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University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series |
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Last Updated: 15 June 2009
Debt-for-development Exchanges: The Origins of a Financial Technique
Ross P Buckley[*]
Citation
This paper was published in the Law & Development Review (2009) 2.
Abstract
Debt-for-development exchanges grew out of debt-equity exchanges and now include debt-for-nature, debt-for-education and debt2health exchanges, among other variants. The history of the evolution of this idea sheds considerable light upon the the technique and allows a more nuanced appreciation of it.
I. Introduction
The beginning was in the
early 1980s. And in the beginning were bad loans, and from the loins of these
bad loans sprang debt-equity
exchanges, which quickly begat debt-for-nature
exchanges, and then debt-for-education exchanges, and most recently,
debt-for-health
exchanges. And today, when all the begatting has been done, the
progeny are known mostly as debt-for-development exchanges, or sometimes
as
debt-for-investment projects (by those who wish to suggest for the technique a
more commercial
focus).[1]
This
article is an analysis of the begatting – an examination of how a
technique evolved to direct funds that would otherwise
have serviced foreign
indebtedness into financing development efforts in debtor nations.
Debt-for-development exchanges matter. In 2005 the United Nations urged
developed nations to seek a ‘durable solution to the
debt problems of
developing countries’, and further noted that ‘such mechanisms may
include debt for sustainable development
swaps,’[2] and in
2007 the European Network on Debt and Development noted that ‘debt-swaps
have a real and growing presence on the political
agendas of donor
countries.’[3]
So it is worth understanding where these techniques came from, and how they
evolved. Indeed, it is the history of the evolution of
the idea that explains
the technique’s quaint title. For, as my wife pointed out,
Where is the exchange when a rich country offers to cancel some of its loans to a poor country, if the poor country spends money on a development project? That’s like our saying to our daughter, ‘You don’t have to repay the advance we gave you last week, provided you spend half of it next week’.
The history explains all this. Not the shopping proclivities of young women,
the author is insufficiently erudite to do that, but
the title and evolution of
a significant financial technique.
But first we must begin, and in the
beginning bad loans were needed, loans that traded at a discount to their face
value. For without
a discount there is no reason to undertake debt-for-equity
exchanges, and debt-for-development exchanges, while certainly still worthwhile
without a source of discounted debt, certainly lose some of their attraction.
Sadly, bad loans are rarely in short supply; and oceans of bad loans became
available in late 1982. In mid-August, 1982 Mexico announced
the suspension of
principal payments on its foreign debt and the debt crisis
began.[4] Shortly
afterwards, Brazil, Argentina and other Latin American nations announced they
required substantial additional funding to
avoid defaulting on their
debts.[5] Commercial
banks stopped virtually all lending to the region and, within 15 months, 27
countries had rescheduled their debt or were
in the process of doing
so.[6] More were to
follow.
The traditional sources of foreign capital for Latin America before
1970 were bonds, direct investment, official loans and supplier’s
credits.[7] Thus each
wave of defaults was not a crisis for the international financial system as the
losses fell upon a broad range of individual
investors and suppliers, not on a
relatively small number of
banks.[8] The
development of the United States (‘US’) in the nineteenth century
was mainly financed by issuing bonds, principally
to European non-bank
investors,[9] and the
defaults, of which there were
plenty,[10] therefore
did not threaten the financial system.
In the early 1970s, aided by the
development of syndicated loans, the major commercial banks began to lend to
Latin America. The
lenders were now banks, not investors in bonds or projects
or exports to the
region.[11] For the
first time in history the major thrust of development finance was commercial
bank lending.[12] The
pace of lending accelerated throughout the decade. The total external debt of
the seventeen highly indebted
countries[13] in 1975
was US$76.6
billion.[14] This
doubled by 1979, and doubled again by 1982, to a total of US$276.5
billion.[15]
Certainly,
when Mexico’s inability to service its debt triggered the debt crisis,
there was an abundance of bad loans to be
used in debt exchanges. However, to
facilitate the process there needed to be a market upon which entities
interested in initiating
debt-for-development exchanges could acquire the debt.
II. The Secondary Market in Discounted Debt
A form of secondary market for the discounted debt of
less developed countries and their corporations had ‘existed on a
relatively
small scale since well before the onset of the crisis in
1982’.[16] But
the secondary market really began to grow after
1982.[17] I have
written at length elsewhere about the development of this secondary
market.[18]
The
market began as a swap market in which a US bank with one or two loans to Poland
in its portfolio might swap them with a German
bank for some Latin American
loans that the German bank no longer wanted. Each bank was refocusing its
portfolio on regions of the
world it knew best, or, at least, to which it had
sizable exposures. After some months, some brave and wise bankers began to
actually
sell loans, and absorb the losses. In the words of Lee Buchheit,
Fortunate indeed are those bankers who in 1983 sold off their Argentine exposure at a 15 or 20% discount although, at the time, this was accompanied by a good deal of hand-wringing, tooth-gnashing and piteous wailing about the cruelty of international lending.[19]
This secondary market provided the source of funds that were soon to be used in debt-equity exchanges and debt-for-nature exchanges.
III. Debt-Equity Exchanges
Debt-equity agreements involve the sale of external
debt by an investor to the debtor government in return for a discounted amount
of local currency which must then be invested in shares in, or otherwise
injected as capital into, a local
company.[20] Their
attraction for investors and debtor nations is that the secondary market
discount is “recaptured” and divided
between them. In effect a
debt-equity exchange results in some debt relief for the debtor nation, and a
preferential exchange rate
for the foreign
investor.[21] In
exchange for this preference there are usually limitations. Often eligible
investment is limited to certain industries and has
to meet certain requirements
and there are usually limitations on the repatriation of capital and the
remittance of dividends. Furthermore,
many countries nominate only a portion of
their outstanding indebtedness as being eligible for conversion into
equity.
In a typical scheme the central bank of the debtor nation announces
that the debt can be swapped at a certain rate for equity in local
businesses or
used for capital investments in the debtor nation. The rate of exchange of
debt-for-equity may be set by the central
bank (for instance, the central bank
may stipulate that it will retain 12 cents on the dollar so that, for every
dollar tendered,
the investor receives local currency to the value of 88 cents).
Alternatively, the rate may be set by an auction so that investors
bid for the
right to convert debt into equity and those willing to accept the largest
discounts receive the right to convert their
debt.[22] For
instance, in 1986 Nissan acquired some US$60 million of Mexican government debt
on the secondary market at a price of US$40 million.
It then resold the debt to
the Mexican central bank for US$54 million in pesos for investment into its
Mexican subsidiary. As a result
some US$60 million in Mexican government debt
was cancelled and Nissan was able to inject some US$54 million of equity into
its Mexican
operation for a cost of US$40
million.[23] In other
words, as a result of this debt-equity exchange Nissan received a preferential
exchange rate some 35% better than the market
rate.
In summary, debt-equity
schemes can increase investment and permit debtor nations to recapture part of
the secondary market discount
in the value of their loans at the cost of
conferring a preferential exchange rate upon foreign investors.
Chile was
the first country to implement a formal debt-equity swap programme in 1985,
which, in time, proved to be perhaps the most
successful debt-equity scheme of
all. Within the first three years, Chile reduced its external debt by some
US$3.8 billion, or 19
per
cent.[24]
Chile’s ability to operate the debt-swap program consistently over a
prolonged period encouraged foreign investment in addition
to that which
otherwise would have been made. Strict limitations on the repatriation of
principal and the remission of dividends
abroad restricted the drain on
Chile’s foreign exchange reserves and, perhaps most importantly,
Chile’s economy had a
remarkable capacity to absorb credit without leading
to inflation. These factors allowed the program to be opened to local investors
which promoted its acceptance by the Chilean
people.[25] Despite
its apparent success it had been suggested that the rapid decline in foreign
direct investment (FDI) that occurred upon
the scheme’s termination
resulted from market saturation and the inferior quality of remaining investment
opportunities.[26]
Mexico’s
debt-equity scheme commenced in April 1986 and had retired US$3 billion of
Mexico’s US$107 billion foreign debt
when it was suspended in November
1987.[27] It had to be
suspended for the scheme was highly inflationary. Rather than issuing bonds, as
Chile had done, Mexico printed pesos,
which led to inflation. The exchange rate
afforded to inbound investments by the scheme was highly preferential and the
scheme,
in the main, only supported investments that would have been made anyway
(as will virtually always be the case in schemes of short
duration due to the
long lead times of international investment
decisions).[28]
The
popularity of debt-equity schemes was further enhanced in this period by the
liberalization of US banking regulations. US banks
had been limited to holding
20 per cent of the equity in any nonfinancial company. Regulation K was amended
by the Federal Reserve
Board in August 1987 to permit 100 per cent ownership of
nonfinancial companies in the 33 most heavily indebted less developed countries
provided the companies were state-owned and the acquisitions were from the
government[29] –
a change enacted specifically to promote debt-equity
privatizations.[30]
Debt-equity
exchanges have also had their vociferous critics. In the words of Rudiger
Dornbusch,
Washington has been obscene in advocating debt-equity swaps
and in insisting that they be part of the debt strategy. The U.S. Treasury
has
made this dogma, and the IMF and the World Bank, against their staff’s
professional advice and judgment, have simply caved
in.[31]
The
principal objections of the critics have been the extent to which debt-equity
schemes proved to be inflationary, and, because
these inflationary consequences
meant most schemes couldn’t be maintained for more than about 18
consecutive months, the failure
of the schemes to encourage additional
investment. The short tenors of most schemes meant that a preferential exchange
rate was,
in effect, granted to inbound investment that was going to come into
the country anyway. The potential for such an exchange rate
to encourage
genuinely additional investment was lost due to the relatively long lead times
for foreign investment and the relatively
short periods nations could afford to
operate these schemes before inflationary pressures became so extreme the scheme
had to be
shut down. As we will consider below, debt-for-development exchanges
do not suffer from these weaknesses: they don’t tend to
be inflationary,
and as their goal is not to generate additional investment, if they are not run
consistently this doesn’t
have any particular downside.
IV. Debt-for-Nature Exchanges
The idea of debt-for-nature exchanges was first
proposed in 1984, and debt-equity schemes had shown the way. In the words of one
market
participant, ‘the ideas for debt-for-nature didn’t really get
off the ground until debt-equity programs had been launched...Really
these
programs can be viewed as
son-of-debt-equity’.[32]
The
idea of utilising debt swaps for environmental purposes, in the model of a
debt-for-equity exchange, is generally credited to
Dr Thomas Lovejoy. In 1984,
when Vice-President of the World Wildlife Fund, Dr Lovejoy suggested that
creditors should give discounts
to debtor nations who were investing in
environmental
protection.[33] He
urged environmental NGOs to finance conservation through the use of the
debt-swap model, by investing in discounted debt on the
secondary
market.[34] Two broad
forms of debt-for-nature exchanges have developed. In the first form a
nation’s debts are purchased and offered
to it for cancellation in
exchange principally for its ongoing protection of a designated part of its
land. In the second form of
debt-for-nature exchanges, the debt is exchanged
for local currency which is then used by local conservation groups (often in
association
with international conservation groups) for various environmental
projects in the debtor country.
An example of a debt-for-nature exchange
involving commercial debt purchased on the secondary market, is the first
debt-for-nature
exchange, in July 1987, in which Conservation International (a
US conservation group) purchased about $650,000 face value of Bolivian
debt for
$100,000. Under an agreement previously reached with the Bolivian government,
the external debt was cancelled in exchange
for two commitments: (i) the
protection by legislation of some 1.2 million acres of biosphere reserve and
regional park and some
2.8 million acres of adjoining forest reserve as a buffer
zone, and (ii) the establishment of an operational fund in local currency
to the
equivalent of $250,000 or the ongoing management and protection of the biosphere
reserve.[35]
Early
projects in which environmental NGOs engaged in swapping debt-for-nature
encouraged the proliferation of debt exchange mechanisms
using bilateral
official debt and agreements negotiated directly between governments. The first
government-to-government exchange
was in 1989 between the Netherlands and Costa
Rica.[36] The advent
of government debt exchanges opened up a far wider pool of resources for use in
debt exchanges.[37]
It did however raise a plethora of additional concerns, including issues of
compliance and enforceability, and brought to the fore
the political dimension
surrounding the implementation of such projects. The debt-for-nature exchange
between the Netherlands and
Costa Rica was the first debt exchange agreement to
incorporate compliance provisions. Both nations had to approve the conservation
agreement and were able to inspect the accounts of ongoing projects.
Additionally, both nations were able to suspend funding on any
project the
progress of which they did not
approve.[38]
The
largest debt-for-nature exchange to date occurred in Poland, through the
creation of the EcoFund in 1992. In 1991 the Paris Club
agreed to forgive 50%
of Poland’s US$32 billion dollar debt, which had become
unsustainable.[39] The
Paris Club also authorised an additional debt reduction of 10% from other
creditors.[40] Six
countries restructured debt agreements with Poland, with the interest paid into
the EcoFund for purposes of environmental preservation.
In total US$473 million
in local currency was invested in the fund. The US was the largest contributor,
contributing US$367 million
for EcoFund
projects.[41]
The
circumstances generating such large debt concessions were a desire to support
reforms taking place in post-communist Poland, with
Western governments taking
strong interest in its
transition.[42] The
EcoFund provides grants to approved conservation projects. Projects approved
have been in the areas of transboundary air pollution,
climate change,
biological diversity and the Baltic
Sea.[43] Between 1992
and 2007 the EcoFund has financed 1,500 programs. All financing agreements were
arranged for annual payments until
the year
2010.[44]
Debt-for-nature
exchanges of bilateral debt between governments have been supported in the US
through legislative initiatives. The
first legislation to enable bilateral debt
to be swapped for conservation projects was the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative Act (‘EAI’) in 1990. The EAI allowed Latin American
and Caribbean countries to reduce the level of bilateral debt owed to
the US and
then re-directed a proportion of debt repayments into a fund to support local
environmental
programs.[45] By 1993
the US had signed agreements with seven nations, with US$875 million of debt
forgiven and the local currency equivalent
of US$154 million used in funds for
environmental
purposes.[46]
Modelled on the EAI, the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) of
1998 extended eligibility for debt-for-nature exchanges past Latin American and
Caribbean nations in the field of tropical
forest conservation. It empowered the
President to authorise debt reductions, debt-buy-backs and debt-for-natures
exchanges. For
example, the Philippines and the US signed a debt-for-nature
agreement in September 2002 in which the US agreed to cancel US$5.5
million of
Filipino debt. In return the Philippine Government agreed to fund tropical
conservation activities through local NGOs
in the
Philippines.[47] The
Philippines agreed to apply in local currency the amount it would save in debt
service repayments over the next 14 years to conservation
activities over that
period.[48] To date
thirteen TFCA agreements have been conducted in twelve countries, which will
generate more than US$163 million for tropical
forest
conservation.[49] A
fourteenth pact with Peru was announced in late 2008 with an agreement to
redirect US$25 million of Peru’s debt into local
funds to protect
rainforests. With the execution of this agreement Peru will become the largest
beneficiary of initiatives under
this Act, with more than US$35 million
generated for conservation
projects.[50]
The
US has not been alone in pursuing debt-for-nature agreements. In 2004 Germany
and Indonesia entered into a debt-for-environment
agreement under which some
US$29.25 million of debt was
cancelled.[51]
Indonesia and Germany have hinted at the possibility of further debt-exchange
agreements to curtail the effects of climate change
and limit the level of
deforestation.[52]
V. Debt-for-Education Exchanges
Some three years after the early debt-for-nature
exchanges, it was realised that the promotion of education could replace nature
conservancy
as the purpose of the exchange. Debt-for-education exchanges are
another application of the basic principle that the acquisition
of debt and its
tender to the debtor nation for discharge can, by virtue of the debt’s
secondary market discount, magnify the
purchasing power of hard currency for
local currency.[53]
Indeed, in the first debt-for-education exchange, Harvard University multiplied
its purchasing power almost three
times.[54]
In 1990
Harvard University and Ecuador entered into a debt-for-education agreement.
Pursuant to the agreement, Harvard acquired $5
million of Ecuadorian debt in the
secondary market and exchanged these loans with the Central Bank of Ecuador for
50 percent[55] of
their face value in local currency bonds. As Harvard acquired the loans at a
price of 15.5 percent of face value their total investment
was
$775,000.[56] The
bonds were transferred to a local Ecuadorian educational foundation, formed for
the purpose. This foundation sold the bonds in
Ecuador and used the proceeds to
purchase US dollars in the local market. The proceeds amounted to some $2
million, or almost three
times Harvard’s initial contribution. These
funds, now owned by the local foundation, were invested in the US. The
investments
were designed to realise about $150,000 per annum of which about 85
percent was used to fund scholarships for Ecuadorian students
to attend Harvard
and the balance was to fund local costs for research and study in Ecuador by
Harvard faculty and
students.[57]
Since
then Germany has undertaken three debt-for-education exchanges with Indonesia
and one with Pakistan, and Spain has undertaknen
debt-for-education exchanges
with Ecuador (US$50 million), Nicaragua ($38.9 million), Honduras ($138.3
million), El Salvador (10
million), Bolivia (72 million) and Peru (US$11 million
and 6 million euro). France has entered into exchanges to benefit education
with
Cameroon, Mauritania, Tanzania, Nicaragua and Uruguay. In most of these
exchanges, the proceeds have been directed to funding
local schools in the
debtor nation. The Harvard model described above has proven to be highly unusual
and not generally copied in
later exchanges, although in one of the French
exchanges a centre for scientific research and education was funded in the
debtor
nation.[58]
After
the acceptance of debt-for-nature and debt-for-education exchanges, it was more
than a decade before the application of the
technique was extended again, this
time to health.
VI. Debt-for-Health Exchanges
The adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in
2000 created a greater awareness of the need to foster development in
impoverished
nations, and of the importance of population health to this
process.[59] Indeed,
health epidemics threaten progress on all other development
goals.[60] The
Declaration of Commitment on AIDS/HIV was adopted in June 2001 by all UN member
states. It holds that ‘the HIV/AIDs challenge
cannot be met without new,
additional and sustained resources.’ Importantly for our purposes, the
Declaration supported ‘debt
swaps for projects aimed at the prevention,
care and treatment of
HIV/AIDs.’[61]
Debt exchange programs to generate funding to address HIV/AIDS and other serious
epidemics have been vigorously promoted by the UN,
in part for the potential to
create publicity ‘of the need to join forces in the fight against the
HIV/AIDS epidemic’
and in the hope that this publicity would lead to
further private
donations;[62] and, in
part as simply another way to generate funds to tackle the HIV epidemic.
The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, is another UN
initiative. It is a public-private partnership which seeks
to finance public
health initiatives in developing
countries.[63] The
Global Fund currently finances two-thirds of all international investments in
fighting malaria and tuberculosis and provides
more than 20% of world-wide
funding for AIDS
prevention.[64] In
2007 it launched its Debt2Heath initiative, a debt exchange program to fight
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. The Global Fund
proposed itself as a third
party in debt exchange negotiations which seek to persuade creditor nations to
forgo payment of sovereign
debts if the debtor nation pays a portion of the
amount owed in local currency to the Global Fund. Debt2Health is the first time
debt-for-development exchanges have been organised through ‘triangular
arrangements’ involving a multilateral organisation.
The Global Fund has
adopted debt exchange techniques to diversify its resource base and free up
domestic resources. The Global Fund’s
commitment is that all funds
generated by debt exchanges will go towards financing grants, and none will be
subsumed in administrative
costs.[65]
A
two-year pilot phase was announced in 2007, with Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan and
Peru eligible to
participate.[66]
Germany was the first donor participant in the program and committed to cancel
EUR 50 million of its debt from Indonesia if Indonesia
invested EUR 25 million
in the Global Fund over a five- year period from 2008. Germany further agreed to
make available a total of
EUR 200 million for debt-for-health exchanges under
the initiative by 2010. The first instalment was paid by Indonesia in June
2008.[67] The
payments to the Global Fund are equal to and in lieu of the periodic interest
payments that would otherwise have been due to Germany,
which avoids any adverse
impact on the Indonesian
budget.[68]
Thus
far the only other agreement to be signed under the Debt2Health initiative has
been between Germany and Pakistan in November
2008. Germany agreed to cancel EUR
40 million in debt under an agreement by which Pakistan agrees to invest EUR 20
million with the
Global Fund. Annual payments of EUR 5 million will be made by
Pakistan, commencing in
2009.[69]
In 2007
the then Labour Opposition made a policy commitment to, if elected, enter into a
A$75 million debt exchange with Indonesia
through the Debt2Health initiative
stating it ‘is time for Australia to join other progressive aid
donors.’[70] The
commitment to the debt exchange has been sustained by the Rudd government now it
has assumed office, with assurances the exchange
will be undertaken later in
2009.[71] If
implemented, the debt exchange will see A$37.5 million invested by Indonesia in
the Global Fund in return for A$75 million of
debt being cancelled by
Australia.[72]
This
range of debt-for-development exchanges has a number of benefits.
VII. Advantages of Debt-for-Development Exchanges
This financial technique has at least four
benefits:
1. Debt-for-development exchanges promote debt reduction. Debt
reduction is critically important for many developing countries. In
2005, the
G-8 nations resolved that the IMF, the concessional lending arm of the World
Bank and the African Development Fund should
totally cancel all of their debts
to poor countries that comply with the requirements of the World Bank’s
debt relief program,
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative. This
resolution became known as the MDRI, the Multilateral Debt Reduction Initiative.
This total cancellation of debt will certainly assist those nations that receive
it, but only 24 nations currently qualify for such
total debt cancellation, and
only a further 17 can potentially become eligible in the
future.[73]
Yet
many nations not nearly poor enough to qualify for such relief labour under
stultifying debt overhangs. For instance in 2007
Indonesia’s total
external debt stood at US$137.4 billion, which was 31.7% of GDP, and represented
104.5% of total
exports.[74] In 2008
the Philippines total external debt was US$53.5 billion which represented 33.4%
of GDP.[75]
Debt-for-development exchanges offer debt relief to debt-constrained nations
such as these which are not eligible for relief under
HIPC initiatives.
2.
Debt-for-development exchanges can be attractive to donor countries. Exchanges
give donor countries considerable control over
how the debtor country will spend
the funds it, and the debtor country no longer has to commit to debt servicing.
Well structured
exchanges can also promote transparency and accountability in
the ways that the savings generated by debt relief are applied.
3.
Debt-for-development exchanges camouflage debt relief for donor countries. Debt
relief is often a politically sensitive topic
in donor countries. For instance,
the announcement by the Australian government of the Debt2Health exchange with
Indonesia was greeted
with nary an adverse comment in the Australian media. Yet
if the Australian government had announced the straight cancellation of
A$75
million of debt owed by Indonesia one would anticipate considerable adverse
comment in the media, and perhaps the radio ‘shock-jocks’
picking up
on the development and arguing that here is another A$75 million that Indonesia
can now use to buy arms to use, one day,
against Australia (as utterly unlikely
as such a development is in geo-strategic terms). The delivery of the debt
relief as part
of a debt-for-health exchange camouflaged it, and insured it
against such a reception. Exchanges make debt relief more politically
palatable
for donor country governments.
4. Debt-for-development exchanges allow
creditors to advance ends that serve the creditor as well as the debtor. For
instance, Indonesia
and the Philippines are both on the flight paths of
migratory birds to Australia, and both have conditions ripe for the development
of an Avian influenza transmissible to, and spreadable by, humans. Accordingly,
if Australia were to enter into debt-for-development
exchanges with Indonesia
and the Philippines to fund Avian influenza mitigation efforts in those nations,
this would benefit both
donor and recipient
countries.[76]
VIII. Disadvantages of Debt-for-Development Exchanges
Debt-for-development exchanges have few downsides.
It is arguable that they entail a loss of sovereignty for the debtor nation
if the debt relief was going to be granted anyway by a
donor country, as the
exchange simply gives to the donor country a degree of control over how the
saved funds will be expended that
it would not otherwise have had. However, this
overlooks the fact that simple bilateral debt relief outside the HIPC or MDRI
frameworks
is not common, and debt-for-development exchanges surely encourage
many more instances of debt relief than they provide control over
the proceeds
of cancellations that would have occurred anyway.
It is also arguable that
exchanges may be used to get rid of illegitimate or odious debt.
Illegitimate debt is debt lent for irresponsible purposes, typically to
promote industries in the creditor, not the debtor, nation.
The best example of
debt being treated as illegitimate is to be found in the decision in 2006 by
Norway to cancel US$ 80 million
of its loans to a number of developing
countries, which loans had been extended to fund the purchase of vessels built
in Norway.
The debt was cancelled in recognition that the loans were made by
Norway to promote employment in its ship-building industry, not
responsibly to
aid the debtor nation’s
development.[77]
Odious debt is much a narrower concept than illegitimacy. The idea is that
sovereign debt is odious if (1) it is incurred for a purpose
does not benefit
the people of the debtor nation, and (2) it is incurred without the consent of
the people. The reasoning is that
“This debt is not an obligation for the
nation; it is a regime’s debt, a personal debt of the power that has
incurred
it, and consequently it falls with the fall of this
power.”[78] The
concept is that it is appropriate for a people to have to repay loans incurred
by a dictator without their consent if the loans
were used to build hospitals or
public infrastructure but not if the funds were used for purposes that
don’t benefit the
people.[79]
If a
donor government is choosing debt to offer up for use in an exchange it may be
likely to offer first for exchange debt which
may be illegitimate or odious.
This is natural – most governments will take an opportunity to bury past
actions which may have
about them a certain odour. This causes NGOs such as the
Jubilee Network to seek audits for all debt offered for use in exchanges
to
ensure illegitimate or odious debt is not used in
exchanges.[80] Clearly
it is preferable for illegitimate or odious debt to be cancelled outright
because it is illegitimate or odious. However,
if this is unlikely, and as
Norway is the only nation to step up to the plate so far in this regard it does
seem unlikely, the issue
for international civil society is whether, given the
crushing debt overhang in many poorer nations, it is better simply to support
all exchanges that result in the reduction of debt and the application of funds
to worthwhile developmental programs, without insisting
on the somewhat
idealistic requirement that debt used in these exchanges be audited to ensure it
is free from any taints whatsoever.
Apart from these two issues, there seems
to be few other grounds upon which objection to these exchanges is possible.
Certainly the
major criticism levelled at debt-equity schemes, that they are
highly inflationary, doesn’t apply to debt-for-development schemes
as they
have, perhaps sadly, never been operated at a scale sufficient to impact a
nation’s money supply.
IX. Scale of Debt-for-Development Exchanges
The scale of debt-for-development exchanges has far eclipsed the debt-for-nature exchanges out of which they grew. It was estimated that from 1987 to 1994 between US$ 750 million and US$ 1 billion face value of foreign debt was cancelled in debt-for-development exchanges[81] with UNICEF alone converting nearly US$ 193 million of debt-for-development.[82] In the same period, a total of about US$ 177 million of foreign debt was converted in debt-for-nature exchanges.[83] Since the mid-1990s the volume of debt exchanges has continued to grow. By 2003 the value of debt-for-nature exchanges was estimated to have reached over US$1 billion.[84] In 2007 Fundaciõn SES, Latindadd and the Organization of Iberoamerican States estimated that US$5.7 billion had been cancelled in debt-for-development exchanges, with some US$3.6 billion having, as a result, been invested to enhance development.[85]
X. Conclusion
This article has traced the birth and evolution of
an idea. The precursor idea, of swapping debt-for-equity, is not new. In the
1880s,
Peru crafted a resolution of its indebtedness in one, novel, massive
debt-equity exchange: British bonds were exchanged for stock
in Peruvian Corp.,
the owner of the state railways, lands and mining
concessions.[86]
Exchanging debt for equity is also often used by banks to resolve domestic
corporate defaults.
However, it was the swapping of external debt for equity
in national companies which gave commentators the idea of swapping external
debt
for nature conservancy efforts, and showed how the discount on the debt in the
secondary market multiplied the buying power
of the funds available for the
task. A truly innovative idea was thereby born.
Debt-for-development
exchanges have made only a tiny dent in the overall indebtedness of developing
nations; sadly the debt burdens
are too large for that. However to measure their
effect on debt levels is to miss the important roles they have played. Some
desperately
poor nations, such as Bolivia, have been able to reduce their
overall debt burden substantially and preserve some of their ravaged
environment, through debt-for-nature exchanges using donated funds. Costa Rica
received funding for conservation efforts where none
would otherwise have been
available. Villages in Peru, the Sudan and elsewhere have drinking water and
villages in Indonesia, Pakistan,
Nicaragua, and many other countries have
schools because of debt-for-development exchanges. Most recently, these
techniques have
begun to serve as a source of additional funds with which to
fight the scourges of HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis.
Debt-for-development exchanges have made a significant contribution to date
to development programs. The debt burden on developing
countries has severely
curtailed spending on health, education and other social programs and the need
to raise exports to service
the debt has often damaged the environment in those
countries. Debt-for-development exchanges have been important because they have
gone some small way to redressing these damaging social and environmental
impacts of external debt.
As the current Global Financial Crisis will
impact poorer nations more harshly than richer ones, and as the consequences
will be felt
for longer in poorer, and thus less resilient, economies,
debt-for-development exchanges have an even more important role to play
now in
seeking to offset some of the impacts of the Global Financial Crisis. The export
revenues of poorer nations are falling, in
some cases precipitately, as
commodity prices weaken and global trade flows contract. Most developing
countries do not have freely
convertible currencies and raise external capital
in foreign currency, so debt service needs to be funded from export revenues.
Contracting
export revenues will thus intensify the burden on these nations of
servicing their existing external debt. In addition, debt-for-development
exchanges offer funding for development projects that will be more needed than
ever, in this context of decreasing export income.
Creditor governments would be
well advised to make greater use of debt-for-development exchanges in the coming
years as measures
to reduce the impact of the global financial crisis upon
poorer and more vulnerable nations.
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[*]
B.Econ., LL.B. (Hons), Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Law, University of New South
Wales; Senior Fellow, Tim Fischer Centre for Global
Trade & Finance, Bond
University. Sincere thanks to Lara K. Hall for her invaluable research
assistance. All responsibility is
mine.
[1] R.P. Buckley
& A. Small, Leveraging Australia’s Debt Relief to the Philippines
Using Debt-for-Investment Projects, 7 Macquarie Law Journal (2007),
107.
[2] United
Nations General Assembly, Draft Resolution referred to the High-level Plenary
Meeting of the General Assembly by the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth
session:
2005 World Summit Outcome, 15 September
2005.
[3] Marta Ruiz,
Debt Swaps for Development: Creative Solution or Smoke Screen?, (European
Network on Debt and Development, October 2007), p.4, available at
<http://www.eurodad.org>
, accessed at 12 December
2008.
[4] Darrel
Delamaide, Debt Shock (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1984),
p.6.
[5] Allegra C.
Biggs, Nibbling away at the debt crisis: debt-for-nature swaps, 10 Annual
Review of Banking Law (1991), 436; and E. Webb, Debt for nature swaps: The
past, the present and some possibilities for the future, 11 Environmental
and Planning Law Journal (1994),
222.
[6] Philip A,
Wellons, Passing the Buck – Banks, Government and Third World Debt
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1987),
p.255.
[7] Richard A.
Debs, David L. Roberts & Eli M. Remolona, Finance for Developing
Countries – Alternative Sources of Finance – Debt Swaps (New
York & London: Group of Thirty, 1987) p.10; Marilyn E Skiles, Latin
American International Loan Defaults in the 1930s: Lessons for the 1980s?,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Research Paper No 8812, April 1988, 41-2.
Stallings notes that suppliers credits only became
significant after WWII; see
Barbara Stallings, Banker to the Third World: U.S. Portfolio Investment in
Latin America, 1900-1986 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1987)
pp.109-110.
[8] Frank
Griffith Dawson, The First Latin American Debt Crisis: The City of London and
the 1822-1825 Loan Bubble (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990) at
237; Delamaide (1984), supra note 4,
p.49.
[9] Delamaide
(1984), supra note 4, p.49; and Cleona Lewis, America’s Stake in
International Investments (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1938) at
pp.17-24, 30, 35, 36-39,
45-48.
[10]
Delamaide (1984), supra note 4, p.49, and Lewis (1983), supra note
9, pp.25-6, 35
&45-6.
[11]
Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, “After the Deluge: Default,
Negotiation, and Readjustment during the Interwar Years”,
ch 2 in
Eichengreen & Lindert (eds), The International Debt Crisis in historical
Perspective (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1989)
pp.40-1.
[12] Debs,
Roberts & Remolona (1987), supra note 7, p.10; and Delamaide (1984),
supra note 4,
p.49.
[13]
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire,
Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines,
Uruguay,
Venezuela &
Yugoslavia.
[14]
The World Bank, Developing Country Debt – Implementing a Consensus
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1987)
p.26.
[15] Jeffrey
D. Sachs, “Introduction” in Jeffrey D Sachs (ed), Developing
Country Debt and the World Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1989), p.9. For Instance, the net liabilities of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
to developed
country international banks increased from $56.6 billion in
December 1979 to $104.5 billion in December 1981; and almost as many
net loans
were made to the major debtors in 1981 and 1982 as the entire period from 1973
to 1979.
[16]
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Debt Equity Conversions
– A Guide for Decision-makers, (New York: United Nations, 1990)
(“UNCTC”).
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
R.P. Buckley, Emerging Markets Debt – An Analysis of the Secondary
Market (Kluwer, London, 1999) pp.1-330; and R.P. Buckley, A Force for
Globalisation: Emerging Markets Debt Trading from 1994 to 1999, 30 Fordham
International Law Journal (2007),
185-259.
[19] Lee
C. Buchheit, ‘Return of the Living Debt’, IFLR, (May 1990),
28.
[20] Paris
Club, Debt Swap Reporting: Rules and Principles (2006), available at
<www.clubdeparis.org/en/public_debt.html>, accessed at 12 January 2009.
[21] Debs,
Robertson & Remolona (1987), supra note 7, p.23. For an analysis of
the preferential exchange rate involved in debt-equity swaps, see George
Anayiotos & Jamie De
Pinies, The Secondary Market and the International
Debt Problem, 18 World Development 12 (1990),
1657.
[22] For two
contemporaneous accounts of debt-equity schemes, see Martin W. Schubert,
Trading Debt for Equity, The Banker, February 1987; and Martin W.
Schubert, Third World Debt as a Trading and Investment Tool, Countertrade
& Barter, April/May, 1987,
38.
[23] Eric N.
Berg, “U.S. Banks Swap Latin Debt”, The New York Times, 11 September
1986; Steven Freeland, Turning to a Trusted Friend: Using Debt Exchanges for
Environmental and Development Purposes, Australian International Law Journal
(2001), 105.
[24]
R.P. Buckley, Debt Exchanges Revisited: Lessons from Latin America for
Eastern Europe, Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business
(1998), 666.
[25]
Ibid.
[26]
Ibid.
[27]
Melanie Tammen, Energizing Third World Economies: The Role of Debt-Equity
Swaps (The Heritage Foundation:1989),
p.7.
[28]
Ibid.
[29]
12 CFR section 211.5(f). See also Eduardo C. G. de Faria, J. Andrew Scott &
Nigel J. C. Buchanan, PW/Euromoney Debt-Equity Swap Guide (London:
Euromoney Publications PLC, 1988) Ch 2, “U.S. Legal Considerations”;
Lee C Buchheit, The Capitalization of Sovereign Debt: An Introduction,
University of Illinois Law Review (1988), 410; and Lee C Buchheit,
“Banking Regulation: Federal Reserve Liberalises Foreign
Investment Rules
for US Banks”, [1987] 3 JIBL N-111 to
N-113.
[30] With
their potential for reducing both the debt burden on a country and the perceived
inefficiencies of state-owned enterprises.
See also David Spencer,
Regulation K Allows 100 Percent Ownership, IFLR (October 1987), 13-14,
citing the Federal Reserve Board’s commentary on the amendment. For an
example of a conversion
which took advantage of this liberalised regulatory
environment, see OCC Unpublished Interpretative Letter of Feb 27, 1989 from the
Comptroller of the Currency to the President, Miami National Bank, NA, (Ref 12
USC 29a, 12 USC 24(7)) -- the Comptroller approved a transaction in which the
named bank proposed to exchange its Argentine debt for Honduran debt and then
swap the Honduran debt for local currency with which to acquire 100% of the
common stock in a Honduran steel
foundry.
[31]
Rudiger Dornbusch, “Panel Discussion on Latin American Adjustment: The
Record and Next Steps” in John Williamson (ed),
Latin American
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington, DC: Institute for
International Economics, 1990),
p.324.
[32]
Randall Curtis, Director of Costa Rica’s debt-for-nature program for
the Nature Conservancy, quoted in The Debt-for-Nature Option, 2 Swaps
– The Newsletter of New Financial Institutions 11 (November 1988),
1.
[33] See Thomas
E. Lovejoy, “Aid Debtor Nations’s Ecology”, New York Times,
October 4, 1984, at
A31.
[34] Freeland
(2001), supra note 23. The World Wildlife Fund participated in its first
commercial debt-for-nature swap with Ecuador in 1987, see Conservation
Finance,
“Debt-for-nature Swaps”, available at:
<www.worldwildlife.org/what/howwedoit/conservationfinance/debtfornatureswaps.html>
accessed 15 December 2008.
[35] M.
Chamberlin, M. Gruson & P. Weltchek, Sovereign Debt Exchanges
University of Illinois Law Review (1988),
443-445.
[36]
Jenifer A. Loughrey, The Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998: Can the
United States really protect the world’s resources? The need for a
binding
international treaty convention on forests, 14 Emory International
Law Review (Spring 2000),
325.
[37] Freeland
(2001), supra note 23, 123.
[38] Amanda Lewis,
The evolving process of swapping debt for nature, 10 Colorado Journal of
International Environmental Law and Policy 2 (1999),
442.
[39] The Paris
Club is the name for the standing group of 19 governments with large claims on
other
governments.
[40]
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Swapping Debt
for Environment: The Polish EcoFund, (March 1998), 8, available at:
<www.cbd.int/doc/external/oecd/oecd-poland-1998-en.pdf> accessed at 11
February 2009.
[41] Pervaze A.
Sheikh, CRS Report for Congress: Debt-for-nature Initiatives and the Tropical
Forest Conservation Act, (11 October 2006), CRS-5, available at:
<www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/r131286.pdf> accessed 20 January 2009.
[42] Freeland
(2001), supra note 23,
126.
[43] OECD
(1998), supra note 40, 5.
[44] Environmental
Technologies Action Plan, Polish EcoFund Offers Template for Eco-innovation
funding, available at:
<http://ec/europa.eu/environment/etap/inaction/funcations/New/-Services/22_en.html>
,
accessed at 11 February 2009.
[45] United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), Innovative Financing for
Forest Conservation and the Environment: Tropical Forest Conservation Act
(TFCA), Enterprise for the America’s
Initiative (EAI), available at:
<www.usaid.gov/our_work/environment/foresty/tfca.html>,
accessed at 15 December 2008.
[46] Freeland
(2001), supra note 23, 134.
[47] US Department
of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs, Fact Sheet: US-Philippines
debt-Reduction Agreement Under the Tropical Conservation
Act (TFCA), (19
September 2002) available at
<http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2002/020920/epf509.htm>
at 14 May 2009.
[48]
Ibid.
[49]
Bangladesh, El Salvador, Belize, Peru, the Philippines, Panama, Colombia,
Jamaica, Paraguay, Guatemala, Botswana, and Costa
Rica.
[50]
Daniel Gorellick, “United States, Peru Announce Debt-for-Nature
Agreement”, America.gov, 21 October
2008.
[51] Embassy
of the Republic of Indonesia, Indonesian – Germany Bilateral
Relations, (3 June 2006), available at:
<www.indonesia-embassy.de/en/about_indonesia/bilateral_relations.htm>
accessed 8 December 2008.
[52] Tony
Hotland, “RI-Germany eye cooperation around renewable energy
sources”, The Jakarta Post, 28 February 2008,
3.
[53] The
discount in the secondary market is of the essence of all of these debt
exchanges as noted, with respect to debt-for-nature
swaps, by Facundo
Gómes Minujín in Debt-for-Nature Swaps – A financial
mechanism to reduce debt and preserve the environment, 21 Environment and
Policy Law (1991),
147-148.
[54]
Jennifer F. Zaiser, Swapping Debt for Education: Harvard and Ecuador Provide
a Model for Relief,12 Boston College Third World Law Journal (1992),
157.
[55] The
Ecuadorian government drove a hard bargain here, recapturing 50% of the loans
value. The reason to insist upon such favorable
terms was probably to minimise
the inflationary impact of the local currency bonds which had to be issued to
“repurchase”
the
debt.
[56] Zaiser
(1992), supra note 54,
180-181.
[57]
Ibid 182-183.
[58]
UNESCO, Working Group on the Debt Swaps for Education, Draft Report for the
Director-General of UNESCO, (August 21, 2007), available at:
<www.unesco.org/education/EFAWGSDE/WGDSE_2nd_draftreportforDG_en.pdf>
,accessed 21 January
2009. See also UNESCO, Education for All, Final Report
of the First Meeting of the UNESCO Working Group on Debt swaps for
education, (2006) available at:
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/00153714e.pdf>
, accessed 21 January
2009.
[59]
For more, see United Nation, UN Millennium Development Goals
(‘MDGs’) <www.un.org/millenniumgoals>, accessed at 28
November 2006.
[60]
Sydney Rosen, Jonathon Simon, Donald Thea & Paul Zeitz, Exchanging
Debt-for-Health in Africa: Lessons from Ten Years of Debt-for-Development
Goals’, (Harvard Institute of International Development, November
1999), p.5.
[61]
UNAIDS, Debt-for-AIDS: UNAIDS Policy Brief (Geneva: UNAIDS, 2004),
p.7.
[62]
Ibid,
p.19.
[63] The
Global Fund has a Memorandum of Understanding with UNAIDS, which has been
renewed annually since 2003. Memorandum of Understanding
UNAIDS and The Global
Fund, available at: <www.hivpolicy.org/Library/HPP000216.pdf>, accessed 29
January 2009.
[64]
The Global Fund to fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Debt2Health:
Innovative Financing of the Global Fund, p.6, available at:
<www.theglobalfund.org/documents/publications/other/D2H/Debt2Health.pdf>,
accessed February 2, 2009.
[65] Ibid,
pp.7-12
[66]
The Global Fund to fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Q&A
Debt2Health, available at:
<www.theglobalfund.org/documents/innovativefinancing/FAQ_d2h_en.pdf>,
accessed February 2,
2009.
[67] Aditya
Suharmoko, “RI pursuing debt-swap mechanism”, The Jakarta Post, 24
June 2008, 14.
[68]
The Global Fund, supra note 64,
p.12.
[69] The
Global Fund to fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria, German Financial
Co-operation with Pakistan, (November 30, 2008), available at:
<www.thegloablfund/documents/innovativefinancing/DE-PK.pdf>, accessed 2
February 2009.
[70] Bob McMullan,
Media Release, Labor Will Swap Indonesia’s Debt for Health, 6 June
2007.
[71]
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 August
2008, 6250 (Stephen Smith, Minister for Foreign Affiars).
[72] Jubilee
Australia states that this contribution ‘could fund village and district
level support for at least 106,128 HIV tests,
the provision of AIDs treatments
for over 3,000 people and the purchase of 23,000 TB treatments’;Jubilee
Australia, Debt-for-Development Swap with Indonesia, (Jubilee Australia
Policy Paper, April 2007), p.
15.
[73]
International Monetary Fund, A Factsheet: Multilateral Debt Relief
Initiative, (Jan 2009,) available at:
<www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/mdri.htm>, accessed 10 December 2008.
[74] See
International Monetary Fund, Country Report No, 08/299, (September 2008),
available at: <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08299.pdf>,
accessed January 21 2009.
[75]
Philippines Quarterly Economic Update – January 2009, Report for
the World Bank, available at:
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPHILIPPINES/Resources/PhilippinesQuarterlyEconomicUpdateWorldBankJanuary2009asofJan23.pdf>
,
accessed 15 December
2008.
[76]
Buckley & Small (2007), supra note 1,
107.
[77] Ruiz
(2007), supra note 3, p.9. Norway makes ground-breaking decision to
cancel illegitimate debt,(European Network on Debt & Development,
October 3, 2006) available
at:<www.eurodad.org/whatsnew/articles.aspx?id=302>,
accessed 13 May 2009.
(includes text of official Norwegian government press release, in English).
[78] M. Kremer
& S. Jayachandran, IMF Seminar: Odious Debt (2002), 3-4, available
at: <www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2002/poverty/mksj.pdf>,
accessed 17 February
2005.
[79] R. Rajam
‘Odious or just Malodorous?’(2004) December Finance and
Development 54, at 54-5; P. Adams, Iraq’s Odious Debts Cato
Institute Policy Analysis N0. 526 (2004), at 2; M. Kremer and S. Jayachandran,
Id, at 3-4.
[80]
See, for example, Jubilee USA, Recent Developments on Odious and Illegitimate
Debt, (April 2008), available at:
<www.jubileeusa.org/?id=111>.
[81]
J. Kaiser & A. Lambert, Debt Swaps for Sustainable Development A
Practical Gude for NGO’s 14 (ICUN,1996). Much of the debt converted in
debt-for-development swaps was official bilateral debt (i.e. loans made by
developed
nations to the LDCs) and was donated for the purpose by the developed
nations. For instance, in 1994 Canada forgave 75% of the C$
22.7 million of
Peru’s official bilateral debt and converted the balance for development
purposes. Similar arrangements were
entered into between Finland and Peru
(1995), Germany and Peru (1994), Switzerland and Bulgaria (1995) and the United
States and
the Philippines (1995): Id at
8.
[82] Ibid
16.
[83]
Ibid
12-13.
[84] Romy
Greiner & Allyson Lankeste, Debt-for-conservation swaps: a possible
financial incentive for on-farm biodiversity conservation, Paper presented
at the 50th Annual conference of the Australian Agricultural and Resource
Economics Society, Sydney 7-10 February
2006, available at
<http://www.riverconsulting.com.au/reports/Greiner_Lankester_AARES-2006.pdf>
,
accessed 21 February
2009.
[85] Working
Group on Debt Swaps for Education (2007), supra note 58,
5.
[86] Carlos
Marichal, A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1989); Werner Baer & Kent Hargis, Forms of
External Capital and Economic Development in Latin America: 1820-1997, 25
World Development 11 (Nov 1997), 1805-1820.
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