
as what amounts to instant customary international law.
This is, of course,
a much narrower point than the general argument in favour of treating words
generally as state practice. And
Schachter is far from alone in wishing to see
at least some resolutions of international organizations, in particular of the
General
Assembly,[127]
treated as a special example of “state
practice.”[128]
As Jennings and Watt opine, “the concentrations of state practice
now developed and displayed in international organizations
and the collective
decisions and activities of the organizations themselves may be valuable
evidence of general practice accepted
as law in the fields in which those
organizations
operate.”[129]
But there are nonetheless several concerns.
First, the fact that the
General Assembly is explicitly denied the right to engage in general lawmaking
activities[130]
should give pause before attributing special lawmaking force to its resolutions.
Second, it seems odd to argue that governments have
effectively consented to use
of the General Assembly as a lawmaking forum in order to overcome the
(presumably overly demanding)
procedural requirements of lawmaking by treaty
when those same governments have declined either to amend the rules of
treaty-making
or the Charter to provide for the speedy process Schachter assumes
they want.[131] And
finally, where precisely is the evidence that states – rather than
scholars – really want a speedy, less formal
lawmaking process? The only
example Schachter provides in support of his thesis is the adoption in 1946 of
resolutions condemning
genocide as a crime and approving the Nuremberg
Principles.[132]
Both the paucity of examples and the fact that the instances cited by Schachter
led to subsequent codification in treaty
form[133] suggest
that support for the “states want it” thesis is modest at
best.
This leaves us with one final argument for treating verbal statements
as practice, namely that the world needs a lawmaking process
capable of
generating results in some core areas, even if state consent cannot be located
through one of the general modes (including
via consistent practice in the case
of custom).[134] In
advancing this thesis, Schachter forthrightly acknowledges its instrumentalist
tenor, writing that “[t]he problem of inconsistent
practice (ie.
violations) comes up sharply in respect of declared norms of human rights... In
the face of these facts, it is hard to conclude that
the declared norms are
confirmed by general and consistent
practice.”[135]
And he is equally candid in noting that “[m]ost international lawyers seek
to minimize the violations by emphasizing strong
verbal condemnations and
denials... [But] [t]he notion that contrary practice should yield to opinio
juris challenges the basic premise of customary
law.”[136]
Schachter’s
solution is to endorse that contradiction in relation to only a subset of
customary lawmaking – namely, where
putative norms “are strongly
supported and important to international order and human
values.”[137]
He argues that in this context “the norm has to be maintained despite
violations” because “they are brittle in
the sense that violations
are likely.”[138]
A more systematized version of this approach is offered by Frederic
Kirgis, who asserts that the two elements of customary lawmaking
–
opinio juris and consistent state practice – should be viewed
“not as fixed and mutually exclusive, but as interchangeable along a
sliding
scale”:[139]
The more destabilizing or morally distasteful the activity – for example, the offensive use of force or the deprivation of fundamental human rights – the more readily international decision makers will substitute one element for the other, provided that the asserted restrictive rule seems reasonable.[140]
Despite the fact that Kirgis speaks of what international decision makers do,
his analysis actually relies on only the Nicaragua case to support the
claim that “a clearly established opinio juris establishes a
customary rule without much (or any) affirmative showing that governments are
consistently behaving in accordance with
the asserted
rule.”[141]
For reasons previously given, this is not in my view an accurate interpretation
of the Nicaragua
case.[142] But even
if advanced simply as a thesis de lege
ferenda,[143]
there are good reasons not to endorse the proposed instrumentalist “gloss
over”[144] of
the duty to show relatively consistent state practice in support of the putative
customary norm.
Most fundamentally, this view of custom is a disingenuous
circumvention of the requirements of lawmaking by
treaty.[145] If
words alone are to evince state consent to be bound, then those words are
required to be formalized as
treaty.[146] To
treat a wide variety of words uttered in less exacting
circumstances[147]
not simply as opinio
juris[148] but
as binding in and of themselves would, as Kelly rightly asserts, be to
“constitute a new legislative form of lawmaking,
not customary
international law based on state behavior accepted as
law.”[149]
Proponents of an exaggerated definition of state "practice" deny the most
elementary distinction between treaties and custom: custom
is not simply a
matter of words, wherever or by whomever
uttered,[150] but is
a function of what is happening in the real
world.[151] Custom,
as distinguished from treaty, is about negotiation via
practice.[152] The
effective obliteration of the consistent practice requirement advocated by many
scholars is thus conceptually
flawed.[153] As
Wolfke has acerbically observed, “repeated verbal acts are also acts of
conduct... but only to customs of making such declarations...
and not to customs
of the conduct described in the content of the verbal
acts.”[154]
This
is not a purely formalist point. As the huge variation in theories of which
words count as
practice[155] makes
clear, the risk of subjectivity and political
distortion[156]
inherent in the transmutation of words into practice is
extreme.[157] Kelly
rightly points to the likelihood of cultural
bias[158] in the
selection of which norms are “important to international order and human
values,”[159]
“important [to] the common interests of states or
humanity,”[160] or which address
concerns that are “destabilizing or morally
distasteful”:[161]
Powerful states use “non-empirical” customary international law to justify the exercise of power without actual acceptance. Environmental and human rights activists, on the other hand, envision customary international law as an instrument for progressive change... [Customary international law] is an inapt instrument for all of these uses. The clever use of arbitral decisions, general dicta from a few ICJ cases, the glorification of general and ambiguous non-binding instruments, or the reconceptualization of customary international law do not establish either requirement of customary law. Custom takes its authority from the belief in the normative quality of resolved experience, not the manipulation of legal instruments.[162]
In sum, “[t]his impressionistic disarray allows the scholar, advocate,
or judge in the few cases that are adjudicated to subjectively
arrive at a
conclusion affected by normative predilection. The customary international law
of human rights is a product of the normative
perspectives of academics and
advocates practicing human rights law, not the social facts of states accepting
legal
norms.”[163]
Given
the inherent
subjectivity[164] of
treating some, but not all, words as customary law without need for concordant
practice, it should come as little surprise that
relevant assertions of
customary duty rarely attract compliance by
states.[165] It is
surely right that “[t]he less powerful nations... would be unlikely to
accept the ‘claims’ approach of D’Amato
or the New Haven
school because it would diminish their role in law
formation,”[166]
even as the view favored by many in the less developed world that “the
accumulation of non-binding international instruments
creates binding legal
obligations is not one which is widely shared by [developed] states and has been
specifically rejected by the
United
States.”[167]
This, it seems to me, is the critical answer to scholars such as Schachter who
argue for the revaluation of words as practice based
on the need to secure
critical social ends. If compliance is not in practice advanced by the
assertion of words alone as customary
international
law[168] – and
there is little evidence that it
is[169] – then
on what basis does the appeal to necessity really stand? And if the alleged
necessity really does exist in the context
of a shared assumption of
critical need – as most theorists assume it should – then there will
in any event be little difficulty
proceeding to a treaty to concretize that
agreement.[170]
The Second Claim: Non-Refugees are Entitled to Refugee Rights
Jane McAdam’s pioneering study, Complementary Protection in
International Refugee
Law,[171]
links neatly to Lauterpacht and Bethlehem’s analysis. McAdam’s
thesis is that all persons who are entitled to be protected
against
refoulement are – despite their non-refugee-status – entitled
to the same rights as refugees admitted pursuant to the requirements
of the
Refugee Convention.[172]
To be clear, McAdam’s argument is not simply that
non-returnable persons are entitled to all generic, internationally recognized
human rights. Her claim is specifically
that all persons who are non-returnable
under international law benefit from the specific entitlements which the Refugee
Convention
grants to refugees who satisfy the refugee definition set in Art. 1
of that
treaty.[173]
McAdam’s
claim at times appears to be (appropriately) aspirational. She is clearly
correct that there is a “protection
gap”[174]
arising from the fact that most of the new duties of
non-refoulement have simply been read into treaty law by authoritative
interpretation of the supervisory bodies. In contrast to the Refugee
Convention’s
explicit design as an instrument to codify the rights of its
beneficiary class,[175]
the incremental and opportunistic way in which broader duties of
non-refoulement have generally
evolved[176]
provided no comparable opportunity to secure clear agreement on the
rights of the expanded class of persons entitled to protection
against
refoulement. Non-removable non-refugees have thus been forced to rely on
generic (and hence often insufficiently attentive) rights set out in
general
human rights
law.[177] McAdam
acknowledges that customary law has not intervened to fill this void,
forthrightly conceding that state practice does not
presently support the
attribution of refugee-specific rights to other persons benefitting from
protection against
refoulement.[178]
She points instead to the comparability of needs between non-removable, at-risk,
non-citizen refugees and non-removable, at-risk,
non-citizen
“others.” McAdam encourages us to recognize the flexibility of the
Refugee Convention’s rights regime,
noting that “... there is
nothing intrinsic in the Convention regime that prevents its extension to
persons outside the article
1(A)(2)
definition...”[179]
There is, in my view, much force to this argument, at least seen as a
sensible policy option.
Indeed, I believe there is much to commend a second
and more legally aggressive argument briefly alluded to by McAdam. Moving
beyond
the purely normative, she points to the utility of non-discrimination law
as the basis for compelling states to grant non-removable
“others”
the same rights granted to non-removable refugees. Arguing that “...
there is no legal justification
for distinguishing between the status of
Convention refugees and beneficiaries of complementary
protection,”[180]
McAdam asserts that “[t]o invoke the Convention refugee definition as
intrinsically and exclusively legitimate in giving rise
to a privileged alien
status is... both historically inaccurate and legally
flawed.”[181]
Noting that non-discrimination law “permits distinctions between aliens
who are in materially different circumstances, but
prohibits unequal treatment
of those similarly
placed,”[182]
she neatly sets the stage for invocation of the broad-ranging duty of
equal protection of the
law,[183] especially
that set by Art. 26 of the Civil and Political
Covenant.[184]
Unless the differential allocation of rights between refugees and other
non-removable, at-risk, non-citizens is demonstrably “objective
and
reasonable,” the same rights must be extended to both
groups.[185]
As such, both in state parties to the Refugee Convention and in countries that
grant refugees preferred rights in practice, the
duty of equal protection is in
my view a powerful basis upon which to assert the need to enfranchise the broad
category of persons
in receipt of protection against refoulement with
refugees.
But McAdam’s claim is neither simply normative nor based on
equal protection
obligations.[186]
Regrettably in my view, she insists that there is a present legal obligation to
assimilate refugees and other beneficiaries of protection
against
refoulement[187]
for purposes of rights entitlement because the recognition of
non-refugee-specific duties of non-refoulement amounts to an indirect
amendment of the scope of the Refugee Convention. She writes:
... [I]nstead of the Convention’s terms being formally expanded by a Protocol or an amendment to the text itself, ... the development of human rights-based non-refoulement has extended eligibility for protection, while the Convention may be appropriately viewed as articulating the resulting status.[188]
More explicitly:
As a specialist human rights treaty comprising one part of a holistic human rights regime, it is argued that the Convention’s application has been extended through the expansion of non-refoulement under human rights law (and, by analogy, to protection granted in accordance with humanitarian and international criminal law), rather than by the conventional means of a Protocol... Since the scope of non-refoulement has been broadened by subsequent human rights instruments, this necessarily widens the [Refugee] Convention’s application.[189]
I believe this analysis to be in error.
Going even farther than the
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem analysis, McAdam accords a reified place to the duty
of
non-refoulement.[190]
Her premise is that the Refugee Convention is essentially a treaty concerned to
identify persons who should be granted protection
against refoulement and
then to define the rights that attach to persons in receipt of protection
against refoulement. Under this rubric, since refugees are only a part
of the “non-refoulement-acquiring class” which is in her view
the basis for accessing Refugee Convention rights, refugees can receive no more
rights
than any other beneficiary of protection against
refoulement.
But the Refugee Convention is not an instrument that is
organized around granting rights to a beneficiary class defined by the duty
of
non-refoulement. Codification of the duty of non-refoulement was
actually far from the core of the Refugee Convention’s purposes; indeed,
as initially proposed, Art. 33 would have applied
only to refugees arriving with
pre-authorization in a state
party.[191] As a
matter of historical fact, there is no basis to suggest that the Refugee
Convention exists to delineate the entitlements of
persons granted protection
against refoulement.
And even if the Refugee Convention were a treaty
intended to define the rights of the beneficiaries of non-refoulement
(rather than about the rights of refugees), how does one amend the express
beneficiary class of the treaty by stealth? Would it
really follow that the
express scope of a treaty concerned to provide rights to the beneficiaries of
protection against refoulement automatically expands to embrace persons
granted comparable protection under other instruments, or under customary
international
law? Given the clarity of rules about the amendment of treaties,
how exactly can it be that “the [broadened] scope of non-refoulement
[under] subsequent human rights instruments,... necessarily widens the
[Refugee] Convention’s
application,”[192]
as McAdam suggests?
Her theory of indirect amendment is that “[t]he
Refugee Convention provides the clearest statement of international law’s
treatment of persons in need of international protection and, as such,
this treaty may be seen as providing the status for a more broadly constituted
notion of ‘refugee’ (emphasis
added).”[193]
The Refugee Convention amounts, in McAdam’s view, to “... a form of
lex specialis (specialist law) for all those in need of international
protection, and provides an appropriate legal status irrespective of the
source of the State’s protection obligation (emphasis
added).”[194]
What is really being said here?
Assuming that McAdam is right (as I believe
to be the case) that the Refugee Convention’s rights regime is “the
clearest
statement” of duties owed to aliens in need of
protection,[195] why
then does it follow – “as such,” to use McAdam’s
language – that it defines the rights of persons
to whom it does not
textually
apply?[196] If the
question were whether this would be desirable, the answer is likely
“yes.”[197]
But McAdam’s is not a mere normative claim; rather, she states it
as a legally required conclusion based on no more than the
principled logic of
the refugee rights list being a good fit with the needs of
others.[198] Yet as
she forthrightly concedes, not even the regime for stateless persons, drafted
contemporaneously with the Refugee Convention,
grants all of the same
rights to that group as are bestowed upon
refugees.[199] To
insist nonetheless that the beneficiary class for refugee rights has been de
jure expanded to include all those protected against refoulement,
whether refugees or not – with no argument based on treaty
amendment[200] or on
the rise of either a customary or general principles norm – is legally
impossible.[201]
Nor
is the argument assisted by McAdam’s appeal to the notion of lex
specialis. This general principle of international law exists primarily to
resolve a conflict between competing international norms; it is
also sometimes
invoked also to justify reliance on specialized norms to interpret the scope of
more general rules. But neither the
primary nor secondary meaning of lex
specialis provides a legal basis for extending a treaty’s beneficiary
class to embrace persons outside its textual
ambit.[202]
Rather,
the core meaning of lex specialis is that where two rules of
international law – one specific, one more general – deal with the
same subject matter, the
more specific rule governs in the event of
conflict.[203]
Lex specialis does not require that general rules be ignored where they
can be applied without infringing the specific
rule;[204] to the
contrary, “[f]or lex specialis to apply... there must be some
actual inconsistency between [the two rules], or else a discernible intention
that one provision is
to exclude the
other.”[205]
Conde provides a helpful example:
... [F]reedom of religious expression (“manifestation of religion”) can be considered lex specialis of the norm of freedom of expression. It carves out a particular area of a more general subject for special treatment. It is usually used in the interpretation of treaty norms as a rule that states that a specific rule will always overrule a general rule covering the same subject.[206]
If therefore a treaty provision on religious freedom were framed in absolute
terms whereas another treaty on freedom of expression
in general were framed
with permissible limitations, a state party to both treaties would be obliged to
respect religious freedom
without reliance on the limitations allowed under the
general accord. But this primary understanding of lex specialis clearly
does not support the view that non-refugees are entitled to refugee rights by
virtue of the similarity of their predicament.
Because there is simply a legal
void to be filled in relation to non-refugees, there is no conflict of rules
that lex specialis can assist to resolve.
The secondary role of
lex specialis is similarly irrelevant to
McAdam’s argument. In
addition to defining the “trump” in the case of legal conflict,
lex specialis may be invoked as an interpretive aid, most commonly to
assist in the construction of a general provision in relation to a matter
also
governed by a more specific norm. In the Nuclear Weapons decision, for
example, the International Court of Justice invoked lex specialis to
require that the meaning of the (general) provision in the Civil and Political
Covenant’s right not to be arbitrarily deprived
of one’s life should
be construed – in the context of armed conflict – in a way that
takes account of the (more
specific) provisions of the simultaneously applicable
rules of international humanitarian
law.[207] And in
the Court’s opinion in the Israeli Wall case, lex specialis
was again relied on to compel assessment of the legality of the wall not only by
reference to the (general) provisions of human rights
law, but also taking
account of the (more specific) rules of international humanitarian
law.[208]
While
not resolving a conflict in the same direct way as it does when playing its
primary “trump” role, the interpretive
variant of lex
specialis promotes the same general end – the avoidance of normative
conflict – but in a more subtle way, namely by refusing to
allow generic
norms to be construed or applied in isolation from more specialized
rules.[209] This
makes sense because, as Grotius observed, in determining the true intentions of
state parties, “... the preference is
to be given to such [treaties] as
are more particular, and approach nearer to the point in
question.”[210]
But the importance of interpreting general rules in harmony with more
specific rules does not advance McAdam’s thesis that
the absence of rules
to define the status of the broader class of non-returnable persons must be
filled by the effective recasting
of the Refugee Convention’s beneficiary
class.
In sum, lex specialis is a general principle of law concerned
with determining the relationship between norms. It exists primarily in order
to resolve
a conflict between two binding standards – not, as McAdam
tacitly suggests, to fill a normative void. Because there is no
normative
conflict of either the direct or indirect variety – non-removable
non-refugees can readily benefit from generic human
rights without any
infringement of the Refugee Convention’s special provisions for refugees
– lex specialis has no legal relevance to the definition of the
scope of the duty to protect
non-refugees.[211]
This
is not to suggest that there are not good reasons in principle to extend many,
if not all, Refugee Convention rights to the
broader class of persons protected
against refoulement. To the contrary, as observed above, the duty of
equal protection may compel that result in at least some cases. But there is no
extant legal basis to assert that all legally non-returnable persons are
entitled de jure to claim all Refugee Convention rights.
Conclusions
Conceptual clarity on these issues
matters.[212] The
net result of the persistent overstatement of the reach of international refugee
law is not, as presumably hoped, the effective
incorporation of new standards
into a clear and practical system of enforceable
duties.[213]
Consider, for example, the reaction of the English Court of Appeal when invited
by UNHCR to find that the duty of non-refoulement should be deemed to
have evolved beyond the text of Art. 33 in order to prohibit efforts to stymie
the departure from their own countries
of would-be refugees. UNHCR frankly
acknowledged that its submissions to this end did “... not turn on the
text of the Refugee
Convention. Rather, they turn on understanding the
international protection regime as a complex of international practice and
precepts
drawn from refugee law, human rights law, and general principles of
international law... Where, as in the present case, issues arise
that strictly
do not fall within the Convention’s textual scope, its objectives and
purposes should act as a reliable
guide.”[214]
The
Court appropriately rejected this argument in clear terms. It cited with
approval the view of the ICJ that “... although
the principle of good
faith is ‘one of the most basic principles concerned with the creation and
performance of legal obligations...
it is not in itself a source of obligation
where none would otherwise
exist’...”[215]
Most fundamentally, the Court refused to expand the duty of
non-refoulement beyond what its text would reasonably bear simply because
such an expansion would prove beneficial to at-risk persons. Adopting
the
earlier view of the High Court of Australia, the court asserted instead that
... the Convention, like many international and municipal instruments, does not necessarily pursue its primary purpose at all costs. The purpose of an instrument may instead be pursued in a limited way, reflecting the accommodation of the differing viewpoints, the desire for limited achievement of objectives, or the constraints imposed by limited resources... It would therefore be wrong to depart from the demands of language and context by invoking the humanitarian objectives of the Convention without appreciating the limits which the Convention itself places on the achievement of them.[216]
It is of course true that the reform of international law, in particular
bodies of law such as refugee law which present few clear
strategic, much less
immediate, advantages to state parties, is a slow and often frustrating process.
But as the history of the last
two decades makes clear, it is not a Sisyphean
pursuit. We can already draw on an extraordinary expansion of the duty of
non-refoulement under the Civil and Political Covenant, as well as under
regional norms; we can build on the potential for major gains in this regard
under both the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and by reliance on
international humanitarian law; and we can ground the arguments
for
rights-attribution to non-refugee beneficiaries of protection against
refoulement in the duty of
non-discrimination.[217]
While less glamorous and surely less
immediate,[218] this
patient and incrementalist strategy allows us to pursue reform from within the
relatively secure space of legal obligation.
If in contrast the scope of extant
legal obligation is exaggerated, we impliedly jettison accrued gains and descend
into the realm
of pure policy – a space in which refugee rights are far
too often deemed dispensable in the pursuit of narrow definitions
of state
self-interest.
In what may seem an ironic twist, those committed to
expansion of the scope of protection must therefore concede that contrary to
the
claim of Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, there is no customary international legal
obligation enjoining states not bound by relevant
conventions to honor the duty
of non-refoulement in relation to refugees and others facing the prospect
of serious harm. And contrary to McAdam’s view, it is not the case
that
all persons entitled to protection against refoulement must, by virtue of
a conceptual fusion of the Refugee Convention and other human rights accords, be
granted all of the refugee-specific
entitlements codified in the Refugee
Convention itself.
There is, in short, no leveraged right to asylum.
[*] Dean of the
Melbourne Law School and William Hearn Professor of Law, University of
Melbourne. The research assistance of Anne Kallies,
as well as the thoughtful
comments of Michelle Foster, Martin Jones, Paul McDonough, Jason Pobjoy and
Michael Timmins on an earlier
draft are acknowledged with appreciation. This
analysis was initially presented at the Auckland University Faculty of Law
‘Human
Rights at the Frontier’ Conference, Sept. 12, 2008. The
author thanks the New Zealand Legal Research Foundation and University
of
Auckland Law Faculty for the invitation to participate in this
conference.
[1]
R. (Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator; Do v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, [2004] UKHL 26, June 17, 2004. See generally N. Mole,
Asylum and the European Convention on Human Rights (2007); and P. van
Dijk et al eds., Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human
Rights (2006), at
433-440.
[2] See
generally P. Alston and J. Crawford eds., The Future of UN Human Rights
Treaty Monitoring
(2000).
[3] UN
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 1465 UNTS 85 (“Torture
Convention”).
[4]
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 172 (“Civil
and Political
Covenant”).
[5]
See J. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law
(2005) (“Rights of Refugees”), at
368-370.
[6] 1577
UNTS 3. See J. McAdam, Complementary Protection in International
Refugee Law (2007) (“Complementary Protection”), at
173-196. It is of course true that relevant norms under these accords are more
substantively circumscribed than the
Refugee Convention’s open-ended focus
on persons at risk of “being persecuted.” But protection claims
derived from
the Torture Convention, Civil and Political Covenant, Covention on
the Rights of the Child and international humanitarian law are
in other ways
less constrained than is refugee status. In particular, there is no need to
show the element of civil or political
disfranchisement inherent in the Refugee
Convention’s “for reasons of” nexus requirement; and states
are not authorized
to deny protection on the basis of lack of deservingness as
Art. 1(F) of the Refugee Convention
requires.
[7] See
generally Hathaway, Rights of Refugees, at 369,
fn.399.
[8] See
generally Hathaway, Rights of Refugees, at
278-990.
[9] J.
Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law:
1920-1950,” (1984) 33 ICLQ
348.
[10] Council
Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of
third country nationals or stateless persons
as refugees or as persons who
otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection
granted, O.J. 304, 30/09/2004
P.0012-0023 (“Qualification
Directive”).
[11]
The original draft of the Qualification Directive (Proposal for a Council
Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and
status of third country
nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need
international protection”,
EU Doc. 14643/02 (Asile 68), 22 November 2002),
denied only two Refugee Convention rights to the beneficiaries of subsidiary
protection.
First, it was proposed that they would only be granted travel
documents in limited circumstances. Second, access to the labor market
was to
be denied for up to six months following the date of status recognition:
see J. Hathaway, “What’s in a Label?,” (2003) 5
European Journal of Migration and Law 1 (“Label”). The
rights afforded to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection were, however, diluted
as a consequence of
further drafting. The limitation on access to travel
documents was retained (Article 25). The six month limitation for access to
the
labor market was removed, but a discretion was introduced allowing Member States
to take into account the situation of the labor
market when considering
potential limitations on access to the labor market for beneficiaries of
subsidiary protection (Article 26).
Discretionary exceptions were also
introduced in relation to access to social welfare (Article 28), access to
health care (Article
29) and the availability of family unification (Article
24). There is nonetheless a high correlation between the standards adopted
for
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and Refugee Convention rights:
Qualification
Directive.
[12]
The Commission of the European Communities has announced its intention to
“reconsider the level of rights and benefits to be
secured for
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, in order to enhance their access to
social and economic entitlements which are
crucial for their successful
integration, whilst ensuring respect for the principle of family unity across
the EU”: Commission
of the European Communities, Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, “Policy Plan on Asylum: An
Integrated Approach to Protection Across the EU,”
COM (2008) 360 final (17
June 2008). The Commission’s proposal finds support in a Staff Working
document accompanying the
Communication: “Given the fact that in practical
terms the situation of the two groups is comparable, their level of rights
should also be (close to) equivalent. A clear example is the lack of provisions
in EU law on family reunification for subsidiary
protection beneficiaries. A
higher level of rights for these persons is necessary if the EU wants to avoid
creating a subclass of
protected persons and also to respond to the call of the
Hague programme which mention the established of a uniform protection status
in
the EU”: Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff
Working Document accompanying the Communication from
the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of Regions,
“Policy Plan on Asylum: An Integrated Approach
to Protection Across the EU,” Impact Assessment, SEC (2008) 2029 (June
17,
2008).
[13]
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001, S.C. 2001, c. 27, at s.
97.
[14] For
Australia, see Department of Immigration and Citizenship, “Draft
Complementary Protection Model: Australia” (13 November 2008) (copy
with
author); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Draft
Complementary Protection Visa Model: Australia: UNHCR Comments”
(January
2009). The proposed model evidences an intention to provide an identical status
to refugees and to beneficiaries of complementary
protection. A similar
approach has been proposed in New Zealand. The most recent draft of the
Immigration Bill 2007 (NZ) is available
at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2007/0132-2/latest/versions.aspx
(accessed Aug. 7, 2009). See generally J. Pobjoy, “Treating like
alike: The principle of non-discrimination as a tool to mandate the equal
treatment of involuntary
aliens entitled to international protection”
(“Treating like alike”), (forthcoming, copy with
author).
[15] A
right to asylum was rejected both in the drafting of the Refugee Convention, and
at the 1977 Territorial Asylum Conference. See generally A.
Grahl-Madsen, Territorial Asylum (1980). I summarize the contemporary
significance of the abortive effort to draft a binding
commitment to grant
asylum in The Law of Refugee Status (1991), at
13-16.
[16] See
eg. J. Hathaway, “Why Refugee Law Still Matters,” (2007) 8
Melbourne Journal of International Law
89.
[17] E.
Lauterpacht and D. Bethlehem, “The Scope and Content of the Principle of
Non-Refoulement,” in E. Feller ed., Refugee Protection in
International Law 87 (2003) (“Non-Refoulement”), at para.
253. The exception is for persons who face a threat to “life, physical
security, or liberty” not rising
to the level of a risk of “torture
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” whose entitlement
to protection
against refoulement can be trumped by “overriding
reasons of national security or public safety”: id. at para.
253(c).
[18]
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark;
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, cited in
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, “Non-Refoulement,” at para.
198.
[19]
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, “Non-Refoulement,” at para.
198.
[20]
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, “Non-Refoulement,” at paras.
201-208. They add for good measure, that there is an “evident lack of
expressed objection by any state to
the normative character of the principle of
non-refoulement”: id. at para.
216.
[21]
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, “Non-Refoulement,” at paras.
209-210.
[22]
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, “Non-Refoulement,” at paras.
211-215.
[23]
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, “Non-Refoulement,” at para. 216.
Somewhat confusingly, they also seem to suggest that non-refoulement is a
general principle of international law, though they provide no analysis in
support of that view:
id.
[24]
Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), [1950] ICJ
266.
[25]
Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), [1950] ICJ 266, at
277.
[26]
“It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international
law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice
and opinio juris
of States, even though multilateral conventions may have an important role to
play in recording and defining rules deriving from
custom, or indeed in
developing them”: Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta)
Judgment, [1985] ICJ Rep. 13, at para. 27. See also Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States,
Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para. 183; and Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] ICJ Rep. 226, at para.
64.
[27] Thus, the
norm must “... be of a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could
be regarded as forming the basis of a
general rule of law”: North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal
Republic of Germany/Netherlands), [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, at para. 72. While
there was some concern in the case that the “equidistance principle”
invoked
as treaty-based custom met this test given its secondary character
(see id.), there is little doubt that the duty of non-refoulement
is of a norm-creating
character.
[28]
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark;
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, at paras.
209-215. “... [T]he substance of [customary] law must be ‘looked
for primarily in the
actual practice and opinio juris of
States’”: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para.
64. Accord International Law Association (“ILA”),
“Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary
International Law” (2000) (“Customary International Law”), at
para. 9.
[29]
“At best, the recommendation made by the Council constitutes the point of
departure of an administrative practice...”:
Reservations to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, [1951]
ICJ Rep. 15, at
25.
[30] To be
fair, customary international law is notoriously murky terrain. As Goldsmith
and Posner write, “It is unclear which
state acts count as evidence of a
custom, or how broad consistent state practice must be to satisfy the custom
requirement. It is
also unclear what it means for a nation to follow a custom
from a sense of legal obligation, or how one determines whether such an
obligation exists”: J. Goldsmith and E. Posner, “A Theory of
Customary International Law,” (1999) 66 U. Chi. L.R. 1113, at 1114. In
the result, “international law arguments based on custom always suffer
from a considerable degree of arbitrariness”:
N. Petersen,
“Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the Role of State
Practice in International Norm Creation,”
(2007-2008) 23 Am. U. Intl. L.R.
275, at 277.
[31]
Anthony D’Amato has strongly criticized the ICJ for commencing with
analysis of opinio juris (rather than with analysis of whether there is
consistent relevant state practice) in the Nicaragua case: A.
D’Amato, “Trashing Customary International Law,” (1987) 81
AJIL 101 (“Trashing”), at 102.
But as Oscar Schacter has observed,
“[e]ven if the [reversal] seemed to place the cart before the horse, it
did not depart
in principle from the basic postulate that binding custom was the
result of the two elements: State practice and opinio juris”: O.
Schachter, “New Custom: Power, Opinio Juris and Contrary
Practice,” in J. Makarczyk ed., Theory of international law at the
threshold of the 21st century: Essays in honour of
Krzysztof Skubiszewski 531 (1996) (“New Custom”), at
534.
[32] Only if
relevant state actions are “based on their being conscious of having a
duty to [act in a particular way] would it
be possible to speak of an
international custom”: The Case of the SS ‘Lotus’, PCIJ
Ser.A, no.10, at
28.
[33] K.
Wolfke, Custom in Present International Law (1993)
(“Custom”), at 51. See also International Law
Association, “Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of
General Customary International Law”
(2000), at 10: “...[T]he main
function of the subjective elements is to indicate what practice counts
(or, more precisely, does not count) towards the formation of a customary
rule.” As Kammerhofer writes, “[t]he
concept of opinio juris
is arguably the centrepiece of customary international law. It is the most
disputed, least comprehended component of the workings
of customary
international law. At the heart of the debate lies an important conflict: on
the one hand, customary law-making seems
by nature indirect and unintentional.
On the other hand, law-making normally requires some form of intentional
activity, an act
of will. In the international legal system, great value has
traditionally been placed in the states’ agreement or consent
to create
legal obligations binding on them...”: J. Kammerhofer, “Uncertainty
in the Formal Sources of International
Law: Customary International Law and Some
of Its Problems,” (2004) 15 EJIL 523 (“Uncertainty”), at
532.
[34]
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at paras.
188-190.
[35]
See eg. R. Jennings and A. Watts eds., Oppenheim’s International
Law (2008) (“Oppenheim’s”), at 28; I. Brownlie,
Principles of Public International Law (2008)
(“Principles”), at 6. But see J. Kelly, “The
Twilight of Customary International Law,” (2000) 40 Va. J. Intl. L. 449
(“Twilight”), at 487: “Aspirational or recommendatory
instruments, enacted while states remain unwilling to sign
concrete treaties,
provide compelling evidence that states lack the normative conviction necessary
to create customary obligations,
rather than evidence that states believe these
norms are
binding.”
[36]
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, “Non-Refoulement,” at para.
209.
[37]
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, “Non-Refoulement,” at para.
209.
[38] Writing
in relation to the practice component of customary law, Villiger observes that
“the condition of uniform practice
requires that the instances of practice
of individual States and of States in general circumscribe, apply, or refer to,
and thereby
express, the same customary rule”: M. Villiger,
Customary International Law and Treaties: A Manual of Theory and Practice of
the Interrelation of Sources (1997) (“Interrelation of
Sources”), at
43.
[39]
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, “Non-Refoulement,” at para.
210.
[40]
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, “Non-Refoulement,” at para.
216.
[41] UNGA
Res. 2312 (XXII), adopted Dec. 14,
1967.
[42]
Id. at Art. 1(1) and
Preamble.
[43]
Specifically, persons threatened with persecution are one of the three groups
said by Lauterpacht and Bethlehem to be entitled to
protection against
refoulement under a general customary duty. The other two are persons
who face “a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment
or punishment” and persons who face “a threat to life, physical
integrity, or liberty”: Lauterpacht
and Bethlehem,
“Non-Refoulement,” at para.
218.
[44] There is
a not-insignificant policy concern, noted by Thomas Franck. “The effect
of [an] enlarged concept of the lawmaking
force of General Assembly resolutions
may well be to caution states to vote against ‘aspirational’
instruments if they
do not intend to embrace them totally and at once,
regardless of circumstances. That would be unfortunate. Aspirational
resolutions
have long occupied, however uncomfortably, a twilight zone between
‘hard’ treaty law and the normative void. Even if
passed with a
degree of cynicism, they may still have a bearing on the direction of normative
evolution. By seeking to harden this
‘soft’ law prematurely,
however, the [ICJ] advises prudent states to vote against such resolutions, or
at least to abstain”:
T. Franck, “Some Observations on the
ICJ’s Procedural and Substantive Innovations,” (1987) 81 AJIL 116
(“Innovations”),
at 119.
[45] Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para.
188.
[46] Some
commentators take strong objection to this holding. “... [A] customary
rule arises out of state practice; it is not
necessarily to be found in UN
resolutions and other majoritarian political documents... If voting for a UN
resolution means investing
it with opinio juris, then the latter has no
independent content: one may simply apply the UN resolution as it is and
mislabel it ‘customary law’”:
D’Amato, Trashing, at 102.
This critique is overstated, as the ICJ merely held that General Assembly
resolutions could contribute
to opinio juris; consistent state practice
must also be identified. D’Amato no doubt makes his charge in view of the
Court’s regrettable
assumption (rather than interrogation) of consistent
state practice. The judgment is, however, clear that consistent state practice
remains an essential element of customary international law formation:
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para. 184. Accord
ILA, Customary International Law, at 63: “Given that General Assembly
resolutions are not, in principle, binding, something
more is needed to
establish [opinio juris] than a mere affirmative vote (or failure to
oppose a resolution adopted by
consensus).”
[47]
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] ICJ Rep. 226, at
para. 71. “... [I]t is necessary to look at its content and the
conditions of its adoption; it is
also necessary to see whether an opinio
juris exists as to its normative character. Or a series of resolutions may
show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris required for the
establishment of a new rule”: id. An extreme interpretation is
that “[t]his decision goes much farther than its predecessors in
transforming [General Assembly
resolutions] from exhortations or ‘soft
law’ principles into ‘hard law’ prescriptions, at least in the
eyes
of the Court... Every resolution that purports to express a legal norm,
even a ‘soft law’ exhortation or aspiration,
has the potential of
being recognized by the Court as a binding and strictly enforceable obligation,
at least for those states which
did not expressly dissent from it”: F.
Morrison, “Legal Issues in the Nicaragua Opinion,” (1987) 81
AJIL 160, at 161. As James Crawford helpfully reminds us, “[o]f course,
the General Assembly is
not a legislature. Mostly its resolutions are only
recommendations, and it has no capacity to impose new legal obligations on
states”:
J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law
(2006) (“Creation of States”), at
113.
[48]
See note 15
supra.
[49]
E. Lapenna, “Territorial Asylum - Developments from 1961 to 1977 -
Comments on the Conference of Plenipotentiaries,”
(1978) 16 A.W.R. Bull.
1, at 4.
[50] A
helpful contrast is provided by the facts of the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case
(United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1974] ICJ Rep. 3, at para. 56, noting that the
opinio juris contended for by Iceland – a provision for special
treatment of states overwhelmingly dependent on fishing – initially
“failed to obtain the majority required, but a resolution was adopted at
the 1958 Conference concerning the situation of countries
or territories whose
people are overwhelmingly dependent upon coastal fisheries for their livelihood
or economic
development.”
[51]
This argument is, however, made by the UNHCR. “The principle of
non-refoulement has been consistently referred to by the United Nations
General Assembly in its various resolutions on the High Commissioner’s
Annual Report. The Office of UNHCR considers that these references to the
principle of non-refoulement, taken together with the... Conclusions of
the [UNHCR] Executive Committee constitute further evidence of its acceptance as
a basic
normative principle”: UNHCR, “The Principle of
Non-Refoulement as a Norm of Customary International Law: Response to the
Questions Posed to UNHCR by the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal
Republic of Germany in Cases 2 BvR 1938/93, 2 BvR 1953/93, 2 BvR 1954/93,”
Jan. 31, 1994, at para.
43.
[52] See
eg. the references to non-refoulement in resolutions adopted
routinely by the General Assembly upon receiving the High Commissioner’s
annual report: UNGA Res. 38/121,
adopted Dec. 16, 1983; UNGA Res. 39/140,
adopted Dec. 14, 1984; UNGA Res. 40/118, adopted Decd. 13, 1985; UNGA Res.
41/124, adopted
Dec. 4, 1986; UNGA Res. 42/109, adopted Dec. 7, 1987; UNGA Res.
43/117, adopted Dec. 8, 1988; UNGA Res. 44/137, adopted Dec. 15,
1989; UNGA Res.
45/140, adopted Dec. 14, 1990; UNGA Res. 46/106, adopted Dec. 16, 1991; UNGA
Res. 47/105, adopted Dec. 16, 1992;
UNGA Res. 48/116, adopted Dec. 20, 1993;
UNGA Res. 49/169, adopted Dec. 23, 1994; UNGA Res. 50/152, adopted Dec. 21,
1995; UNGA Res.
51/75, adopted Dec. 12, 1996; UNGA Res. 52/103, adopted Dec. 12,
1997; UNGA Res. 53/125, adopted Dec. 9, 1998; UNGA Res. 54/146,
adopted Dec. 17,
1999; UNGA Res. 55/74, adopted Dec. 4, 2000; UNGA Res. 56/137, adopted Dec. 19,
2001; UNGA Res. 57/187, adopted
Dec. 18, 2002; UNGA Res. 58/151, adopted Dec.
22, 2003; UNGA Res. 59/170, adopted Dec. 20, 2004; UNGA Res. 60/129, adopted
Dec. 16,
2005; UNGA Res. 61/137, adopted Dec. 19, 2006; UNGA Res. 62/124,
adopted Dec. 18, 2007; UNGA Res. 63/148, adopted Dec. 18,
2008.
[53]
See text at note 17
supra.
[54]
There is no pattern of substantial negative votes or abstentions of a kind that
would negate the opinio juris value of the resolutions: Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] ICJ Rep. 226, at para.
71.
[55] “To
begin with, over half the States concerned, whether acting unilaterally or
conjointly, were or shortly [afterward] became
parties to the Geneva Convention,
and were therefore presumably, so far as they were concerned, acting actually or
potentially in
the application of the Convention. From their action no
inference could legitimately be drawn as to the existence of a rule of customary
international law in favour of the equidistance principle”: North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic
of Germany/Netherlands), [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, at para.
76.
[56] For
example, the Thai Ministry of the Interior lists as one of its key functions the
effort “to intercept and drive back refugees”:
U.S. for Refugees and
Immigrants (USCRI), World Refugee Survey 2008 (2008), at 7. The
Malaysian Minister of Information similarly announced with respect to Acehnese
refugees, “We will treat
them as we do other refugees. We will detain
them and send them back”: Reuters, “Malaysia says it will deport
fleeing
Acehnese,” June 3, 2003, quoting Khalil Yaacoub. In India, there
is no domestic legal framework for recognizing refugees.
The Foreigners Act
1946 does not distinguish between undocumented migrants and refugees, and allows
the government to arrest, detain
and deport any undocumented migrant. See
generally P. Saxena, “Creating Legal Space for Refugees in India: the
Milestones crossed and the Roadmap for the Future,” (2007)
19(2) IJRL 246.
[57] Reliance is
sometimes placed on express acknowledgments of the duty of
non-refoulement in bilateral arrangements between regional states and the
UNHCR, but these are not in fact a dependable indicator of opinio juris.
For example, despite having executed such an agreement Jordan simply closed its
borders to Palestinian and Iranian Kurdish refugees
in 2006 on the basis of
capacity and concerns that the refugees would not depart even when the risk
abated: Human Rights Watch, “Nowhere
to Flee: The Perilous Situation of
Palestinians in Iraq,” Sept. 2006 (“Nowhere to Flee”), at
38.
[58]
Participation in both the Torture Convention, supra note 3 (containing an
express duty of non-refoulement in Art. 3) and the Civil and Political
Covenant, supra note 4 (containing an implied duty of
non-refoulement in relation to Arts. 6 and 7) is fairly strong. 70% of
Asian states and 85% of Middle Eastern countries are parties to the Torture
Convention, while 80% of Asian countries and 85% of Middle Eastern nations are
parties to the Civil and Political Covenant: Office
of the High Commissioner on
Human Rights, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification (as at 14 August
2009). Notwithstanding
the high participation rate, only two Asian states
(Kazakhstan and the Republic of Korea) and one Middle Eastern country (Qatar)
have accepted the competence of the Committee Against Torture in accordance with
Article 22 of the Torture Convention. Similarly,
only 50% of Asian state
parties to the Civil and Political Covenant and no Middle Eastern country have
accepted the competence of
the Human Rights Committee to hear individual
complaints under the Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant (99
UNTS 302): Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification (as at 15 August 2009).
Acceptance
of a duty of non-refoulement vis à vis refugees in both
of these regions is very low. Only 40% of Asian countries and 23% of Middle
Eastern states have
acceded to either the Refugee Convention or Protocol: UNHCR,
“State Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees
and the 1967 Protocol,” (Oct. 1, 2008). This refusal formally to be bound
by the duty to avoid the refoulement of refugees is moreover of
long-standing: see K. Hailbronner, "Nonrefoulement and 'Humanitarian'
Refugees: Customary International Law or Wishful Legal Thinking?", in D. Martin
ed., The New Asylum Seekers: Refugee Law in the 1980s (1988), at
128-129. The claim of opinio juris in support of a comprehensive duty of
non-refoulement is thus
undermined.
[59]
Lebanon’s Memorandum of Understanding with the UNHCR, for example, states
that “Lebanon does not consider itself an
asylum country”: United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Global Report 2003 –
The Middle East Regional
Overview,” (June 1, 2004). Lebanon therefore
permits refugees to remain only on the condition that they are resettled or
repatriated
by the UNHCR within a period of six months: USCRI, World Refugee
Survey 2009 (online version, 2009): <http://www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?id=2334>.
A similar concern arises in Jordan: see note 57 supra. See
generally M. Kagan, “The Beleagured Gatekeeper: Protection Challenges
Posed by UNHCR Refugee Status Determination,” (2006) 18(2)
Int. J. Ref. L.
1.
[60] J.S.
Verma, “Inaugural Address,” in UNHCR and SAARCLAW eds., Seminar
Report: Refugees in the SAARC Region: Building
a Legal Framework (1997), at
13-18. Accord P. Saxena, “Creating Legal Space for Refugees in
India: the Milestones Crossed and the Roadmap for the Future,” (2007)
19(2) Intl. J. Ref. L. 246, at 255: “A plethora of unreported cases
demonstrates that the courts have treated these matters
on purely technical
grounds; no pronouncements of law are made nor are any general guidelines laid.
This explains why the majority
of these cases do not find a place in law
reports. Interim non-speaking orders may provide relief in individual cases,
but their
contribution to jurisprudence is negligible, even negative at times.
Ranabir Samaddar has agreed that the judicial reasoning has
been mainly
humanitarian and not rights based, dispensing kindness and not justice, and that
the Court has nothing to say on the
‘refugee-situation.’”
See also O. Chaudhary, “Turning Back: An Assessment of
Non-Refoulement under Indian Law,” (2004) 39 Economic and Political
Weekly 3257. But see V. Vijayakumar, “Judicial Responses to
Refugee Protection in India,” (2000) 12(2) Intl. J. Ref. L. 235, at
235-236, arguing
that Indian court decisions have provided “a series of
rights to the millions of refugees who had to cross the internationally
recognized borders and continue to stay in
India.”
[61]
“As regards those States, on the other hand, which were not, and have not
become parties to the Convention, the basis of their
action can only be
problematical and must remain entirely speculative. Clearly, they were not
applying the Convention. But from
that no inference could justifiably be drawn
that they believed themselves to be applying a mandatory rule of customary
international
law. There is not a shred of evidence that they did and... there
is no lack of other reasons for using the equidistance method,
so that acting,
or agreeing to act in a certain way, does not of itself demonstrate anything of
a juridical nature... The frequency,
or even habitual character of the acts is
not itself enough”: North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal
Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands),
[1969] ICJ Rep. 3, at paras.
76-77.
[62]
“... State practice, including that of States whose interests are
specially affected, should have been both extensive and
virtually uniform in the
sense of the provision invoked; and should moreover have occurred in such a way
as to show a general recognition
that a rule of law or legal obligations is
involved”: North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of
Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), [1969] ICJ Rep.
3, at para.
74.
[63] At the
end of 2008, 6,228,400 refugees were in the Middle East; 909,100 in East Asia
and the Pacific; and 2,512,400 were in South
and Central Asia. This amounts to
more than 70% of the total world refugee population: USCRI, World Refugee
Survey 2009 (2009), at
33.
[64]
Hudson’s classic definition speaks of four elements, including “...
(a) concordant practice by a number of States with
reference to a type of
situation falling within the domain of international relations; (b) continuation
or repetition of the practice
over a considerable period of time; (c) conception
that the practice is required by, or consistent with, prevailing international
law; and (d) general acquiescence in the practice by other States”: M.
Hudson, [1950] 2 YBILC 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1.
Elements (a),
(b), and (d) have converged over time in the requirement to demonstrate that
“... the conduct of States should,
in general, be consistent with [the
putative norm]...: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para.
186. Yet “[i]t is not to be expected that in the practice of States the
application of the rules
in question should have been perfect, in the sense that
States should have refrained, with complete consistency, from [actions
prohibited
by the putative norm]”: id. at para. 185.
Hudson’s element (c) remains a second and independent criterion for
recognition of a rule of customary international
law. “It is of course
axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked for
primarily in the actual
practice and opinio juris of States...”:
Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta) Judgment, [1985] ICJ
Rep. 13, at
para.27.
[65]
USCRI, World Refugee Survey 2008 (2008), at
22.
[66]
Id.
[67]
The most basic categories of Refugee Convention rights inhere provisionally in
persons claiming to be refugees until and unless
they are determined not to
qualify for refugee status: Hathaway, Rights of Refugees, at
156-160.
[68]
Hathaway, Rights of Refugees, at
279-281.
[69]
Id. at
281-282.
[70]
Id. at
282.
[71]
Id. at
283-284.
[72]
Id. at
284-286.
[73]
Id. at
287.
[74]
Id. at
287-289.
[75]
Id. at
290-291.
[76]
Id. at
291-299.
[77]
Indeed, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has formally expressed its
“distress” at the “widespread
violation of the principle of
non-refoulement and of the rights of refugees”: UN Commission on
Human Rights, Res.
1997/75.
[78]
Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), [1950] ICJ 266, at
276.
[79] North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal
Republic of Germany/Netherlands), [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, at para.
74.
[80]
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para.
186.
[81] Brownlie,
Principles, at 7. Hersch Lauterpacht cautions, however, that
“because of the underlying requirement of consent, the condition of
constancy
and uniformity is liable on occasion to be interpreted with some
rigidity when there is a question of ascertaining a customary rule
of general
validity”: E. Lauterpacht ed., International Law: The Collected Papers
of Hersch Lauterpacht 62
(1970).
[82]
Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), [1950] ICJ 266, at
277.
[83]
“State practice, the material element, provides the concrete evidence of
normative conviction”: Kelly, Twilight, at
500.
[84]
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para.
202.
[85] In the
same paragraph, the Court found that “[t]he existence in the opinio
juris of States of the principle of non-intervention is backed by
established and substantial practice”: Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States, Merits),
[1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para.
202.
[86]
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para.
207.
[87] As such,
Duffy’s conclusion that the fact“[t]hat states have rarely
totally disregarded their duty not to ‘refoule’
individuals to face torture is evidence of the normative practice of
non-refoulement (emphasis added)” is not justified: A. Duffy,
“Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-refoulement in International
Law,” (2008) 20(3) Intl. J. Ref. L. 373, at
387.
[88]
Villiger, Interrelation of Sources, at
29.
[89]
See text supra at note
65.
[90]
See text supra at note
66.
[91]
See text supra at note 65. This is not to say that states outside
of Asia and the Middle East have solid records of avoiding refoulement.
To the contrary, states around the world have often violated the putative norm:
see text supra at notes
67-76.
[92] Of the
24 states assessed as presenting “systemic” or
“severe”risks of refoulement, half are in Asia or the Middle
East, namely China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel (including the Occupied
Territories), Lebanon, Libya,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and
Yemen: USCRI, World Refugee Survey 2009 (2009), at
22.
[93] Villiger,
Interrelation of Sources, at
44.
[94]
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para.
186.
[95]
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para.
186.
[96]
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para.
206.
[97]
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at paras.
207-208.
[98] For
example, Egypt summarily sent Sudanese refugees back to Sudan in 2007, as well
as Eritrean refugees to Eritrea in 2008 with
no explanation or justification
given: Amnesty International, “Egypt/Israel: Fear For Safety,” Doc.
MED 15/038/2008/UA/241/08,
Sept. 3, 2008. US President Bush simply declared,
“We will turn back any refugees that attempts to reach our shore, and that
message needs to be very clear as well to the Haitian people”: Human
Rights Watch, “US: Don’t Turn Away Haitian
Refugees,” Feb. 26,
2004. As Kelly observes, “[n]ations do not regularly explain the legal
basis of their actions, nor
is it clear how to determine the normative belief of
hundreds of states, many of whom have never had the opportunity or need to
express
their opinion on a particular principle”: Kelly, Twilight, at
470.
[99] Greece
has asserted that whole groups of persons seeking protection are not refugees,
treating them simply as unauthorized migrants.
“The Greek coast guard
systematically forced boatloads of potential asylum seekers out of its national
waters and back into
Turkish territorial waters, sometimes deliberately damaging
their boats to prevent their return or attempting to swamp them with
waves, and,
occasionally abandoning migrants on uninhabited islands...Greek border guards
arrested migrants upon arrival, issued
all of them automatic deportation orders,
and detained them incommunicado without registration for several days before
returning
them to Turkey”: USCRI, World Refugee Survey 2008 (2008,
online version), http://www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?id=2138 (accessed
15 August 2009). See also S. Troller, “Greece does EU’s
migration dirty work,” The Guardian (Jan. 25, 2009), <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/25/eu-greece>.
Jordan insisted that it had the right to refuse entry to Iraqi Palestinians on
the grounds of the enormity of its other responsibilities
towards the
Palestinians: Human Rights Watch, Nowhere to Flee, at
38.
[100]
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem argue that the only internal limitation to the
putative customary norm is where a state demonstrates “[o]verriding
reasons of national security or safety... in circumstances in which the threat
of persecution does not equate to and would not be
regarded as being on par with
a danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and
would not come within
the scope of other non-derogable customary principles of
human rights. The application of these exceptions is conditional on the
strict
compliance with principles of due process of law and the requirements that all
reasonable steps must first be taken to secure
the admission of the individual
concerned to a safe third country”: Lauterpacht and Bethlehem,
Non-Refoulement, at para.
253.
[101]
Examples of the classic opposition are those who assert that only physical acts
count as practice, eg. A. D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in
International Law (1971); and, arguing that custom may be based on verbal
acts alone, B. Cheng, “Custom: The Future of General State Practice
in a
Divided World,” in R. Macdonald and D. Johnston eds., The Structure and
Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy Doctrine and
Theory 532
(1983).
[102]
Kammerhofer, Uncertainty, at
525.
[103]
See text supra at note
28.
[104] ILA,
“Customary International
Law.”
[105]
ILA, “Customary International Law,” at para.
10(c).
[106]
See eg. Franck, Innovations, at 118-119; S. Donaghue, “Normative
Habits, Genuine Beliefs and Evolving Law: Nicaragua and the Theory of
Customary International Law,” (1995) 16 AYBIL 327 (“Normative
Habits”), at 338; Villiger, Interrelation of Sources, at
20.
[107]
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para.
188.
[108]
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para. 183, quoting from
Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta) Judgment, [1985] ICJ
Rep. 13, at para.
27.
[109]
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para.
184.
[110]
“In Nicaragua... the ICJ discussed the requirement of state
practice, but neither analyzed, nor cited examples of this element”:
Kelly, Twilight,
at 476, fn.112. See also Franck, Innovations, at
118-119, and F. Kirgis, “Custom on a Sliding Scale,” (1987) 81 AJIL
146 (“Sliding Scale”),
at
147.
[111]
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para.
186.
[112]
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para.
186.
[113]
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para.
186.
[114]
Franck, Innovations, at 118-119; Kirgis, Sliding Scale, at
147.
[115]
Having found there to be “abstention” from the use of force other
than as authorized by the UN Charter, the Court turned
to the issue of opinio
juris: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para.
188.
[116]
See text supra at note
34.
[117]
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at paras.
188-190.
[118]
“The Court has however to be satisfied that there exists in customary
international law an opinio juris as to the binding character of such
abstention. This opinio juris may, though with all due caution, be
deduced from, inter alia, the attitude of the Parties and the attitude of
States towards certainly General Assembly resolutions... It would therefore seem
apparent that the attitude referred to expresses an opinio juris
respecting such rules (or set of rules), to be thenceforth treated separately
from the provisions, especially those of an institutional
kind, to which it is
subject on the treaty-law plane of the Charter”: Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States,
Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at para.
188.
[119] The
arguments made by Donaghue – that verbal “practice” is neither
more ambiguous in purport nor necessarily any
more politically motivated than
practice on the ground – are not really arguments in favour of
treating verbiage as practice; they are rather counterpoints to arguments made
against this position: Donaghue, Normative Habits,
at
332.
[120]
Villiger, Interrelation of Sources, at
21.
[121] The
primary meaning of “practice,” however, focuses on “habitual
action or performance”; it is “action
or execution as opposed to
theory”: Concise Oxford Dictionary (1995), at
1072.
[122]
See text supra at note 106. But see text at notes 110-117,
indicating why a careful reading argues against this
interpretation.
[123]
See text supra at note
28.
[124]
Villiger, Interrelation of Sources, at
22.
[125]
Schachter, New Custom, at
533-534.
[126]
Schachter, New Custom, at
534-535.
[127]
“Perhaps the difficulty arises in part from the attempt to differentiate
too clearly between practice and the opinio juris. They are rather
aspects of the same idea. Even the older writers do not always mean by
‘practice’ the mere habit of
acting in a certain way but rather the
evidence, in the form of dispatches, opinions, arguments and so on, which
support the existence
of an opinio juris. Seen thus, the possible effect
of a generally acclaimed General Assembly resolution falls easily into place in
the orthodox scheme
of things”: R. Jennings, Collected Writings of Sir
Robert Jennings 10
(1998).
[128]
Others are more cautious in this regard. “Collective resolutions by
States in international organizations are not sufficient by themselves to
generate customary norms. There has to be evidence of additional State
practice which is consistent with those collective resolutions”: L.
Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical
Development, Criteria, Present Status 236 (1988). See also Crawford,
Creation of States, at 114: “State practice is just as much State
practice when it occurs in the context of the General Assembly as in bilateral
fora. The practice of States in assenting to and acting upon law-declaring
resolutions may be of probative importance, in particular
where that practice
achieves reasonable consistency over a period of
time.”
[129]
Jennings and Watt, Oppenheim’s, at 31. Accord Villiger,
Interrelation of Sources, at 21: “For most members of the State
community, the UN and similar bodies have become the most important fora in
which to
express themselves collectively or
individually.”
[130]
Charter of the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945), at Arts. 10-18. These
articles authorize the General Assembly to make binding
decisions only on a
range of administrative
matters.
[131]
“... [S]tates could amend the UN Charter to create a new, more democratic
process at the UN General Assembly. Similarly,
resolutions passed in a
prescribed form could bind all members specifically voting for a measure.
States could approve an even more
radical measure that would specifically bind
all states to norms upon passage of a law-defining resolution by an appropriate
supermajority”:
Kelly, Twilight, at
497.
[132]
Schachter, New Custom, at
534.
[133]
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 UNTS
277; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS
90.
[134] A
weaker version of this thesis is that treating words as practice“has many
beneficial functions,” in particular ease
of access to documentation of
practice and the ability to change international law without breaking it:
Villiger, Interrelation of Sources, at 21-22. While these technical
points have merit, it is difficult to imagine that either is so pressing that it
justifies a revision
of a core rule of international
lawmaking.
[135]
Schachter, New Custom, at
538.
[136]
Schachter, New Custom, at
538.
[137]
Schachter, New Custom, at 538. He cites in particular “the prohibitions
of aggression, genocide, slavery, torture and systematic
racial
discrimination... [and] the humanitarian law of armed conflict”:
id. at 538-539. He distinguishes these areas from “the law on
jurisdiction, immunities, State responsibility, [and] diplomatic
privileges” where he does not believe the requirement of consistent state
practice can be satisfied by words alone: id. at 538. Other commentators
reach the same conclusion. See eg. J. Wouters and C. Ryngaert,
“Impact on the Process of the Formation of Customary International
Law,” in M. Kamminga and
M. Scheinin eds., The Impact of Human Rights
Law on General International Law 111 (2009) (“Impact”), at 112:
“It will be argued that the more important the common interests of states
or humanity
are, the greater the weight that may be attached to opinio
juris as opposed to state practice. If the stakes are high, inconsistent
state practice may be glossed over, and a high premium may be
put on
states’ statements and declarations, inter alia in multilateral
fora, in identifying customary law combined with general principles of
law.”
[138]
Schachter, New Custom, at
539.
[139]
Kirgis, Sliding Scale, at 149. But as Donaghue observes, “[a]rguments
that practice, or opinio juris... form part of a sliding scale are
clearly incorrect as they fail to recognize the purpose of the inclusion of
these elements in
Article 38 [of the ICJ Statute]”: Donaghue, Normative
Habits, at
330-331.
[140]
Kirgis, Sliding Scale, at 149. See also ILA, “Customary
International Law,” at 13: “When defining State practice – the
objective element in customary
law – it is necessary to take account of
the distinction between what conduct counts as State practice and the weight to
be
given to
it.”
[141]
Kirgis, Sliding Scale, at 148-149. “Views questioning the necessity of
one of the... two elements... have no foundation in
international legal
practice”: Wolfke, Custom, at
41.
[142]
See text supra at notes
106-118.
[143]
Kelly appropriately refers to these theories as “normative discourse
masquerading as empirical”: Kelly, Twilight, at
497.
[144]
Wouters and Ryngaert, Impact, at
112.
[145]
“... [T]hat customary international law furnishes a means to develop
universal norms when actual agreement is difficult or
inconvenient cannot
justify norms when there is no genuine acceptance”: Kelly, Twilight, at
537.
[146]
“Without practice (consuetudo), customary international law would
obviously be a misnomer, since practice constitutes precisely the main
differentia specifica of that kind of international law”: Wolfke,
Custom, at
40-41.
[147]
“... Customary law is by its very nature the result of an informal
process of rule-creation, so that the degree of precision found in more formal
processes of law-making is not to be expected here”:
ILA, “Customary
International Law,” at
2.
[148]
See text supra at notes
32-35.
[149]
Kelly, Twilight, at
486.
[150] The
resolutions of the General Assembly may provide evidence of opinio juris,
or confirm the existence of a norm of customary international law: Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] ICJ Rep 226, at para. 70.
It remains the case, however, that inconsistent state practice precludes the
development of a
customary norm despite strong evidence of opinio juris:
id. at para.
73.
[151] The
International Court of Justice has taken the position that “[w]hen it is
the intention of the State making [a] declaration
that it should become bound
according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character
of a legal undertaking,
the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a
course of conduct consistent with that declaration. An undertaking of this
kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made
within the context of international negotiations, is
binding”:
Australia v. France, [1974] ICJ Rep 253, at 267; New Zealand v.
France, [1974] ICJ Rep 457, at 472; endorsed in Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States,
Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at paras. 39-40. It seems clearly to have been
the Court’s intention to constrain this doctrine; however,
the same result
could readily have been avoided by reliance on such general principles of law as
acquiescence or estoppel. A WTO
panel has appropriately urged caution in the
application of this approach, noting that “[a]ttributing international
legal significance
to unilateral statements made by a State should not be done
lightly and should be subject to strict conditions...”: WTO Panel
Report,
United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Dec. No.
WT/DS152/R, Jan. 27, 2000, at para.
7.118.
[152]
“The misunderstanding resulting from such a broad interpretation [of state
practice] arises from the fact that it neglects
the very essence of every kind
of custom, which for centuries has been based upon material deeds and not
words”: Wolfke, Custom, at
41-42.
[153]
“The strategic advantage of elevating customary international law to a
rule of recognition is that it allows the theorist
to redefine the requirements
of customary international law from empirical law to a preferred process while
retaining its formal
authority”: Kelly, Twilight, at
494.
[154]
Wolfke, Custom, at
42.
[155]
See Kelly, Twilight, at
495-496.
[156]
“Normative scholars, advocates, and self-interested states are misusing an
empirical source of law to articulate their preferred
norms as if they were
propounding a constitution rooted in common culture... I do believe that in a
diverse world without a consensus
on values, a general normative approach is
premature and would threaten primary values, such as state sovereignty and the
procedural
values of open, democratic decision-making, that retain
vitality”: Kelly, Twilight, at
458.
[157]
“Approximately two centuries after the rise of the positivist view, a new
theory [of customary international law] is beginning
to take hold in some
quarters. The theory derives norms of CIL in a loose way from treaties
(ratified or not), UN General Assembly
resolutions, international commissions,
and academic commentary – but all colored by a moralism reminiscent of the
natural
law view”: J. Goldsmith and E. Posner, “Understanding the
Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional Customary International
Law,”
(2000) 40(2) Virginia Journal of International Law 639, at
640.
[158]
Kelly, Twilight, at
467.
[159]
Schachter, New Custom, at
538.
[160]
Wouters and Ryngaert, Impact, at
112.
[161]
Kirgis, Sliding Scale, at 149.
[162] Kelly,
Twilight, at 498.
[163] Kelly,
Twilight, at
492.
[164]
“Under the indeterminate and manipulable theory of customary international
law... customary international law is then a matter
of taste”: Kelly,
Twilight, at
451.
[165]
“... [R]esolutions and recommendations..., however sympathetic one may be
towards their motivation and purpose, cannot themselves
establish a legal rule
binding in international law”: Sepet and Bulbul v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department, [2003] UKHL 15 (UK HL, Mar. 20, 2003). See also
Garza v. Lappin [2001] USCA7 303; (2001) 253 F 3d 918 (US CA7), at 924-925: “The
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of man, on which the Commission
relied in reaching its
conclusions in Garza’s case, is an aspirational
document which, as Garza admitted in his petition... did not on its own create
an enforceable obligation on the part of the OAS member
nations.”
[166]
Kelly, Twilight, at 495. “The substantive norms offered as customary
international law in much of the Western literature are,
not coincidentally,
norms associated with individualism and the market economy”: id. at
466.
[167]
Kelly, Twilight, at 489. As Byers has observed, “[t]he newly independent
non-industrialized States found themselves in a
legal system which had been
developed primarily by relatively wealthy, militarily powerful States. They
consequently sought to change
the system. They used their numerical majorities
to adopt resolutions and declarations which advanced their interests. They also
asserted, in conjunction with a significant number of legal scholars (and
perhaps with the International Court of Justice) that resolutions
and
declarations are instances of State practice which are potentially creative, or
at least indicative, of rules of customary international
law... Powerful States,
for the most part, along with some scholars from powerful States, have resisted
these developments. They
have emphatically denied that resolutions and
declarations can be State practice”: M. Byers, Custom, Power and the
Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law 41
(1999).
[168]
“... [T]he customary international law process does not encourage
compliance. With few effective means of enforcing norms,
the international
system relies on commitment and reciprocal self-interest for compliance.
Nations that played no role in the formation
of norms nor had their interests
considered are unlikely to honor such norms”: Kelly, Twilight, at
540-541.
[169]
In the context of the asserted duty of non-refoulement, see eg.
Hathaway, Rights of Refugees, at 279-300. But the customary legal
argument recently found favour before Justice Hartmann of the Hong Kong Court of
First Instance
in a decision presently on appeal: C. v. Director of
Immigration, Hong Kong Court of First Instance Dec. No. 132/2006, Feb. 18,
2008. Reviewing not only the Lauterpacht and Bethlehem opinion but
also
relevant UNHCR Executive Committee conclusions and the full range of scholarly
positions, the judge determined that “...
[o]n balance... it must be
recognized that the principle of non-refoulement [as] it applies to
refugees has grown beyond the confines of the Refugee Convention and has matured
into a universal norm of customary
international law”: id. at para.
113. Extraordinarily, the judgment makes this finding against an express
acknowledgment that “... a good many states
have... by their actions been
unambiguous in their repudiation of the norm as it has evolved in customary
international law”
(id. at para. 114); indeed, it observes that
UNHCR proclamation of the non-derogable nature of the customary duty of
non-refoulement “... was made by the Executive Committee... against
the backdrop of ‘widespread violations of the principle of
non-refoulement’”: id. at para. 118. In the end,
however, the court refused the declaration sought by the applicants on the
ground that Hong Kong has been
a persistent objector to the norm – a
conclusion reached not on the basis of real evidence of persistent objection,
but rather
on legally doubtful basis that in the context of “... the
refusal to accede to the Refugee Convention, the refusal to enlarge
the terms of
the Immigration Ordinance, the making of specific reservations concerning
immigration and the often-stated policy against
asylum – Hong Kong’s
refusal to pass legislation incorporating the rule is equivalent to passing
legislation for the
purpose of excluding it”: id. at para. 149.
For a detailed description of this case, see O. Jones, “Customary
Non-Refoulement of Refugees and Automatic Incorporation into the Common
Law: A Hong Kong Perspective,” (2009) 58 ICLQ
443.
[170]
“If nations have, in fact, accepted legal norms and possess the necessary
normative conviction, then the vast majority of
states should have little
difficulty signing a treaty. Modern communications and transportation have
simplified the logistics of
international meetings, reducing treaty negotiations
and international decisionmaking to a common occurrence”: Kelly, Twilight,
at 538.
[171]
McAdam, Complementary
Protection.
[172]
The one critical exception asserted by McAdam relates to persons who would fall
afoul of the exclusion clauses of the Refugee Convention:
id. at
223-242.
[173]
McAdam’s analysis of the beneficiary class is not grounded in customary
international law. She focuses instead on the various
treaty-based regimes
which expressly or by interpretation give rise to a duty of
non-refoulement. See id. at 53-196. There is, however, no basis
in principle to distinguish the rights of persons entitled to protection against
refoulement under a treaty from those entitled to the same protection by
virtue of customary international
law.
[174]
“In the human rights context, however, [non-refoulement] has been
separated from these other rights to provide the trigger for protection without
any corresponding legal status. The result
is a protection gap”:
id. at
201.
[175]
Hathaway, Rights of Refugees, at
91-93.
[176] The
clear exception is Art. 3 of the Torture Convention, which contains an explicit
duty of non-refoulement yet does not define the rights of the beneficiary
class. Expert analysis of this treaty provides no explanation for the omission:
M. Nowak and E. McArthur, The United Nations Against Torture: A
Commentary
(2008).
[177]
“The strong theoretical claims of human rights law unfortunately do not
always sit comfortably with the realities of State
practice”: McAdam,
Complementary Protection, at 253.
[178]
“There is not yet a consistent understanding of what the resultant legal
status [of the beneficiaries of complementary protection]
should entail,
although this book advances the argument that a status identical to Convention
status ought to apply”: id. at 3; “Though a number of States
have traditionally respected these additional non-refoulement
obligations, they have been reluctant to grant beneficiaries a formal legal
status analogous to that enjoyed by Convention refugees”:
id. at 5;
“States have sought to distinguish them from refugees by granting them
fewer rights and entitlements”: id. at 11; “In many cases,
healthcare, employment, social security, and other rights which Convention
refugees receive are denied.
Accordingly, the extent of protection may be
little more than non-refoulement through time”: id. at
17.
[179]
Id. at
210.
[180]
Id. at
11.
[181]
Id. at
198.
[182]
Id. at
220.
[183]
“... [T]here is no legal justification for differentiating the rights of
beneficiaries of international protection based on
the source of the
protection need”: id. at
197.
[184] Civil
and Political Covenant. McAdam does not, however, explicitly reference this
critical provision. But see J. Hathaway, Label, at 8; and especially
Pobjoy, Treating like
alike.
[185]
See Hathaway, Rights of Refugees, at
123-147.
[186]
“... [T]he Convention operates as a lex specialis for all
persons in need of international protection – a specialized blueprint for
legal status, rights, and obligations, irrespective
of the legal source of the
protection obligation (emphasis added)”: McAdam, Complementary
Protection, at 17; “... [B]eneficiaries of complementary protection
are entitled to the same legal status as Convention refugees... (emphasis
added): id. at 197; “... [T]he extended scope of
non-refoulement under international human rights and humanitarian law
imposes a two-fold obligation on States: to refrain from removing persons
to territories where they face a substantial threat of particular
kinds of
ill-treatment; and to provide such persons with a legal status equivalent to
that of Convention refugees (emphasis added)”:
id. at
252.
[187]
Indeed, McAdam speaks of the beneficiaries of complementary protection as
“... refugees who fall outside the framework of
the major international
treaties, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol”: id.
at 1.
[188]
Id. at
11.
[189]
Id. at
209.
[190]
“Non-refoulement is certainly the most fundamental principle of
refugee law – indeed, its application to persons in need of international
protection
might be described as ‘qualifying’ or
‘constitutive’ of their status. The question, who are the
beneficiaries
of international protection?, is a converse way of asking, who is
protected by the principle of non-refoulement?”: id. at
200.
[191]
Hathaway, Rights of Refugees, at 302 ff. Indeed, the duty of
non-refoulement did not appear in pre-1933 refugee conventions, having
been added then as an afterthought to fill a perceived void in the scope of
Art.
32's duty of non-expulsion:
id.
[192]
McAdam, Complementary Protection, at
209.
[193]
Id. at
11.
[194]
Id. at
1.
[195] It
should, however, be acknowledged that generic international human rights law in
some instances offers protections that exceed
the scope of guarantees in the
Refugee Convention itself. For example, rights to both physical security and to
access the necessities
of life, not codified in refugee law, can be established
for refugees and other non-citizens by reliance on the Human Rights Covenants.
See Hathaway, Rights of Refugees, at
439-514.
[196]
McAdam at some points attempts an historical argument. “... [I]f
historical definitions are considered, then persons who
today ‘only’
fall within complementary protection would in some cases have been recognized as
refugees under formal legal
definitions, and persons who today fall within
article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention may in the past have been denied
protection”:
id. at 198. Assuming the point to be accurate, it
nonetheless has no necessary present legal significance for purposes of
interpreting
the (present, Art. 1(A)(2)-based) refugee definition.
[197] In the
European context of primary concern to McAdam, however, there is actually little
value to be secured by assimilation of the
rights of subsidiary protection
beneficiaries to those of Convention refugees. As set out at note 11
supra, the main difference in rights allocation between these groups
within Europe concerns the length of residence permits and availability
of
family reunification – neither being a subject regulated by the Refugee
Convention. Non-discrimination analysis is thus
a more plausible basis to close
the gap on these and most other points. See Pobjoy, Treating like
alike.
[198]
“... [H]uman rights law alone does not provide a sufficient status for
beneficiaries of complementary protection. Despite
the theoretical universality
of human rights law, in reality characteristics such as nationality or formal
legal status can significantly
affect the extent of rights an individual is
actually accorded... [O]nly the Refugee Convention creates a mechanism –
refugee
status – by which [rights] attach, and which does not permit
derogation”: id. at 12-13; “... [T]he beneficiaries of
complementary protection are entitled to the same legal status as Convention
refugees,
given their analogous circumstances and the Convention’s
function as a form of lex specialis for persons protected by the norm
of non-refoulement”: id. at
197.
[199]
Id. at
212.
[200] At
one point, McAdam suggests that “... it would in any case be futile for
instruments like the CAT to enumerate the legal
status arising from the
application of non-refoulement since the Refugee Convention (as the
lex specialis) already provides an appropriate legal status for any
person protected by that principle”: id. At 209-210. Putting to
one side the mis-characterization of the Refugee Convention as lex
specialis, there is surely no prohibition against other treaties providing
for differently defined protected status of their beneficiaries.
The Convention
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, for example, does precisely that (a
point ironically noted by McAdam,
id. at 212). Yet McAdam goes so far as
to insist that the fact that Art. 1(A)(1) of the Refugee Convention –
which assimilated
pre-World War II so-called “statutory refugees” to
Convention refugees for purposes of rights entitlement – “...
mandates against the creation of additional statuses for persons in need
of international protection who do not fall within the Convention
definition...
(emphasis added)”: id. at
210.
[201]
McAdam rightly invokes the intention of the drafters of the Refugee Convention
that the treaty “[e]xpress[ed] the hope that
the Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees will have value as an example exceeding its contractual
scope and that all nations
will be guided by it in granting so far as possible
to persons in their territory as refugees and who would not be covered by the
terms of the Convention, the treatment for which it provides [Final Act of the
Conference of Plenipotentiaries, Rec. E]”: id. at 11. But that
hortatory statement is no basis to insist that this is a binding
obligation. Cf. McAdam, Complementary Protection, at 209,
referring to the “... Convention’s function as a ‘charter of
minimum rights to be guaranteed to refugees,’
which the drafters envisaged
would extend to additional groups of refugees (emphasis
added).”
[202]
“The maxim lex specialis derogat lex generali is usually dealt with
as a conflict rule. However, it need not be limited to conflict. In the
Neumann case, the European Court of Human Rights observed that the
provision on compensation in case of unlawful arrest... was not lex
specialis in relation to the general rule on compensation... The former did
not set aside the latter but was to be ‘taken into account’
when
applying the latter. In both cases – that is, either as an application of
or an exception to the general rule –
the point of the lex
specialis rule is to indicate which rule should be applied. In both cases,
the special, as it were, steps in to replace the general”:
International
Law Commission (ILC), “Fragmentation of International Law: Topic (a): The
function of the lex specialis rule and the question of
‘self-contained regimes’: An outline” (2005)
(“Fragmentation”), at
4.
[203] G.
Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice
(1986), Vol. I, at 371.
[204] The
exception may be in relation to what are usually referred to as
“self-contained regimes” – in Pauwelyn’s
view, for
example, including WTO law. Where a self-contained regime exists, lex
specialis may completely oust the application of more general norms: J.
Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (2003), at 488.
But McAdam clearly does not view refugee law as lex specialis in this
strong sense. Rather, she correctly argues that “[h]uman rights law not
only provides an additional source of protection
for persons with an
international protection need, but also strengthens the status accorded to
all refugees through its universal application”: McAdam,
Complementary Protection, at 253; and “[s]ince universal human
rights law is coextensive with Convention status, it follows both as a matter of
principle
and of law that Convention status should not be used to read down
rights. Rather, where human rights law provides more favourable
standards,
these should be interpolated to improve Convention rights”: id. at
11.
[205] ILC,
“Fragmentation”, at
7.
[206] V.
Conde, Dictionary of International Humanitarian Law (1999), at
82.
[207]
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion),
[1996] ICJ Rep 226, at
240.
[208]
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory (Advisory Opinion), [2004] ICJ Rep 136, at 178, para.
106.
[209] By
way of an example of an argument invoking lex specialis in order to
ground the continued relevance of specialized norms despite the subsequent
development of less generous but broader norms,
see A. Edwards,
“Crossing Legal Borders: The Interface Between Refugee Law, Human Rights
Law and Humanitarian Law in the ‘International
Protection’ of
Refugees,” in R. Arnold and N. Quenivet eds., International
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in
International Law 421, at 429
(2008).
[210] H.
Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace (1625), translated by A.C. Campbell,
Book II, Ch. XVI, s.XXIX, at
183.
[211] In any
event, the result of such a characterization would not be to give rights to
additional classes of non-removable non-citizens,
but rather to deny to refugees
the benefit of generic human rights entitlements, a position which McAdam
clearly does not support:
McAdam, Complementary Protection, at 11, 253.
“... [T]he [Refugee] Convention is not to be treated as lex
specialis enabling one to restrict the implications of general human rights
law”: P. Mathew, “Review: J. Hathaway, The Rights
of Refugees under
International Law,” (2008) 102(1) American Journal of International Law
206, at
207.
[212]
“... [T]he concept of a ‘source’ of a rule of law is
important, since it enables rules of law to be identified
and distinguished from
other rules (in particular from rules de lege ferenda)...”:
Jennings and Watt, Oppenheim’s, at
23.
[213] See
Hathaway, Rights of Refugees, at Chapter
1.1.5.
[214]
R. (European Roma Rights Centre and others) v. Immigration Officer at Prague
Airport, [2003] EWCA Civ 666 (Eng. CA, May 20, 2003), at para.
28.
[215]
Id. at para. 45, citing the decision on preliminary objections in
Cameroon v. Nigeria, [1998] ICJ Rep 2, at para.
39.
[216]
Applicant “A” and Anor v. Minister of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, (1997) 190 CLR 225 (Aus. HC, Feb. 24, 1997) per
Dawson J, adopted in R. (European Roma Rights Centre and others) v.
Immigration Officer at Prague Airport, [2003] EWCA Civ 666 (Eng. CA, May 20,
2003), at para.
36.
[217]
See text supra at notes
3-7.
[218]
“Universally recognized treaties can be achieved, but they require
political will, compromise, and attention to the sensibilities
of all
perspectives... If the goal is a world legal order, then the attempts to
universalize standards, without the participation
and consent of states, impede
progress rather than promote it”: Kelly, Twilight, at 539-543.
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